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 COLLECTIVE ACTION OR COLLECTIVE INACTION: 
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE  
IN TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 
Mark Wintz, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
This dissertation examines influence and decision-making within the transatlantic 
security regime, focusing on the four major member states of NATO.  Two cases of post-Cold 
War transatlantic military intervention are examined in which regime member states sought to 
develop and adopt a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of NATO’s 
traditional (i.e. collective defense) area of operations: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  These 
cases illustrate the “puzzle” that the dissertation attempts to solve: why did the transatlantic 
security regime adopt a common military intervention policy relatively quickly in one case 
(Kosovo) but much more slowly in other the other case (Bosnia) despite the fact that deep policy 
differences were initially present in both cases?  The dependent variable in the dissertation is 
thus the likelihood of the transatlantic security regime adopting and successfully implementing a 
common policy regarding the use of military force in a given case.   
Relative distribution of power among regime members has no effect on collective policy 
congruence whatsoever.  Collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility, however, 
strongly influenced regime policy cohesion (or lack thereof) in both case studies.  This seems to 
indicate that regime policy cohesion is a function of actor rationality and yet also through rather 
socially constructed ideological compatibility.  These variables are mutually supportive.  That is, 
strong correlation in each is necessary to precipitate collective regime policy cohesion.  Thus, 
both a similar view among the major regime states of the costs and benefits of military 
intervention and a significant level of ideological compatibility among their national leaders is 
necessary to create and maintain regime policy cohesion.   
The active presence and involvement of an international institution had moderate effect in 
both cases.  However, while the active engagement of NATO may not, in itself, be a causal 
factor in regime policy cohesion, the institution may help to more rapidly facilitate policy 
cohesion as long as the influence of variables four and five is present.  This variable is thus 
rather interesting; however, additional case studies are necessary to explore its role and function 
in this issue-area.     
Finally, collective threat perception and collective domestic pressures have mixed results, 
with domestic pressures being the stronger of the two.  Again, this seems to indicate that notions 
of collective state cooperative behavior based primarily (or even solely) upon perceived external 
threat is not accurate.  Like the institutional variable, collective domestic pressures plays an 
uncertain and yet interesting role.  It is also certainly not a causal factor in itself but may play a 
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1.0  CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. 
Edmund Burke 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The transatlantic security relationship has come under increasing stress since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  The end of the old bipolar global power 
structure and East-West competition freed the United States and the countries of Europe to 
pursue more narrow national interests with less fear of offending allies or endangering national 
security than during the Cold War era.  Now, the shared ideals and institutions of the Cold War 
era, while still present, must also compete with more significant differences in: 1) security 
problem perceptions and definitions; 2) specific policies of security implementation; and 3) the 
roles of both the traditional Westphalian state and modern international institutions in security.  
These differences are not only evident in the relationship between Americans and Europeans but 
can be found in the interstate and inter-organizational politics of the European Union (EU) and 
within the national/domestic level politics of individual states as well. 
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This dissertation examines such differences and decision-making among the major 
member states of the transatlantic security regime.1  It explores the conditions under which the 
major regime member states adopt a single, collective policy with regard to using military force2 
outside of their sovereign geographic territories when there are different opinions about the 
specific policy option that should be adopted at the outset of such a circumstance.  Recent post-
Cold War experiences of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU 
demonstrate that such a collective policy is not easily or readily achieved.  While the United 
States still enjoys tremendous influence in Europe (even after the end of the Cold War), it often 
fails to shift European policy with regard to the use of military force in particular instances.  
Conversely, Europeans have had varying degrees of success or failure influencing either 
American policy or each other’s national policies with regard to the use of military force.   
The dissertation first develops an argument explaining why the transatlantic security 
relationship may be analyzed at a regime level of analysis.  Second, it presents the research 
design used to study the central question in the dissertation (what conditions or factors increase 
or decrease the likelihood of the major member states of the transatlantic collective security 
regime developing and adopting a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of 
the regime’s territorial boundaries?  And third, it provides the hypotheses used to test rival 
explanations for levels of transatlantic cooperation and/or discord in military intervention policy.  
                                                 
1 My use of the term “regime” is derived directly from the commonly accepted definition of an international regime 
given by Stephen D. Krasner: “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area,” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.  The “major members” of the regime are 
the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany.  See chapter three for further explanation.    
2 In using the phrase “military intervention” or “use of military force,” throughout this work, I use the commonly 
understood definition: “Armed interventions entail the introduction or deployment of new or additional combat 
forces to an area for specific purposes that go beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for 
national interests.”  See Richard N. Haas, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War 
World (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 19-20.  
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What emerges in the dissertation is an understanding of the process of regime policy 
formation (or lack thereof) in which the collectively perceived cost-benefit risk analysis of using 
military force to intervene, the ideological compatibility of the major national leaders within the 
regime, and the collective domestic pressures (supporting or opposed to intervention) in major 
member states are all far more important to achieving regime policy cohesion regarding military 
intervention than are the distribution of material power among major regime members states or 
the collectively perceived perception of a security threat to those states.  Additionally, and the 
role of an international institution, such as NATO, while not sufficient in itself to achieve regime 
policy cohesion, may aid as a “promoter” or “facilitator” to speed or ease the formation of 
collective policy, assuming the other important conditions are also present.      
After the Introduction, the second chapter provides a brief overview of the modern (post-
World War II) history of transatlantic security relations, with the firm belief that present 
phenomena can best be understood and explained by first having some degree of understanding 
of the past.  Chapter Three discusses relevant topics and literature related to regime-level 
analysis and collective military intervention.  Chapter Four contains a brief overview and 
explanation of the six independent variables tested in the dissertation.  Chapters Five and Six 
each consist of an analysis of a separate case study.  And finally, the concluding chapter contains 
a brief summary of the findings of the research and some final thoughts on policy making and 
policy processes, as well as possible future developments. 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Shifting from its Cold War role as a purely defensive alliance, NATO exercised military 
power beyond its member states’ borders, for the first time in its history during the Bosnian Civil 
War.  This was done initially only to a limited extent in Bosnia, primarily in order to protect 
United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and pressure the Yugoslav government into accepting UN 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed at ending the war.  The regime’s intervention in this 
conflict, followed by the Kosovo War (NATO using military force without UNSC approval) are 
instructive, because they reflect apparent shifts in collective regime intervention policy (or lack 
of it) over time.  In Bosnia, various political-military policies and implementation approaches 
were both debated and attempted.  Diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and (eventually) 
limited military force were utilized through the UNSC, the (then) European Community (EC), 
the Contact Group,3 and finally NATO.  By contrast, in Kosovo, the regime acted almost 
exclusively through NATO, without the specific authorization of the UNSC.4  An analysis of the 
responses of the major regime actors to these crises provides particular insights into major 
change over time in the formation and implementation of transatlantic and European security 
policy. 
The critical research and policy question, then, is: “What conditions or factors increase or 
decrease the likelihood of the major member states of the transatlantic security regime adopting a 
common, collective policy with regard to military intervention in a given case?”  This 
                                                 
3 Created specifically to develop a response to deal with and (if possible) end the Bosnian war.  It originally 
consisted of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  Italy was added later, when the 
Contact Group was reconstituted to attempt to deal with the Kosovo crisis. 
4 Although the Security Council had unanimously voted in September 1998 to demand a halt to the Serb attacks 
against civilians in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb security forces, a new resolution authorizing NATO to 
enforce compliance with these demands faced a certain Russian and probable Chinese veto.   
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dissertation seeks to answer that question by testing several possible alternative explanations 
drawn from relevant academic literature.  
1.3 WHY IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING 
This dissertation topic is important and interesting for a number of reasons.  First, an 
understanding of transatlantic cooperation in this policy area is crucial for international security 
because not only are most military interventions that take place in the world conducted and led 
by the major members of the transatlantic security regime, but also because the regime represents 
the most powerful concentration of military power in the world.  Furthermore, both NATO and 
the EU are simultaneously struggling to develop policy guidelines regarding out-of-area use of 
force and military intervention—to a degree complimentary but potentially competitively.5  This 
increasingly important policy debate affects a wide range of related issues, including the future 
role and institutional structures of both NATO and the EU, shaping the national security policies 
of individual regime member states, and determining current and future national defense 
planning and expenditures.  
Second, scholarly work on this subject by social scientists is rather limited.  The topic 
does enjoy widespread attention from political policy advocates and military analysts.  However, 
the political implications of and motivations for collective military intervention at the regime 
                                                 
5 After a decade of (primarily) French-led efforts for a distinct and independent EU security and defense capability, 
a joint declaration was adopted by NATO and the EU on December 16, 2002, opening the way for closer political 
and military cooperation between the two organizations.  The landmark Declaration on the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) provides a formal basis for cooperation between the two organizations in the areas of crisis 
management and conflict prevention.  It outlines the political principles for NATO-EU cooperation and gives the EU 
assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations.  However, these measures have not 
yet been put to a “real world” test beyond the EU taking over passive peacekeeping missions in Macedonia and 
Bosnia from NATO, and it remains to be seen how effective cooperation would be and how smoothly decision 
making (political and military) would occur across and between the two organizations in a real crisis situation. 
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level have remained largely unanalyzed.  Most previous studies of intervention policy investigate 
one of three factors: 1) national decision-making (without regard to collective regime policy 
formation and change); 2) the impact of a given intervention on the people or country in which it 
takes place; or 3) analysis of the purely military successes and/or failures of the operation.  Most 
studies also focus on cases purely at the state level of analysis.  Because regime-level debate 
over military interventions has increased only recently (since the mid-1990s), scholarly work on 
the subject remains somewhat deficient. 
Third, in examining this issue, the dissertation explores valuable questions in both the 
field of international relations (in terms of states’ collective action dilemmas and rational choice 
decision making) and also in the field of public policy (in terms of implementation of collective 
policy).6  And, in addition, the conclusions of the study should offer a wider contribution to the 
body of literature examining international versus domestic influences on foreign and security 
policy formation and change.7  
Finally, this study will add to understanding of the overall transatlantic relationship in the 
post-Cold War era.  If one believes that it is important or desirable for the members of the 
security regime to maintain that regime and to pursue compatible policies, then this study may 
offer important insights.  By examining the successes and failures of collective intervention 
policy in the past, this dissertation hopes to provide some lessons for current and future policy-
makers for transatlantic and European security.  Conversely, even if one does not believe in the 
                                                 
6 An often-overlooked area of study in traditional international relations literature is policy implementation.  Despite 
a huge body of literature studying foreign policy decision-making and even a significant body of work studying 
coalition or alliance decision-making, the successful implementation of collective foreign policy decisions is widely 
overlooked in the current literature.  By including implementation as a component of a “successful” intervention 
policy, I also seek to make a clear distinction between actual effective policies and those that are simply “lowest 
common denominator” agreements that leave the initial security problem essentially unchanged or untreated.  
7 See J. David Singer, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations” in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba 
(eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1961, pp. 
77-92.  
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importance of regime members pursuing some degree of policy coordination and cooperation, 
this study may still be valuable in showing under what conditions it might be fruitful to facilitate 
or attempt cooperation and coordination and under what conditions such actions might very well 
prove to be futile (or at least a significant waste of valuable time and resources during the outset 
of a future crisis).    
1.4 CASE SELECTION 
Military interventions generally occur in one of three distinct forms: 1) war (organized 
force exercised from the outside in order to change the policies of an adversary or to destroy it); 
2) less extreme coercive attempts to change the internal political balance of another state; or 3) as 
a mechanism for the promotion of purportedly universal norms, such as human rights.8     
In this dissertation, two cases of post-Cold War transatlantic military intervention are 
examined in which the NATO allies and the EU and its member states sought to develop and 
adopt a single, collective policy on the use of military force outside of NATO’s traditional 
(collective defense) and the EU’s territorial area of operations: the diplomacy and ultimate 
military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995) and the diplomacy and ultimate 
military intervention in Kosovo (1998-1999).9  These two cases illustrate the “puzzle” that the 
dissertation attempts to solve: why does the transatlantic security regime adopt a common 
                                                 
8 S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, Adelphi Paper No. 350 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 7.   
9 In deciding which cases to study for analysis, it is obvious that there are numerous other possibilities.  Specifically, 
during the post-Cold War period thus far (1991-2006), I counted fifteen separate crises in which member states of 
the regime either actually used military force or considered/debated using force: 1) Gulf War (1991); 2) Bosnian 
Civil War (1992-1995); 3) Somalia (1992-1993); 4) Haiti (1994); 5) Rwanda (1994); 6) Kosovo (1999); 7) 
Macedonia (2000); 8) Afghanistan (2001); 9) Congo (2002); 10) Sierra Leone (2002); 11) Ivory Coast (2002); 12) 
Liberia (2003); 13) Iraq (2003); 14) Haiti (2004); and 15) Sudan (2005-2006).   
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military intervention policy relatively quickly in some cases (such as Kosovo) but much more 
slowly in other cases (such as Bosnia), despite the fact that deep policy differences were initially 
present in both cases?  And how and why are political or operational differences within the 
regime overcome in some cases but not in others?  In selecting these two cases, I have chosen 
cases that represent a combination of two specific types of military interventions listed above—a 
combination of coercive use of force short of full-scale war and humanitarian intervention—but 
yet that also retained the possibility of leading to the first type: full-scale war.10     
To test the various explanatory variables, I examine the behavior of the four most 
important regime members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) with 
regard to each case.  Two main criteria guided my selection of those states for this study.  First, 
all are members of NATO, which is the primary institution for the regime.  And second, the four 
countries represent the core of the regime’s political leadership.  As a result, consensus among 
those four members is almost always sufficient to sway the remaining members of the regime, 
while dissention among the four nearly always results in inaction.  In short, these are the states 
that have had and will continue to have the most impact on out-of-area military interventions for 
the regime.  
                                                 
10 Humans live in a constant state of social and political conflict.  Indeed, it is impossible to have a human social 
organization without some form of conflict.  Even in the most peaceful community, social organization is 
maintained because the controlling group can force people to join the organization and then force members to obey 
the organization’s rules (i.e. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Social Contract”).  The amount of force is subject to 
limitation, but the ability to coerce is real.  Therefore, no social organizations are ever truly “at peace”; they are 
always engaged in some level of conflict.  The amount and level of conflict vary, but it is always present.  To 
illustrate this, the United States Army developed a concept in the early 1970s, after the Vietnam War.  The Army 
realized that its mission was changing, and it had to be prepared to fight any number of different styles of war.  
Conflict could range from low-level “brushfire” wars to nuclear devastation, and the meaning of war was nebulous 
at best.  To clarify this situation, the U.S. Army began speaking of a spectrum of conflict.  This spectrum is a 
continuum that ranges from low-intensity conflict to full-scale war.  This scale more correctly reflects the human 
condition than the belief that we are either at war or at peace.  It also helps us to understand military intervention.  
See Appendix Two for the Spectrum of Conflict.  
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1.5 FINDINGS 
In this dissertation, I attempt to demonstrate the following conclusions.  First, that out of 
the six independent variables tested across the two case studies, variable one (relative 
distribution of power among regime members) has no effect on collective policy congruence 
whatsoever.  This would seem to indicate that in terms of regime cohesion regarding questions of 
using military force, relative power is not helpful in influencing policy changes among fellow 
regime members.  This tends to support neoliberal/regime literature and discount realist literature 
regarding such factors.   
Second, two independent variables (variables four and five—collective risk analysis and 
ideological compatibility) strongly influenced regime policy cohesion (or lack thereof) in both 
case studies.  This seems to indicate that regime policy cohesion is a function of actor rationality 
(determined through traditional cost-benefit analysis, whether intended or abstract) and yet also 
through rather socially constructed ideological compatibility.  I posit that these two variables, 
rather than being mutually exclusive, are mutually supportive.  That is to say that strong 
correlation in each is necessary to precipitate collective regime policy cohesion (i.e. each 
variable can act as a “spoiler” of policy cohesion by itself).  Thus, both a similar view among the 
major regime states of the costs and benefits of military intervention and a significant level of 
ideological compatibility among their national leaders is necessary to create and maintain regime 
policy cohesion.  A change in either variable (for instance, a change in the cost-benefit ratio due 
to changing circumstances “on the ground” or a change in ideological compatibility due to a 
change in national leadership of one or more major members) can precipitate a degrading or even 
collapse of regime policy cohesion.   
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Third, the active presence and involvement of an international institution had moderate 
effect in both cases.  This seems to argue against neoliberal institutionalist literature regarding 
the role of such bodies.  However, there are two caveats to this conclusion.  First, the unanimity 
rules in each institution in question reduce the power of each institution to function in a stronger 
enforcing role.  And second, while the active engagement of NATO or the EU may not, in itself, 
be a causal factor in regime policy cohesion, the institutions may help to more rapidly facilitate 
policy cohesion as long as the influence of variables four and five is present.  This variable is 
thus rather interesting; however, additional case studies are necessary to explore its role and 
function in this issue-area.     
Finally, variable two (collective threat perception) and variable six (collective domestic 
pressures) have mixed results, with domestic pressures being the stronger of the two.  Again, this 
seems to indicate that realist notions of collective state cooperative behavior based primarily (or 
even solely) upon perceived external threats is not accurate.  This dissertation attempts to 
demonstrate that states that are members of a security regime will be led or driven to increasingly 
cooperative behavior by other factors having little or no direct relation to perceived threat.  Like 
the institutional variable, collective domestic pressures plays an uncertain and yet interesting 
role.  It is also certainly not a causal factor in itself but may play a much stronger role dependent 
upon the strength of the other variables.   
In short, this dissertation is meant to be primarily an exploratory project.  It certainly 
raises more questions than it can answer.  But it does attempt to demonstrate that the issue of 
collective regime policy cohesion regarding the use of military force is a highly complex 
dynamic in international relations and one deserving of greater research and analysis.  This body 
of work is only meant to open the door and shed light on this complex puzzle—one that is likely 
to be increasingly relevant in both the academic and policy world in the near future.  As such, its 
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primary aim is not necessarily to provide concrete answers for this important research topic and 
policy issue but rather to develop the appropriate questions for further research.                  
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2.0  CHAPTER TWO: PAST TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS: 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD   
NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. 
Lord Hastings Ismay, the First Secretary General of NATO, 1951 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The history of the transatlantic security relationship is inextricably tied to the East-West 
confrontation arising from the end of World War II and to the consequent development of the 
U.S. policy of containment and the formation of NATO.  It was inevitable, therefore, that the 
dramatic changes that swept the European continent in 1989-1991 would cause a fundamental 
reassessment of both American and European security perceptions and needs.  The United States 
still has strong interests in Europe, however, just as Europeans have strong historical, cultural, 
and economic ties to the U.S.  And despite some differences and difficulties, present and future 
security policies on both sides of the Atlantic will undoubtedly retain clear elements of 
continuity with the past. 
This focus on the evolution from past to present is the primary foundation for this 
chapter, as understanding the past may provide a key to preparing for the future.  The chapter 
describes and explains transatlantic security relations and policies since the end of World War 
II—origins, development, changes over time, the new directions these relationships seem to be 
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heading toward, and the various measures and organizations attempted and developed 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) in order to coordinate and implement collective security policy 
in the transatlantic region. 
The chapter provides an overview of the Cold War origins of NATO, its development 
and expansion over the years, and, finally, how the recent events of September 11, 2001, have 
impacted transatlantic security.  The chapter has two primary purposes: 1) to inform the reader 
about the historical development of transatlantic security relations, institutions, and policies; and 
2) to illustrate the fact that at any given time (even in times of commonly perceived great 
collective danger), the NATO allies have had varying degrees of agreement or disagreement.  In 
practice, collective international policy-making can be very difficult and painstaking, and these 
difficulties are by no means limited to the current transatlantic political environment or even 
specifically to U.S.-European relations.  As I hope the historical review in this chapter will 
demonstrate, one might perhaps very well be more surprised when a common policy is achieved 
and adopted than when one is not.      
2.2 BEDROCK OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY: THE ORIGINS OF NATO  
After World War II, immediate European security and stability was challenged by a 
number of factors.  A massive Soviet military presence dominated Eastern Europe, and the 
Soviet Union consolidated its wartime gains by creating communist puppet regimes in occupied 
countries.  Western Europe was economically devastated and militarily weak.  Economic 
disaster, fragile democracies, and demoralized populations also made the West European states 
 13 
vulnerable to internal, Soviet-backed, communist influence.  At the same time, the U.S. was 
dramatically reducing its military presence in Europe. 
 Toward the end of the war, Britain had considered alternative postwar international 
developments and sought to institutionalize the integrated wartime cooperation between the 
combined U.S. and British military staffs.11  On November 9, 1944, the British chiefs of staff 
issued a classified report concluding that Britain’s security interests lay in the formation of a 
West European security group that would cooperate with the British Commonwealth and the 
U.S.; such a security group would begin with an Anglo-French alliance and expand to include 
closer cooperation with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.12  By early 1946, sustained 
Allied security cooperation took on a greater sense of urgency.  American involvement in 
postwar European security had become increasingly important for the Europeans because of the 
immediate concern over Soviet intentions, the potential for a renewal of German nationalism, 
and Britain’s inability to maintain its traditional stabilizing influence on the continental balance 
of power.   
The North Atlantic Treaty thus was not an idea originating in the United States but rather 
in West European countries—particularly Great Britain and France.  In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Britain and France decided that no real Western European security assurance 
could be constructed without U.S. participation in an alliance that would guarantee American 
involvement in combating any future aggression on the continent (whether from the Soviet 
Union or possibly from a resurgent Germany).  To address the German question, Britain and 
France signed a bilateral mutual defense pact—the Treaty of Dunkirk—on March 4, 1947.  The 
                                                 
11 This close wartime cooperation marked the origins of the Anglo-American “special relationship.” 
12 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) and Joseph Smith (ed.), The Origins of NATO (Exeter, United Kingdom: University of 
Exeter Press, 1990).  
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treaty committed them to mutual assistance in the event of German aggression and to cooperate 
in their postwar reconstruction efforts.13  At the same time, the decline of British influence on 
continental affairs became apparent in Greece, where the Western-oriented Greek monarchy 
became engaged in an intense civil war against Soviet-backed communist rebels.  Britain could 
no longer afford to provide military and economic assistance as it had been doing, and it hoped 
that the U.S. would fill in the void. 
The U.S. responded with the Truman Doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, in a 
presidential address to Congress, in which President Harry Truman specifically promised 
American economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.  In June 1947, U.S. Secretary of 
State George Marshall also announced a plan of economic assistance for all of Western Europe 
designed to prevent the rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic 
containment of the Soviet Union.  This European Recovery Program (dubbed the Marshall Plan) 
implicitly recognized the growing convergence between interdependence, stability, and security.   
On December 15, 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin met with Marshall in 
London, following the collapse of the four-power (the U.S., Britain, France, and the USSR) talks 
over the future of Germany, arguing for an increased U.S. commitment to Western Europe.  
Marshall generally supported Bevin’s ideas; however, he was adamant that Bevin proceed under 
the same structure as the Marshall Plan and that the Europeans should first institutionalize a 
defense community in Western Europe.14  Thus, the U.S. established that any peacetime alliance 
with Europe should enhance the Europeans’ responsibility for their own security and not replace 
it.   
                                                 
13 See John Baylis, “Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO,” Journal of Strategic Studies, June 
1982, pp. 236-247. 
14 Charles E. Bohlen, Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 92-
93.  
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After Soviet-backed communists took over Czechoslovakia in late February 1948, and 
the pro-Western Czech Foreign Minister Thomas Masaryk was murdered on March 10, 1948, 
Western European states became increasingly fearful of so-called “fifth column” Soviet 
aggression.  Such Soviet actions might use covert activity to rally communist forces in a fragile 
democracy and overthrow the elected government or otherwise subvert government authority 
and policy from within.  Western concerns were also heightened by the ongoing civil war in 
Greece, the possibility of a communist victory in Italian elections scheduled for April, and Soviet 
pressure on Finland and Norway to declare neutrality and sign non-aggression pacts with the 
USSR.   
French concerns were particularly intensified, as there was a large communist minority in 
the French National Assembly.  France had few options at the time for increasing its national 
security.  It could not isolate Germany (as it had in the early 1920s) out of fear that such a policy 
could push western Germany into the Soviet orbit.  Going it alone was no longer an option, as 
the Soviet threat was much too great for the resources that France could bring to bear alone.  
Establishing bilateral alliances with Eastern European states was not possible as long as the 
Soviet Union occupied the region—nor was political accommodation with the USSR a viable 
option, as this would increase the domestic power and influence of French communists.  France 
was thus left with little choice but to seek hard security guarantees from both Britain and the 
U.S.        
Thus, Britain and France enlarged the Dunkirk Treaty by including the Benelux countries 
and created the Brussels Pact or “Western Union” (which would later become known as the 
Western European Union) on March 17, 1948.  Formally, it sought to promote integration and 
mutual assistance in a range of political, economic, and military activities.  But informally, it was 
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designed to establish a framework for a broader, transatlantic institution leading hopefully to 
some sort of American security guarantee.  Worried about a potential isolationist backlash at 
home,15 the Truman administration was careful to not associate publicly with the formation of 
the Western Union.  However, the administration privately encouraged the Europeans and saw a 
Western European alliance as a necessary prerequisite for negotiating any transatlantic security 
agreement.  It was soon viewed by both the U.S. and the Europeans as inadequate in light of 
increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior.   
Thus, on March 22, 1948, American, Canadian, and British officials began secret 
discussions at the Pentagon about the prospect of creating a formal transatlantic alliance based on 
the Brussels Pact.  These three-way talks were preliminary but resulted in a draft working paper 
presented by the U.S.; the central recommendations included having the President invite thirteen 
other countries (the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy) to negotiate a collective 
defense agreement for the North Atlantic area.16  Formal negotiations began in Washington by 
the Brussels Pact members with the United States and Canada about possible defense 
cooperation began on July 6, 1948, shortly after Soviet Premier Josef Stalin initiated a blockade 
of the U.S., British, and French occupation sectors in Berlin.  On March 18, 1949, the treaty was 
made public and was officially signed on April 4, 1949, by twelve of the participants: the United 
States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.      
                                                 
15 The United States had never entered into any formal, permanent alliance with any country in its history. 
16 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, Colorado: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1998), pp. 20-21. 
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Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had actually hoped to create a regional (Scandinavian) collective 
security institution of their own, based on shared cultural identity, commonality of interests, and 
(at Sweden’s insistence) neutrality.17  This neutrality policy suited Sweden, which had not been 
occupied by Germany during World War II, but it was less appealing to Norway and Denmark, 
which had suffered under German occupation.  Additionally, Norway shared a border with the 
Soviet Union and was thus directly threatened with possible Soviet military aggression.  Thus, 
recent Norwegian and Danish historical experiences made Sweden’s insistence on neutrality 
quite unappealing.  At the same time, the U.S. and Britain wanted Iceland, Norway, and 
Denmark in the new alliance because of their geo-strategic importance for the North and Baltic 
Sea regions.  Early in 1949, Norway came under strong pressure from the USSR to sign a non-
aggression pact (as had been previously signed between the Soviet Union and Finland).  This 
Soviet pressure caused the collapse of the Scandinavian defense pact discussions and pushed 
Norway and Denmark toward the Atlantic alliance.18   
 The Republic of Ireland was also invited to join the discussions on membership.  The 
Irish government responded that it would join the negotiations only as a representative of a 
united Ireland; but while the U.S. was interested in using the island state as a base for anti-
submarine warfare, the Irish government’s linkage of the partition issue was unacceptable.19  The 
U.S. neither wanted to incorporate the problems associated with Ireland’s partition into the treaty 
nor offend its most important ally, Great Britain.  The U.S. and Britain also wanted Portugal as 
one of the original treaty members.  The Azore Islands and the position of the Iberian Peninsula 
placed a strong geo-strategic priority on Portuguese membership.  However, the authoritarian 
                                                 
17 Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 83-89.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Kay, op. cit. in note 16, p. 28. 
 18 
dictatorship of Antonio Salazar stood in direct contrast to the Western democratic ideals upon 
which the treaty was supposed to be based.  In this early test of political ideals versus strategic 
priorities, however, the latter won, and Portugal was admitted as an original member.    
 Italy, Greece, and Turkey presented additional problems for the negotiators.  There was a 
general concern among the principal negotiators that if Mediterranean states were admitted, it 
would reduce the “North Atlantic character” of the pact.20  Having secured Scandinavian 
participation, there was also a legitimate concern that extending the geographic scope of the 
treaty could harm the principle of mutual aid.  Broadening the geographic membership raised a 
fundamental question of collective defense; would Norway and Denmark go to war to defend 
Mediterranean states or vice versa?  Also, would an institution covering too large an area be able 
to make effective decisions, or would it lose cohesion and collapse in a crisis?  Today, nearly 
sixty years later, these same questions are still relevant in NATO. 
The negotiators agreed that Italy had an important role to play in Central Europe and should be 
invited to join the final treaty negotiations.21  Greece and Turkey were not invited because of 
concerns that they would dilute the North Atlantic element of the alliance and stretch the alliance 
too far to the borders of both the Soviet Union and the troubled Middle East.  There was, 
however, a general understanding that the Truman Doctrine made Greece and Turkey part of the 
area covered by the treaty.  Greece and Turkey would thus be defended by the U.S., whether or 
not they were members of NATO, because it was in America’s interests to do so. 
The greatest difficulty in negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty was finding an 
institutional structure that would satisfy the Europeans (who wanted a U.S. commitment that 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 29. 
21 France initially opposed Italian membership, believing that since Italy had been disarmed after World War II, it 
would not offer any tangible military contribution to Western defense plans.  However, the French position changed 
due to events in Algeria (which France wanted covered by the treaty).  The French government felt that giving the 
alliance a Mediterranean element (via Italy) might help its position vis-à-vis Algeria.  
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would be sufficient to deter the USSR) but would not prevent the U.S. government from having 
time to deliberate before going to war (a key U.S. domestic requirement).  In other words, the 
U.S. was prepared to enter into a permanent military alliance for the first time in its history, but it 
was not prepared to enter any such alliance that had an “automatic war trigger.”   
 In a compromise, Article 11 of the treaty (which stipulates that the treaty’s provisions 
will be carried out in accordance with the “respective constitutional processes” of the 
signatories) gave the U.S. the clause it desired, but the final wording adopted in Article 5 
contains a strong commitment to mutual defense: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
 
 This was a revolutionary commitment by the United States, in view of its long-standing 
political tradition of isolationism and avoiding “entangling alliances” during peacetime.  At this 
time, however, the North Atlantic Treaty was seen as little more than a short-term mutual 
defense commitment that would deter Soviet aggression and reassure Western Europe during its 
crucial post-war economic recovery period.  It was assumed (by nearly everyone) that the West 
Europeans would rebuild their defense capabilities relatively quickly, and that, after a few years, 
they would bear the major burden of balancing Soviet military power in Europe.  To this end, the 
United States encouraged the countries of Western Europe to initiate a process of political and 
economic integration.  Thus emerged an alliance whose primary raison d’etre was never 
officially stated but was often (informally) repeated: keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, 
and the Germans down.                
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2.3 THE COLD WAR: NATO HOLDS THE LINE 
From its beginnings, the NATO alliance was conceived of by its members as primarily a 
political alliance (embodied by the Washington Treaty in its principal decision making body, the 
North Atlantic Council)—only to become effectively a military organization if war actually 
broke out.  The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, however, convinced the 
NATO allies of the necessity of organizing an integrated military command structure during 
peacetime and the necessity of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe.  Many 
experts and analysts in both the U.S. and Europe feared that the North Korean invasion was 
simply the opening act of a massive communist move toward global domination.  The attack was 
seen as evidence that the communists (then seen as a unified, monolithic bloc) were prepared to 
resort to armed aggression, and some hypothesized that the attack against South Korea was 
perhaps but a prelude or distracting feint before an all-out Soviet-led attack against Western 
Europe.  The United States and its allies responded.  In December 1950, General Dwight 
Eisenhower (who had served as the Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in 
Europe in 1944-1945) was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).  
In April 1951, Allied Command Europe (ACE) became operational, with the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Roquencourt, near Paris. 
The United States still hoped that the magnitude of its defense burdens in Europe could be 
minimized through greater West European efforts.  The Federal Republic of (West) Germany 
had been founded in 1949 but was still under formal occupation, with no armed forces of its own 
and with legal responsibility to the three occupying powers (the U.S., Britain, and France).  
Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to press its “rights and responsibilities” regarding any 
ultimate, permanent resolution of the German question.  But after the outbreak of the Korean 
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War, leaders in both the U.S. and Europe became convinced that only with a rearmed West 
Germany could the Soviet threat in Europe be countered.  In September 1950, the United States 
proposed that West German armed forces be established, and France immediately advanced a 
counterproposal for a European Defense Community (EDC), which would subordinate any West 
German military forces under common European command. 
 While France understood the strategic rationale for rearming West Germany (the threat of 
Soviet aggression in Europe), it nevertheless sought firm constraints on any such armed forces.  
Defense Minister Jules Moch said that France could never “accept the creation of German 
divisions”; German soldiers, he suggested, should be organized in “battalion units of about 1,000 
men” that would be distributed throughout the proposed European army.22  During a bitter 
debate from 1950 to 1954, French proponents of the EDC presented it as the only alternative to 
“a new Wehrmacht.”  EDC opponents in France argued that it would reconstitute German armed 
forces while subordinating the French military to a supranational European organization.  Strong 
U.S. and West German support for the EDC made the French quite suspicious, as well.23
 When the French opponents of the EDC effectively defeated it in the National Assembly 
in August 1954,24 another framework for the establishment of West German armed forces was 
devised.  At Britain’s suggestion, the 1948 Brussels Treaty was used as a basis for an Anglo-
French agreement in 1954.  Italy and West Germany would be admitted to the Western Union (to 
be renamed the Western European Union or WEU).  The failure of the EDC, though, reaffirmed 
                                                 
22 Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 91. 
23 The U.S. and West Germany each had its own reasons for supporting the EDC.  For the U.S., creation of the EDC 
was seen as a way to get the Europeans to begin to provide more for their own defense, which could possibly lead to 
reducing the American military presence in Europe.  For West Germany, the EDC (like the European Coal and Steel 
Community) was seen as a reluctant but necessary step on the road to eventually recovering full German 
sovereignty. 
24 In fact, the EDC was never directly voted on in the French National Assembly, nor was a full-scale debate even 
held.  The EDC was defeated on a procedural motion before such a debate could even be held.  Fursdon, op. cit. in 
note 22, pp. 295-297.  
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the centrality and importance of NATO.  The WEU would provide a means to incorporate West 
Germany into the active defense of Western Europe, and it served as the bridge by which the 
Federal Republic could be integrated into NATO, but NATO remained the principal West 
European security institution. 
Under the agreement, the United States, Britain, and France ended their formal 
occupation of West Germany.  In exchange, the Federal Republic renounced the production of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons on its territory, accepted numerous restrictions 
on its conventional armed forces, and was invited to join the WEU (and subsequently to join 
NATO); NATO would oversee the “operational aspects” of the West German military, while the 
WEU supervised the political and legal steps necessary for German rearmament.25  The United 
States, Britain, and Canada agreed to maintain ground and air forces in Germany, subject to 
certain conditions.  In a concession to France, the Federal Republic pledged to pursue a peaceful 
foreign policy and to never “have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany.”26  
With these assurances, France finally agreed to the Federal Republic’s entry into NATO and the 
establishment of independent West German armed forces in 1955.   
West Germany became the alliance’s first new member since Greece and Turkey had 
joined in 1952.  The entry of these two states demonstrated the importance of American 
leadership within the Alliance.27  Ostensibly as a response to the creation of NATO and its 
                                                 
25 For a more detailed explanation of the treaty provisions, see Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel (eds.), The 
Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU): Introduction and Basic Documents (London: Martinus 
Nihhoff Publishers, 1994). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands opposed Greek and Turkish entry, because the two countries were 
perceived to lack the democratic credentials of other members and would “dilute” the cohesion of the Alliance.  
Other members, especially France, were concerned about the potential for an intra-alliance conflict between the two 
states.  Nevertheless, the United States was able to convince the other members to accept the necessity of 
membership for the two countries as a means of securing NATO’s Mediterranean flank.  See Mark Smith, NATO 
Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance (London: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 79-
82.   
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subsequent enlargements, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in 1955 (within days of 
West Germany’s admission to NATO).  And, at the end of 1955, the USSR established a puppet 
communist regime in its occupied section of East Germany, thereby politically splitting Germany 
until the end of the Cold War.   
For Europe, the period from the mid-1950s to the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-
1991 was generally one of political and strategic stalemate, with little change in formal political-
military alignments.  Europe, Germany, and Berlin remained divided, and communist rule in the 
Warsaw Pact countries was maintained through Soviet military power and a network of internal 
security organizations.  Yugoslavia maintained a unique status throughout this period.  Ruled by 
a communist dictatorship under Josep Broz Tito but not a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
Yugoslavia enjoyed good relations with the West.  Partly because of its geographic isolation and 
lack of economic value, Albania succeeded in leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968.  Romania, like 
Albania, declined to participate in the Soviet-led suppression of democratic reform in 
Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968.  Romania was reluctant to participate in the 
Warsaw Pact’s integration and managed to achieve a certain degree of foreign policy 
autonomy—in part because it had persuaded Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev to withdraw 
Soviet forces from its territory in the late 1950s.  On the Western side, Spain joined NATO in 
1982, following the end of the Franco dictatorship there.  Spain and Portugal were invited to join 
the WEU in 1988, and they did so in 1990.  
 Despite intermittent phases of détente, in which East-West tensions relaxed, the Soviet 
Union provided a solid incentive for cohesion in NATO.  Soviet interventions in satellite states 
(East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979) 
and Soviet-provoked crises (the Berlin Blockade and Cuban Missile Crisis) reinforced consensus 
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in NATO on the necessity of organized collective defense.  Soviet advances in military 
technology (the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile, for example) and occasional 
Soviet declarations calling for global Marxist-Leninist revolution also reinforced Western 
resolve. 
NATO’s collective defense planning during the Cold War focused almost exclusively on 
how to deter the Soviet Union from undertaking aggression or coercion against the West and 
(failing that) how to defeat an outright Soviet-led attack.28  Although the United States was 
taking on more and more foreign responsibilities around the world, President Eisenhower cut the 
U.S. defense budget for conventional forces and decided to depend almost solely on nuclear 
weapons for deterrence against any Soviet conventional military attack.  In this, the U.S. yielded 
to pressure from its NATO allies, who did not want to spend large sums on conventional military 
forces instead of social welfare programs. Because the protection afforded to NATO allies by 
U.S. strategic nuclear commitments was seen as a decisively important element of deterrence 
from the earliest days of the Alliance, a primary issue throughout the Cold War was the 
credibility of what came to be known as U.S. “extended deterrence” or the American “nuclear 
umbrella”—that is, the prevention of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies or security 
partners through the threat of U.S. strategic nuclear retaliation.  Contentious issues that arose 
from U.S. nuclear deterrence included the level of Allied involvement (or lack thereof) in U.S. 
decision making in the potential operational use of nuclear weapons, the types and roles of U.S. 
nuclear forces in Europe, and the utility and functions of the British and French independent 
nuclear forces.29  Nuclear controversies were closely tied to American-European debates about 
                                                 
28 See Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation, 1993) and Laurence Martin, NATO and the Defense of the West (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1985). 
29 David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983). 
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the proper level of investment in conventional forces and burden sharing, about how to assess the 
NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional military force balance, and about what approaches to arms 
control to pursue in negotiations with the Soviet Union.30   
2.4 POST-COLD WAR RESTRUCTURING: FROM COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TO 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
By the late 1980s, military overextension and internal economic crisis forced the Soviet 
Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate of Europe.  This process began in December 
1987, when the U.S. and Soviet Union eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe 
through the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.  A year later, Soviet Premier 
Mikhail Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 personnel from the Soviet military, 
including a significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.  In November 1990, the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed by all NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries.  Conventional reductions were followed by agreements between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear weapons through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties 
(START I and II).   
In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the beginning of the end of the Soviet bloc, and in 
1991, the Cold War officially ended with an unquestionable communist defeat.  The Warsaw 
Pact formally dissolved on April 1, and eight months later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced the forthcoming dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
In a very short period of time, the Soviet military threat to Western Europe disappeared, and for 
                                                 
30 See Simon Duke, The Burden Sharing Debate: A Reassessment (London: Macmillan, 1993). 
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the first time in its history, NATO found itself without an enemy.  While Russia could still pose a 
threat to its neighbors and/or regional stability, the most serious danger posed by post-Cold War 
Russia is not expansionism but internal instability, potential disintegration, and the proliferation 
of NBC weapons, technology, and materials—very different threats from those conceived at 
NATO’s creation.  The reunification of Germany also renewed historical concerns about German 
power and the potential for security competition between Germany and Russia.  Furthermore, 
while democracy was spreading through Central and Eastern Europe after the dramatic post-
communist revolutions of 1989, regional stability was by no means assured. 
 At the point of its greatest triumph and the defeat of its main external threat (the Soviet 
Union), NATO also faced its most significant challenges as an institution.  The end of the Cold 
War called into question the continuing utility of NATO and its role in the security of Europe.  
But contrary to many assumptions or predictions about alliances dissolving in the absence of a 
threat, NATO moved to the core of an emerging post-Cold War European security architecture.  
Meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state stressed the continued institutional 
task of collective defense, while acknowledging that challenges to that mission had been 
radically transformed: 
We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to 
the security of its neighbors.  NATO must become an institution where Europeans, 
Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build 
new partnerships with all the nations of Europe.  The Atlantic Community must reach out 
to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to 
them the hand of friendship.31  
 
NATO invited East European leaders (including Gorbachev) to address the NAC and to establish 
regular diplomatic liaison with the alliance. 
                                                 
31 “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” July 1990, NATO Office of Information and 
Press.   
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 The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 demonstrated the potential for events outside of 
NATO’s traditional geographic scope to impact European security.  The war also demonstrated 
the overwhelming military superiority of the United States in terms of advanced weaponry, 
command and control assets, and strategic lift capability and that no European country had the 
capability to deploy large numbers of combat and support troops as quickly and efficiently as the 
United States could.32   
 The Persian Gulf War was followed by a series of events that demonstrated that while the 
direct military threat to Western Europe was gone, there was a number of emerging new threats 
that European leaders had to consider.  These included: 1) ethnic and religious conflict in 
Europe; 2) new threats from the Middle East and North Africa; and 3) the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Many of these challenges to European security were not 
necessarily “new,” but they received new attention after the Cold War ended, since they emerged 
as the most significant threats for Western European peace and stability.   
 At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept, its 
members agreeing that the primary challenge to their security was uncertainty and instability in 
Eastern Europe: 
…the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, 
social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which 
are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  The tensions which may 
result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and 
territorial integrity of members of the Alliance.  They could, however, lead to crises 
inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside 
powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the 
Alliance.33  
 
                                                 
32 See Bruce W. Watson (ed.), Military Lessons of the Gulf War (London: Greenhill Books, 1991). 
33 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” agreed upon by the heads of state and government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, NATO Office of Information and Press.  
The communiqué also specified potential challenges arising from the Mediterranean region and nuclear 
proliferation.  
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NATO outlined four “fundamental tasks” for the alliance after the Cold War:  
1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful 
resolutions of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any 
European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 
 
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic 
forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including 
possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate 
coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. 
 
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO 
member state. 
 
4. To preserve the strategic balance of power within Europe.34  
 
 During the drafting, there were serious divisions among the member states.35  Some 
members opposed the emphasis on preserving the strategic balance of power in Europe, 
believing that this gave NATO an appearance of wanting to maintain the previous status quo at a 
time when the Warsaw Pact was collapsing.  Additionally, some alliance officials and member 
states were deeply divided on whether NATO’s successful adaptation would require changing its 
mission to include action outside of its territorial area.  Among many NATO officials, there was 
considerable enthusiasm for giving NATO an out-of-area role—some even arguing that NATO’s 
future depended on it.  However, France especially opposed any out-of-area language in the 
document, insisting that NATO should be maintained as a purely defensive alliance and not take 
on any new missions.  NATO did agree to establish an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 
but this was to respond only to Article 5 challenges within the NATO territorial area. 
 Hoping to promote a more direct relationship with NATO and the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, NATO also created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Kay, op. cit. in note 16, p. 62. 
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(NACC) at the Rome Summit.  An American initiative, the NACC represented NATO’s first 
attempt to go beyond “military contacts” and “regular diplomatic liaison” with the states of the 
former Warsaw Pact and to develop “a more institutional relationship of consultation and 
cooperation on political and security issues.”36  The Alliance invited the foreign ministers of all 
the former Warsaw Pact states to meet with their NATO counterparts, and the first meeting of 
the NACC was held in December 1991.  The disintegration of the Soviet Union later that month 
led to the expansion of the NACC to include all former Soviet republics.  
It was agreed at the founding of the NACC that its members would meet annually at the 
foreign minister level, and every two months at the ambassadorial level, with further meetings at 
these levels “as circumstances warrant.”37  The Allies and the other NACC states (which were 
known as “liaison partners”) agreed to hold other meetings under the auspices of NATO 
committees with regard to security-related issues such as “defense planning, conceptual 
approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military 
coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defense production to civilian 
purposes,” and with regard to NATO’s “third dimension” programs on science and the 
environment.38  
 NACC membership was limited from the outset to NATO members and former 
adversaries (the Warsaw Pact states and their successors), because it was envisioned primarily as 
a specific instrument to overcome the divisiveness of the Cold War.  However, the NACC’s 
limitations soon became apparent.  In the beginning, NACC discussions included specific 
problems such as the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic States and the dispute 
                                                 




concerning Nagorno-Karabakh.  It soon became apparent to the governments that raised these 
issues, however, that the other NACC participants were unwilling to do more than simply listen 
to their complaints, and that the NACC was incapable of taking any real action about such 
matters.  The focus of attention thus shifted to more general topics such as peacekeeping, 
scientific and environmental cooperation, arms control verification, and the conversion of 
defense industries.  These topics were also of greater interest to states that were not original 
members of the NACC, and discussions soon followed about designing an institution that would 
be more inclusive and encompass activities beyond simply holding regular meetings—what 
would become known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  The NACC was finally 
replaced in May 1997 by an organization including all NACC and PfP participants—the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
 By 1993, several Central and Eastern European states felt that only full NATO 
membership would resolve their perceived security dilemmas, promote stability to attract 
economic investment and eventual membership in the EU, and provide reassurance for 
democratic and market reform-oriented political leaders.  The U.S. under President Bush had 
previously ruled out any NATO enlargement beyond absorbing the recently reunified East 
Germany.  But by mid-1993, the U.S. (under a new presidential administration) had seriously 
begun to consider the possibility.  Germany had begun to quietly but assertively push for NATO 
expansion in order to stabilize its eastern border and provide economic stability and reassurance 
for the growing free markets in the region.  Germany thus proposed Associate Membership in 
NATO for some Central and Eastern European countries.  Defense Minister Volker Rühe, in 
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particular, argued that Associate Membership could speed full entry into NATO for the Visegrad 
countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).39   
Senior officials in the U.S. State Department (most notably Ambassador to Germany 
Richard Holbrooke) and the National Security Council (most notably National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake) also began to support NATO enlargement, arguing that it could promote stability, 
the peaceful resolution of disputes, and democratic reform in the East.40  In particular, they also 
felt that by integrating new members into NATO’s transparent, multilateral planning process, 
post-communist states could avoid costly and competitive national defense build-ups that could 
lead to new security competition in the region.  The advocates in the U.S. also hoped that NATO 
enlargement might push the EU to open its doors to new members in areas where it otherwise 
might not in the absence of NATO membership coming first.   
However, opposition to enlargement in the U.S. came from both the Department of 
Defense (namely the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Russia experts in the State Department (especially 
Deputy Secretary of State for Russian and East European Affairs Strobe Talbot).41  The former 
feared NATO expansion would lead to “overreach” of U.S. and allied military capabilities and 
strength and that any new members would bring more liabilities to the Alliance than assets.  The 
latter opposed enlargement on the grounds that it might anger or upset the Russian government 
and be seen by it as a hostile move.  Such concerns led to a compromise within the various 
agencies of the U.S. government: the Partnership for Peace (PfP).42        
                                                 
39 Kay, op. cit. in note 16, pp. 68-69.   
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 69. 
42 The name Partnership for Peace grew out of discussion in SHAPE about giving the NACC a “Partnership for 
Peacekeeping” function.  While the PfP was the result of considerable interagency debate in the U.S., the primary 
impetus came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
 32 
Among the NATO allies, there was a general agreement that some sort of compromise 
was necessary that would allow the Central and Eastern European countries to go beyond the 
NACC but stop short of full NATO membership, and there was no consensus at that time on 
NATO enlargement.  Thus, the PfP seemed like the perfect compromise within NATO as well.  
The Partnership for Peace was first proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an 
informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993, and it 
was formally approved three months later at NATO’s January 1994 Brussels Summit.  Its 
purposes were clearly defined as follows: 
At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating 
states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, 
promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military 
exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and others as may be 
agreed.43  
 
Ultimately, several PfP members would go on to become full NATO members in two post-Cold 
War rounds of enlargement.  (See Appendix One.) 
By this time, all of the former communist states had significant ethnic minority problems 
that ranged from outright armed conflict (Yugoslavia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, etc.) to questions of legal citizenship (nearly everywhere else).  The most pressing 
problems arose in the former Yugoslavia, where widespread conflict eventually prompted 
peacekeeping missions, armed intervention, or peace enforcement deployments in Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia.44  These conflicts threatened European security 
on several levels.  They led to the greatest loss of life in Europe since the Second World War 
(with a majority of the casualties being civilians).  The brutality of the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia 
                                                 
43 North Atlantic Council Declaration, January 11, 1994, NATO Office of Information and Press. 
44 See Chapter Five. 
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and Kosovo approached nearly unthinkable proportions, as Serbs and Croats sought to 
“ethnically cleanse” areas populated with people of a different religious affiliation.  The strife 
caused enormous refugee problems.  And the conflicts threatened to reawaken centuries old 
European political rivalries, as several European countries politically backed one side or another.     
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3.0  THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 
War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Few national or international security issues are as controversial as the use of military 
force.  While all member state governments of NATO and the EU would agree that national 
military forces should be prepared to defend their home country from direct attack, there is much 
less consensus on how and when (or even whether) military forces should be used in situations 
wherein the threat to a given friend or ally is less clear, less imminent, or even non-existent.  
This is understandable, as the decision to deploy military forces imposes tremendous risks on 
both the individual countries committing forces and to friends and allies, as well.  The use of 
force is also inherently controversial because there are often significant risks if force is not used; 
for example, NATO and/or the EU could lose vital interests and/or credibility in international 
affairs.  Finally, there is considerable disagreement over whether military force is effective in 
many situations for which it is proposed or used.   
The end of the Cold War has made military intervention even more controversial because 
the fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the main guidepost that NATO allies relied upon for 
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planning for the use of military forces.  During the Cold War, NATO policy for the use of 
military force was linked to U.S. containment policy, and the (then) European Community had 
no real military/security policy distinct from NATO.  Nearly all NATO forces were dedicated to 
deterring or defeating a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe.  Even U.S. policy for military 
operations outside Europe was oriented specifically toward the Soviet threat.   
With the collapse of the Soviet threat, much of the traditional rationale that underpinned 
NATO military policy was suddenly invalid.  Yet, even before the Cold War ended, there were 
signs that the NATO allies needed to focus on more than just the Soviet conventional and nuclear 
military threat.  Events in the Middle East (including, for example, the various Arab-Israeli Wars 
and the 1979 Iranian revolution) highlighted how instability outside of the traditional NATO-
Soviet confrontation could affect transatlantic security.  A second factor was the rise of “low 
intensity conflict” (LIC) in the 1970s and 1980s.  LIC includes operations such as 
counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and illegal narcotics interdiction—missions that require combat 
forces but fall short of full-scale war.45  NATO leaders soon realized that the heavy armored and 
mechanized forces designed to defeat the Soviet threat were often poorly suited for LIC.  More 
recently (in the 1990s), another set of contingencies began to emerge: situations in which armed 
forces are called upon to provide non-combat services in the form of humanitarian relief or 
disaster recovery.  
Two types of guidelines affect the use of force.46  The first set addresses the question of 
whether to use force.  They help determine what kinds of situations lend themselves to being 
affected by intervention.  In particular, they help determine what interests are involved and 
whether they are sufficiently important to justify sacrificing “blood and treasure” on their behalf.  
                                                 
45 See Appendix Two. 
46 Haas, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 67-68.  
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In the terminology of public policy analysis, this first set of guidelines may be considered policy-
making.  The second set of guidelines address the question of how to use force.  These guidelines 
are concerned with tactics, operational approaches to the use of force, and useful or necessary 
political concomitants.  In the terminology of public policy analysis, this second set of guidelines 
may be considered policy implementation.  While at first glance, the two sets of considerations 
are distinct, they cannot be effectively analyzed separately.  The question of whether to use force 
cannot be separated from the question of how to use it effectively.  If there is no satisfactory 
answer to the latter question, there can be no commitment to the former.  The decision to use 
force cannot be made in the abstract; it must be grounded in implementation considerations.   
Thus, in the attempt to understand and explain collective transatlantic policy formation 
and change regarding military intervention, I have incorporated both sets of considerations into 
an “intervention advocacy matrix.”  Expanding upon a model of different post-Cold War 
American grand strategies proposed by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, I have identified 
three primary advocacy groups, within the transatlantic security regime.47  Posen and Ross argue 
that “four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the 
world, now compete in our public discourse.  They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective 
engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.”48   
I argue that a typology matrix similar to these American grand strategies may also be 
utilized in order to identify the basic policy choices within the transatlantic security regime to be 
found at any given time with regard to any given crisis wherein military intervention is being or 
could be considered.  Certainly, within the two cases presented here, the three advocacy groups 
                                                 
47 Barry L. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 
21, No. 3, 1996. 
48 Ibid., p. 1. 
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reflect (albeit very broadly) the primary policy choices available to political leaders.  The neo-
isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a “non-
intervention” policy choice within the Euro-Atlantic regime.  Similarly, their selective 
engagement group corresponds to a “limited intervention” policy choice.  And finally, Posen and 
Ross’s cooperative security group corresponds to an “active intervention” group in transatlantic 
security policy-making.  Their “primacy” group does not correspond to any policy choice 
regarding the use of military force in these two particular cases, as will be shown later. 
Simply put, “non-intervention” represents a choice made by political leadership within 
the regime to not intervene with any type of military force.  This does not preclude other types of 
intervention, such as political/diplomatic or economic influence; however, such policy tools are 
beyond the scope of study of this dissertation.  Both “limited intervention” and “active 
intervention” reflect a decision made by political leadership within the regime that some level of 
military intervention is the preferred policy choice.  Using Richard N. Haas’ classification 
scheme, “limited intervention” policy advocacy shall entail any policy preference for military 
intervention of the following types:49 1) peacekeeping;50 2) interdiction;51 3) humanitarian 
assistance;52 or 4) indirect use of force.53  “Active intervention” policy advocacy shall entail any 
                                                 
49 Haas, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 49-65. 
50 Peacekeeping involves the deployment of unarmed or at most lightly armed forces in a peaceful environment, 
normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement between two or more contending parties.  Peacekeepers 
are supposed to be impartial and relatively passive and to only use force as a last resort and then only for purposes of 
self-defense. 
51 Interdiction involves the discrete and direct use of force to prevent specific equipment, resources, goods, or 
persons from reaching a port or terminal.  It can be done to enforce sanctions or for law enforcement purposes. 
52 Humanitarian operations involve the deployment of forces to save lives without altering any existing or ongoing 
political conflict.  They can entail the delivery of basic human services where the central authority is unable or 
unwilling to do so, the evacuation of peoples, and/or the protection of a people from hostile forces.  
53 An indirect use of force involves providing military assistance in the form of training, arms, intelligence, etc. to 
another party so that it may employ force directly for its own purposes.  It involves military instruments, but it is not 
a military intervention per se. 
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policy preference for military intervention of the following types: 1) preventive/preemptive 
attacks;54 2) punitive attacks;55 3) war fighting;56 or 4) peace-making.57          
3.2 REGIME-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
The term “transatlantic (or Euro-Atlantic) security regime refers to the construction of a 
system of interlocking institutions comprised of NATO, the EC/EU, and the WEU.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the origins of this process of building a transatlantic security architecture 
lie not so much with the end of the Cold War but with the end of the Second World War.  As 
much as “interlocking institutions” may be a post-Cold War concept, its primary function is the 
preservation and promotion of an Atlantic security community inherited from the Cold War. 
 An Atlantic security community, in Karl Deutsch’s terms, is essentially a transatlantic 
community that evolved from an accumulation of defense and security cooperation among its 
party states during the Cold War.58  However, this defense and security cooperation is not 
entirely confined to the technical/military level; there is a broader socio-cultural aspect.  The 
Atlantic community, as such, is not just NATO, although it was built around the existence of 
NATO and the East-West divide.  The components of this transatlantic security community are 
                                                 
54 Preventive/preemptive uses of force are those that seek to either stop another state or party from developing a 
certain military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter. 
55 Punitive actions are uses of military force designed to inflict pain and cost, that is, to make the opponent pay a 
price for his behavior.   
56 War fighting is the “high end” of military intervention and involves full-fledged combat operations.  It brings to 
bear whatever forces are available and deemed necessary to dominate a confrontation by attacking enemy forces on 
the battlefield and those forces located elsewhere that could be introduced to or affect the battlefield.  
57 Peace-making is an imprecise term that includes a host of activities falling between peacekeeping and war fighting 
in environments characterized as neither “permissive” nor “hostile” but “uncertain.”  Unlike war fighting, where the 
goal is to inflict significant destruction on the adversary, peace-making is carried out with measurable restraint.  
Much greater emphasis is placed on limiting the scope of the combat and on restoring or creating an environment in 
which resistance to a peace accord will become marginal and allow peacekeepers to operate.  
58 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of 
Historical Experience (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).  
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also bound together by economic, social, and cultural links, as well as military ones.  In this 
sense, the “culture” of the transatlantic security community goes beyond NATO as a formal 
institution, because it embodies the preservation of a certain way of life.  In this context, 
countries such as Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden, although not members of NATO, are 
also part of this transatlantic security community’s culture.  In this sense, institutions are simply 
the skeletal framework that holds the security community together; but the various webs linking 
this community together have risen above a tangible inter-institutional dimension to the sphere of 
cultural and social norms.  
 The transatlantic security community originally evolved from a set of post-World War II 
conditions that necessitated its existence: 1) the issue of Germany’s reintegration into Europe; 2) 
the ideological/political division of Europe into East and West; 3) the rehabilitation of the 
European economy; and 4) the direct Soviet military threat.59  These conditions eventually 
culturally bound a group of states with the common thread of preserving a certain way of life.  
This way of life was determined by three factors: 1) the values of democracy; 2) the values of 
free market economies; and 3) U.S. geostrategic considerations.60  During the Cold War, the 
transatlantic security community was bound together by at least two of these factors at any given 
time—and sometimes by all three.  From this web of relations, the transatlantic security 
community evolved into an international regime over time.  And a regime, in this sense, takes on 
a life of its own, regardless of the erosion of the original conditions that caused or led to its 
creation. 
Thus, transatlantic military intervention policy adoption and change may be studied at the 
level of international regimes, which function as quasi-political entities.  Stephen Krasner 




defined an international regime as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.”61  As such, a regime is quite 
different from other inter-state interactions, such as formal agreements, alliances, treaties, etc.  
Regime-based behavior is based on long-term rather than short-term calculations of interest.  An 
actor is willing to give up a certain amount of decision-making flexibility and short-term gain-
seeking in return for the assumption that other actors in the regime will reciprocate, to the benefit 
of all.  In this sense, a regime protects and provides a collective good (in this case, security).   
The more difficult part of this argument, of course, is attempting to “prove” that a 
regional security regime exists in the transatlantic geographic region.  For this, I turn to Robert 
Jervis’ essay on security regimes.62  Jervis argues that there are essentially four main criteria 
necessary to establish a security regime.63  First, the great powers want to establish it.  Second, 
actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and 
cooperation.  Third, even if all actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot 
form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion.  And 
fourth, war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly. 
 I believe that all criteria apply.  First, remember the definition of a regime itself.  The 
United States, its NATO allies, and the member states of the European Union all share a similar 
set of principles and norms in terms of international security.  All share basic values about 
human rights, democracy, and free market economies.  All share a basic belief in national 
sovereignty (as long as a national government poses no threat to other sovereign states or to its 
own people).  All share a strong desire to avoid the bloody great power wars of the past and to 
                                                 
61 Krasner (ed.), op. cit. in note 1. 
62 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes” in Krasner (ed.), op. cit. in note 1. 
63 Ibid., pp. 176-178. 
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maintain regional stability.  They disagree to some degree on the appropriate rules for 
interaction, but all agree on the norms of intergovernmental negotiations and collective action.  
In this regard, it can be seen that it does not necessarily matter which institution (NATO or the 
EU) implements regime-wide security policy, since such policy will have originated from the 
shared values and norms of the regime.  
 As for Jervis’ criteria, they also seem to apply.  The great powers of the U.S., Germany, 
UK, and France are all willing participants of the regime, and his remaining three criteria are also 
easy to justify.  All the members of the regime value mutual security and cooperation; this is 
especially true for the member states of the EU, which are integrated economically, socially, and 
somewhat politically.  None of the states in the regime are currently in favor of any kind of 
attempt to expand territorially, and this has been codified in several post-war treaties recognizing 
current boundaries.  And finally, (major) war between or among members within the region is 
certainly viewed as prohibitively costly by all. 
3.3 CONTINUATION OF THE REGIME 
The survival of a regime depends on how much it is valued by its members.  According 
to Arthur Stein, regimes are maintained as long as the patterns of interest that gave rise to them 
are unaltered; since the distribution of power determines the patterns of interests, any change in 
the distribution of power can also lead to change in the regime.64  However, this analysis does 
not explain why, after the end of the Cold War, the regime of the transatlantic security 
community is still maintained.  But Stein goes on to explain that regimes may be maintained 
                                                 
64 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” in Krasner (ed.), op. cit. in note 1, p. 138. 
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even after the interests that gave rise to them shift or are replaced with other interests.  Although 
Stein’s analysis is not based on security cooperation of any kind, it provides a reasonable 
explanation as to why the transatlantic security community should survive after the erasure of all 
the patterns of interest that gave rise to it.  Stein gives three reasons why regimes are maintained 
even when the patterns of interests that gave rise to them are no longer existent or relevant: 
1) It is more costly to dismantle institutions because, once set up, they serve to guide 
patterned behavior between states, and this cuts down on the costs of continuous 
recalculation of other states’ behavior.  In this context, confidence over one another’s 
behavior is valued by states because it breeds stability. 
 
2) Changes in interest do not automatically lead to changes in the regime or to its 
destruction because there may well be uncertainty about the permanence of the observed 
changes.  This may generate a feeling that these institutions could be useful again in the 
future.  In this sense, the regime and its institutions are maintained as an “insurance 
policy” in an uncertain international environment.  
 
3) Actors attach importance to their reputations and are unwilling to break with 
customary international behavior from fear of damaging their reputations.  In this sense, 
tradition provides the legitimacy for the maintenance of a regime.  This stems from the 
value states ascribe to mutual reciprocity and the maintenance of a certain degree of order 
in their relations with other states.65   
 
The diffuse regime of the Cold War, which gave birth to the current transatlantic security regime, 
may no longer be valid, but the principles and norms of the security community survived, and 
thus the regime has survived as well.   
3.4 HOW TO EXPLAIN: DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND RIVAL HYPOTHESES 
National governments frequently attempt to persuade other countries to adopt a particular 
course of action—one more amenable to their policies and interests.  Similarly, countries also 
                                                 
65 Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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occasionally seek to convince others to abandon policies inimical to their interests.  Such 
persuasion is one of the routine aspects of international relations.  While much academic and 
policy literature has been produced on this subject in the economic security field regarding real 
or potential adversaries or rivals, little attention has been paid (especially in theoretical terms) to 
attempts at persuasion among governments within a security regime.  Yet, for a collective regime 
policy to be successfully adopted and implemented, some level and intensity of inter-state 
influence must take place.  In such cases, the use or threat of military force against a fellow 
regime member is unacceptable and unthinkable.66  Instead, a government seeking to exert its 
influence must convince others to cooperate based upon the merits of the particular policy under 
discussion.  Or, it may persuade the target governments that their interests will be better served 
by shifting course—or even that the interests themselves should be changed.  The influencing 
government might also seek to convince another based upon the nature and strength of the 
relationship between the two countries.   
The member states of the transatlantic security regime are bound together through a 
complex set of bilateral and multilateral connections.  Linked politically, militarily, and 
economically, the regime members have created a relationship that can truly be described as one 
of “complex interdependence.”67  Moreover, there is no expectation of the use or threat of 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 173. 
67 Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, The United States and the European Community in the 1990s: Partners 
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military force between or among regime members.68  Thus, in Karl Deutsch’s terminology, a 
genuine, pluralistic security community (i.e. regime) exists.69      
That does not mean, however, that the regime members necessarily share identical 
perspectives and interests.  In fact, collaboration on a range of international issues both within 
and outside of the security issue-area has often proven difficult to arrange, and attempts at 
achieving cooperation or collective response have frequently served to highlight differences.  
Even within NATO or within the EU, two “enforcing” institutions within the regime, consensus 
has been far from automatic.  Thus, if a collective policy is desired on a particular issue, member 
states (even the U.S.) must usually exert diplomatic influence, rather than simply assuming that 
others will automatically fall in line.      
The dependent variable in the dissertation is thus the likelihood of the transatlantic 
security regime adopting and implementing a common policy regarding the use of military force 
in any given case.  Such an attempt starts at the point where the four major regime members have 
significantly different views on what policy the regime should adopt and/or how it should 
proceed.  When such a rival difference of views occurs, one or more regime major members 
must then begin to attempt to influence the others to change their approach to the problem and/or 
alter their behavior.  Only if such an attempt succeeds can a collective policy be said to be truly 
successful.   
Using the typology of military intervention described earlier, it is thus possible to allocate 
a numerical value to the level of desired military intervention (from lesser to greater levels of 
escalation): 0=non-intervention; 1=active distribution of (but not necessarily protection of 
                                                 
68 It should be noted that there is one glaring exception to this, and that is the continuing tension between Greece and 
Turkey. 
69 Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit. in note 58, pp. 5-7. 
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humanitarian aid); 2=peacekeeping forces/observers; 3=surface interdiction (enforcing any arms 
and/or economic embargoes with military force); 4=defensive air interdiction (using air power to 
protect peacekeeping forces and/or humanitarian aid deliveries); 5=offensive air interdiction 
(enforcing a no-fly zone through air-to-air combat); 6=punitive attacks (limited air strikes against 
small number of ground targets); 7=sustained air bombardment; and 8=indirect use of ground 
forces (direct arms shipments to a belligerent and training of belligerent’s armed forces); and 
9=active use of ground forces (i.e. offensive ground combat operations).   
To answer the research question, I will examine several independent variables, each of 
which will be based upon the relevant literature regarding foreign and security policy formation 
and change.  Over the years, much effort has gone into explaining the basic motivations behind 
state behavior.  I drew upon these theories and models to develop specific hypotheses about the 
conditions under which collective intervention policy formation and implementation are likely to 
succeed or fail.  This should provide a better understanding of the process of collective 
intervention policy formation, along with the relevance and applicability of these theories. 
Briefly, national-level security policy formation and change is usually explained in terms 
of either international or domestic effects (causal mechanisms).  In understanding regime policy 
formation and change, these causal effects will be examined and tested.  One obvious set of 
conditions that might affect collective policy formation are those found in the international 
system: its power capabilities relative to those of others, the presence of institutions and other 
actors that may shape that environment, etc.  A second set of possible conditions includes 
internal (state) domestic factors that may play a role.  This level includes the domestic factors 
that affect the choice and implementation of intervention policy by that state.  Thus, the 
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hypotheses and independent variables will be grouped into two categories: international level and 
domestic level.          
It should be noted that I do not expect (nor will I argue in the dissertation) that any one of 
these various explanations is singly adequate to explain the behavior examined here.  What I 
attempt to do, however, is to examine which of these factors is/are the stronger and more 
reliable predictors/indicators of security regime behavior regarding the collective use of military 
force.   
3.5 INTERNATIONAL LEVEL VARIABLES 
The international level variables focus on interactions between states, including the 
possible influence of changes in the relative distribution of power across states and other non-
domestic factors that affect the patterns of bargaining between them.  No two actors or groups of 
actors in a given security policy situation will necessarily have the same, identical sets of 
interests.  This is true whether they are individuals within the same government or leaders of 
different countries.  Consequently, they will try to induce each other to “give in” to some degree 
to their own favored policy choice through some form of bargaining, persuasion, and/or 
coercion.  In the literature, there are several rival explanations for which phenomena have the 
strongest influence on bargaining behavior.   
Thus, at the international level, the following are possible (i.e. rival) explanations for 
coherence (or lack of it) in regime policy: 1) the distribution of power among the states within 
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the regime;70 2) the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to the members of the 
regime;71 and 3) the role and influence of the enforcing institution(s) of the regime,72 including a 
possible “policy entrepreneur.”73  
3.6 DOMESTIC LEVEL VARIABLES     
The domestic level variables focus on internal factors behind government behavior.  
Domestic politics almost inevitably affect the security policy behavior of national leaders, even 
in a collective regime structure.  National leaders’ security policy choices are influenced by 
                                                 
70 Derived from the realist tradition of international relations and more specifically, the structural realist school.  
This school of realist thought has two main divisions, but both argue that national policies regarding decisions of 
peace and war may be explained to a significant degree by major changes in the power structure/distribution in the 
international system.  For an explanation of the “balance of power” school, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979) and Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of 
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalsim” in International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 
(Summer) 1988, pp. 485-507.  For an explanation of the “preponderance of power” school (also known as 
hegemonic stability theory), see A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958) and Robert Gilpin, War 
& Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).  In this case, I apply the structural 
realist literature to the transatlantic security regime as a sub-unit of the international system.  Some scholars have 
adopted the concept of a “security complex” that possesses all the characteristics of a global system but is contained 
geographically to a specific region.  In this case, a “security complex” may be analyzed in the same manner as a 
global system, using the same theories and methods.  See Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 2nd Edition 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 186-229.   
71 The classic work that spawned a significant amount of literature examining the relationship between threat 
perception/misperception and state behavior is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).  See also Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters” in World 
Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July) 1982, pp. 505-526.  
72 Derived from neoliberal institutionalism.  See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Eleanor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  In 
addition, there is a wide body of literature on European integration that describes and/or explains the relationship 
between institutionalization and international cooperation.  For an excellent study on the subject regarding the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Michael E. Smith, “The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of 
External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam” in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Filgstein (eds.), 
The Institutionalization of Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).   
73 The concept of policy entrepreneur was originally conceived and developed within the public policy literature; in 
recent years, the concept has been successfully adopted by EU scholars in their research.  In the context that I am 
applying it, the concept might be more conveniently thought of as “individual level of analysis” in traditional 
international relations theory.  From the public policy field, see especially Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, 
“Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change,” Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996, pp. 
420-434.  From the field of EU studies, see especially Andrew Moravcsik, “Supranational Entrepreneurs and 
International Cooperation” in International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1999, pp. 267-306.   
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domestic pressures and the effect that the expected policy outcome will most likely have on the 
leader’s domestic position.  In addition, at the domestic level, individual leaders generally act on 
the basis of the reality that they themselves perceive, and not necessarily as perceived by others 
they seek to cooperate with.  In this regard, individual leaders’ (and other relevant actors’) 
perceptions (cultural, historical, ideological, etc.) of a specific security problem can also 
influence their decision-making about how to deal with it.   
Thus, at the domestic level, the following are possible (rival) explanations for coherence 
(or lack of it) in regime policy: 1) the degree of congruence among national governments’ 
perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy (i.e. the perception of the risks and/or 
costs involved with the particular policy vis-à-vis the benefits to be gained)—also known as an 
expected utility or risk analysis model;74 2) the degree of congruence of domestic governmental 
or political alignment/structure of member states (ideological perception, strategic culture, 
etc.);75 and/or 3) the degree of congruence in domestic public opinion and domestic elite support 
or opposition (for a given policy) of regime member states (domestic political pressures).76
                                                 
74 A huge body of literature has been spawned discussing, explaining, and analyzing the rational actor model of 
human behavior.  However, in the context of foreign policy analysis, see especially Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1972) and Jonathan Bendor and Thomas J. 
Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1992, pp. 301-
322. 
75 For examples of ideological-based study, see (for example) Katerina Brodin, “Belief Systems, Doctrines, and 
Foreign Policy,” Conflict and Cooperation, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1972), pp. 97-112; Alexander L. George, “The 
Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making” in International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June) 1969, pp. 190-222; Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), 
Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993); and 
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy” in International Security, Vol. 
21, No. 3, 1996/1997, pp. 5-53. “Strategic culture” as an explanation for state behavior has gained much enthusiasm 
in the post-Cold War era; yet, it has remained stronger at explaining past state behavior rather than explaining and 
predicting change in state behavior.  Perhaps the most (in)famous examples of this argument are Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 
and (especially for its relevance for transatlantic relations) Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and 
Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); but see also Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic 
Culture and National Security Policy” in International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, (Fall) 2002, pp. 87-113.   
76 Again, a huge body of literature also exists covering the influence of public opinion on national decision makers.  
For some very good examples of some relevance to this dissertation topic, see Richard Eichenberg, Public Opinion 
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4.0  CHAPTER FOUR: ABOUT THE SIX SETS OF VARIABLES 
Why this is hell; nor am I out of it. 
Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus 
4.1 POWER AS INFLUENCE IN SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE 
One of the most obvious indicators of a state’s position in the international hierarchy is 
that of power.  In much of realist theory, there is an assumption that the more power (i.e. 
resources and capabilities) a state possesses, the more likely it is to “get its way” with other 
states.  Since states are ultimately self-interested, they should attempt to acquire and maintain 
increasing power.77  In the anarchic world system, power is the ultimate guarantor of a state’s 
freedom of action.  A stronger state may use its power either coercively or as a means of 
influence to restrict another’s choices, or the target state, if stronger, may more easily resist 
coercion or influence from other states. 
However, it is not just the use of existing power resources (or influence derived from 
them) that may affect state behavior.  A target state’s resistance to influence may be affected by 
the possibility that an influence attempt will affect the future balance of power.  Thus, a state’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
and National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989);  Ole R. Holsti, Public 
Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and Eugene 
Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1990).  
77 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th Edition (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1967), p. 25.  
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willingness to cooperate with another (or its willingness to be influenced by another) may 
depend on whether it believes such action will maintain or enhance its own relative power 
position; a target state will more strongly resist any influence attempt that adversely affects its 
current or future power.  Thus, the realist literature on relative power and state behavior yields 
the first hypothesis.        
H1: Changes in the relative distribution of power within the regime, among the major regime 
member states themselves, can increase or decrease the likelihood of successful collective 
regime policy formation.   
 
This hypothesis is a direct test of realist literature and hegemonic theory.  This theoretical 
approach would predict that changes in the distribution of power among the states within the 
regime result in changes in national security policies, as national leaders attempt to adjust their 
policies to adapt to new realities in power dyads and relative power positions.  As such, 
collective regime policy would increasingly become easier to form as relative power within of 
the regime became increasingly concentrated with the hegemon (i.e. the U.S.) (H1A).  Likewise, 
collective regime policy would increasingly become more difficult to form as relative power 
inside of the regime became more diffuse (H1B).  The theoretical explanation for this prediction 
is that collective regime policy is increasingly easier to facilitate the stronger the hegemon is 
relative to the other major regime members.  (The regime members have an increasingly stronger 
desire to cooperate due to a “bandwagoning” effect, but see less of a reason to cooperate as the 
benefits of “bandwagoning” with the hegemon decrease as the hegemon’s relative power 
decreases.78
                                                 
78 See Stephen M. Walt, On the Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
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This independent variable of relational state power, derived from neorealist literature, is 
perhaps the easiest to measure.  This concept refers to two aspects of state power.79  One is the 
ready availability of a state’s economic and military capabilities for external use.  Consistent 
with the relative gains concerns of neorealists, the second aspect of strength places those 
capabilities in the context of similar capabilities available to other powers potentially seeking to 
challenge systemic norms or global leadership. 
The relative strength concept has a long history of operationalization in the literature.  
Most attempts at empirically observing the relative strength of states first identify a subset of 
states seen as great powers and then create a “share” measure of some combination of economic 
and military capabilities.  I use a measure fairly commonly used in the literature:80 1) identify a 
subset of major powers within the regime; 2) assess the size of each state’s economy and military 
spending annually; and then 3) calculate each state’s share of the aggregate values of military 
and economic capabilities using the following formula: RS=(GDP/Group GDP) + 
(MilSpend/Group MilSpend)/2.81  Thus, I am able to use the resulting annual values for each 
state to measure its relational power within the transatlantic security regime over the time 
covered by my case studies. 
                                                 
79 Thomas J. Volgy and Alison Bailin, International Politics and State Strength (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), p. 43. 
80 Ibid. 
81 RS=Relative Strength; GDP=Gross Domestic Product; MilSpend=Military Spending; and Group=Aggregate 
Scores for the Designated Group Powers.  Source=Volgy and Bailin, op. cit. in note 76.  
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4.2 THREAT PERCEPTION AND SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE 
Aside from balances or imbalances of power, another major international level factor that 
states may use to convince others to change their policies/behavior is that of shared external 
threat.  Clearly, the shared threat of a potential Soviet attack did much to facilitate and promote 
collective transatlantic security policy.  In fact, the fear that social unrest in postwar Europe 
could lead to revolution in and thus Soviet domination of Western Europe was a major factor in 
U.S. support for European integration.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the identity 
and nature of a common threat was much less clear.  Such a common threat may have 
“rematerialized,” however, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S.  Thus the 
changing nature of perceived external threat yields a second hypothesis.     
H2: An increase in the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to the major 
members of the regime leads to an increase in the likelihood of a collective policy being formed 
(H2A).  Conversely, a decrease in the degree of perceived shared external threat or danger to 
the major members of the regime leads to a decrease in the likelihood of a collective policy being 
formed (H2B).  
 
In this case, it is not relative power that influences state or collective decision-making or 
policy-making; rather, it is perception of individual or shared threat.  Simply put, regime 
members are more likely to cooperate and form collective security policies if they share the same 
type and degree of security threat.  This hypothesis tests the neoliberal and constructivist critique 
of neorealism that states are concerned more with security than with power. 
In order to measure this variable, I have designed a “threat matrix” consisting of four 
components with which I measure the degree of perceived potential threat that member states felt 
that they were under throughout the historical period of the study.  For the purposes of this 
particular variable, “threat” will be defined as only potential threats external (to the security 
regime) that have the potential to cause loss of human life and/or serious economic disruption or 
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damage to the regime member states.  Each component of the threat matrix can be measured as 
an ordinal measurement, thereby allowing analysis.  The four components of the threat matrix 
are imminence, probability, proximity, and severity.  Each is assigned an ordinal value of (in 
descending order of threat) very high, high, medium, low, or very low.  “Imminence” is defined 
as nearness in time (i.e. the higher the imminence rating, the lower amount of reaction time is 
available to policy-makers once the threat becomes actual rather than potential).  “Probability” is 
defined as the likelihood of the threat moving from potentially to actually occurring.  
“Proximity” is defined as the nearness of regime members in geographic space to the source of 
the threat.  And “severity” is defined as the damage that would occur to member states in terms 
of (primarily) loss of human life and (secondarily) economic damage and/or disruption if the 
threat became actualized.     
4.3 ENFORCERS, FACILITATORS, OR RIVALS? THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
IN SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE 
Another international level condition that may affect the likelihood of collective regime 
policy formation is the existence of a formal international institution in which relevant countries 
are active members.  By providing consistency, rules of behavior, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms in a particular issue area, they can reduce state insecurity and conflict to a degree 
that a state might not achieve by itself.  By facilitating the pooling of members’ resources, 
institutions may also provide more ability to deal with a crisis or threat directly.  Thus, it would 
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be in a state’s interest to cooperate within the institution, and, indeed, a state’s own view of its 
interests may come to include the preservation of the institution itself.82   
The structure of the international institution not only makes international interaction 
within the given issue area much easier but also institutionalizes the preferences of the major 
actors in that issue area.  In such cases, institutions may affect how key actors seek to maximize 
their interests.  They may alter the interests themselves, become a source of power to which the 
actors can appeal, or even change the power capabilities of certain actors.83  Additionally, an 
appeal by one or more states within the regime to another, encouraging it to change its 
policy/behavior for the “good of the institution,” may have a significant impact, particularly if 
the very continued existence of that institution seems in question.  Thus, the literature on 
international institutions yields a third hypothesis.       
H3: The higher level of participation within an enforcing institution of the regime (including the 
active participation and influence of an individual “policy entrepreneur” within the institution) 
increases the likelihood of collective regime policy formation and implementation. 
 
This hypothesis directly tests various neoliberal and institutionalist theories, which argue 
that the role of institutions as enforcing mechanisms in regimes can transcend simple state-to-
state bargaining and negotiating behavior.  For this dissertation, there are two (sometimes rival) 
enforcing institutions for the regime: NATO and the EU.  Throughout the period of time covered 
by the two cases I examine, these two institutions undertook rather significant policy and even 
structural changes, as they adapted to the new, post-Cold War security environment.  To test this 
hypothesis, I examine diplomatic initiatives that took place within the institutions in attempts to 
formulate a common policy and attempt to determine what (if any) effect the presence of the 
                                                 
82 Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” in Krasner (ed.), op. cit. in note 1, 
pp. 132, 138-139. 
83 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 5-
6. 
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formal institutional structures had on making collective regime policy formation easier and/or 
more difficult. 
NATO and the EU comprise several sovereign member states.  Neither institution has 
legal sovereignty and lacks a central executive power in the manner that a sovereign state 
possesses one (such as a president or prime minister).  Yet, because of the manner in which each 
institution was designed, both must make major decisions regarding the use of force or military 
intervention by unanimous consent of all member states.  In NATO, unanimous consent is 
necessary in the North Atlantic Council—NATO’s highest decision-making body for such major 
policy decisions.  Within the EU, only the European Council (the collective heads of government 
of all member states) can make such a decision.  This principle of unanimity at work in both 
institutions makes collective decisions on major and controversial issues difficult to achieve, and 
it is within this institutional environmental context that both NATO’s Secretary General and the 
four largest member states must work in to advance their national policy interests.      
Thus in terms of this particular dependent variable in relation to the decision-making 
procedures of the two institutions, the role of individual institutional leaders (such as Secretary 
General) in facilitating collective policy formation becomes extremely relevant.  The role of 
individual leaders and bureaucrats in facilitating policy formation and implementation is widely 
studied in public policy; also, the field of EU studies has increasingly examined such behavior.  
While one could theoretically examine the “personal diplomacy” and personal relationships of all 
the national and international leaders throughout this time period, only one position is worthy to 
investigate in the context of this particular variable/hypothesis: NATO Secretary General.84  As 
                                                 
84 During the historical period of the dissertation, NATO had three Secretary Generals: Manfred Wörner (1988-
1994), Willy Claes (1994-1995), and Dr. Javier Solana (1995-1999).  The position of High Representative for CFSP 
was established by the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union (ratified in 1997) but was not filled until June 1999—
after the Kosovo war had ended.  Thus, that position was not in existence during this time period. 
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such, I examine what role (if any) the men who held this position during this time played in 
facilitating (or hindering) successful adoption of collective regime policy.  This particular 
variable is one of the most difficult to measure, in part because it is nearly impossible to 
quantify.  In order to determine the level of influence that one or both institutions in question 
may have had during this period, I use two qualitative measurements.   
First, I attempt to determine to what degree the institution contributed to or was otherwise 
a part of policy debate over the case in question.  Second, I determine whether and to what 
degree the institutional leader (Secretary General) in question was supported by the U.S. and/or 
other major powers.  The higher the degree of policy congruence and common support from the 
major powers at the outset of the crisis, the less likely the individual was independently 
influential.  Instead, any such “influence” might be explained by the backing of 
powerful/influential states within the regime.  For an individual to be considered to be a true 
“policy entrepreneur,” he or she must be shown to wield influence that transcends the power 
relationships of the relevant actors.   
4.4 SECURITY REGIMES AND RISK ANALYSIS 
The debate over whether expected utility decision rules explain public policy and foreign 
policy outcomes has received considerable attention over the years.  At the core of the debate are 
questions about the actual decision-making behavior of political leaders: whether they maximize 
or satisfy utility, whether they are capable of making detailed calculations or are limited to 
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simplifying heuristics, and whether they are influenced by framing effects.85  According to 
various “rationality-based” theories (expected utility theory, game theory, rational-
comprehensive theory, etc.) decision makers attempt to think about the outcomes that could 
result from the available choices as well as the chances of those outcomes occurring, and then 
choose the alternative that seems in some way to offer the best potential for success.86  The 
debate over rationality in decision-making is so omnipresent in all fields of social science that 
one could venture to say that it has become one of the most fundamental—if not the most 
fundamental debate.  In any case, while this dissertation is in no way meant to be some sort of 
comprehensive test of the expected utility model, the literature in the field does nevertheless 
yield a fourth hypothesis.  
H4: The perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy (i.e. the perception of the risks 
and/or costs involved with the particular policy vis-à-vis the benefits to be gained) increases 
(H4A) or decreases (H4B) the likelihood of collective regime policy formation. 
 
This hypothesis tests the expected utility body of literature.  Simply put, the higher the 
costs of military intervention (in terms of both monetary costs and loss of human life) in relation 
to expected benefits, all regime members should be less prone to intervene; thus the likelihood of 
adopting a single collective policy increases.  Similarly, the higher the perceived benefits of 
military intervention in relation to expected costs, all regime members should be more prone to 
intervene; thus likelihood of adopting a single collective policy also increases.  When the two 
factors balance each other out, or when the costs and benefits of military intervention are 
perceived or measured differently across major regime members, then the likelihood of adopting 
a single collective regime policy should decrease.  In order to measure this rather difficult 
                                                 
85 See Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (New York: Pergamon, 1993). 
86 See especially William N. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis, 2nd Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1994), p. 
275 and Graham T. Allison, op. cit. in note 74. 
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variable, I use a set of qualitative “costs” and “benefits”—both material and political and distinct 
to each case—in order to generally reflect and measure the expected utility of the outcome (non-
intervention, limited intervention, or active intervention) in each case.   
 
4.5 PERCEPTUAL LENSES AND SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE 
Examination and analysis of decision makers’ ideology and belief structure has arisen, in 
large part, as a direct challenge to the rational actor paradigm.  Like the rational actor school, this 
body of literature is widespread and has come from a variety of social science disciplines each 
viewing the debate through its own (disciplinary) lens.  Many such scholars see rational choice 
theory as being normative and prescriptive rather than an accurate reflection of how actual 
human decision-making takes place.87   
 One factor that makes purely “rational” decision-making so difficult in any field of public 
policy—and especially in foreign/security policy—is that, in many instances and contexts, public 
policy decisions involve an issue of morality.  Especially in the area of “high politics” (such as 
decisions on the use of military force), decisions are necessarily undertaken in such a way that 
involves making a moral judgment, based on the assumption that some categories of violence are 
justifiable, whereas others are not.  Such decisions then, necessarily involve the moral, 
ideological, and philosophical perceptual lenses of the decision makers involved in making them.  
Thus, a fifth hypothesis is presented.    
                                                 
87 See, for example, Herbert A. Simon’s studies of decision-making and “bounded rationality” in Administrative 
Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1945); Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957); and The Sciences of the 
Artificial (New York: Wiley, 1970).  
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H5: A collective regime policy is increasingly likely to be formed as the ideological beliefs and 
policy views of the major member state leaders are increasingly similar (H5A).  Likewise, 
collective regime policy formation is increasingly unlikely the more dissimilar the ideological 
beliefs and policy views of the major member state leaders (H5B).  
 
Simply put, this hypothesis will test various scholarly arguments (primarily from 
constructivist and public policy literature) that purely “rational” decision-making with regard to a 
given policy is a misnomer, as individual leaders and decision makers view every policy issue or 
problem through their own ideological perceptual lens.  Thus, while a national policy adopted by 
one state may seem quite “irrational” to others (with regard to power, security, cost-benefit ratio, 
etc.), that adopted policy may, in fact, be quite rational when viewed through such an ideological 
lens.  As such, collective regime policy formation is easier to facilitate when national leaders 
share the same or similar ideological/political beliefs and increasingly harder the farther apart 
such beliefs are. 
Operationalizing psychological factors of political leaders (especially on a cross-national 
basis) is enormously difficult.  However, one of the more noteworthy aspects of an individual’s 
belief system is that it exhibits at least some degree of organization; an ideological belief system 
is tightly and coherently organized or constrained.88  The structuring is deductive in the sense 
that knowledge of higher-level elements (for example the decision maker’s position on the left-
right political continuum) permits the observer to infer lower-level phenomena (specific policy 
preferences) with a degree of accuracy.   
The Bosnia and Kosovo cases thus provide an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of 
the perceptual lenses and ideological belief structures of individual political leaders outside the 
traditional context of domestic politics and policy.  Expanding upon a model of different post-
                                                 
88 Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and 
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Cold War American grand strategies proposed by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, I have 
identified three primary belief typologies regarding military intervention and the use of military 
force within the transatlantic security regime.89  Posen and Ross argue that “four grand 
strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the world, now 
compete in our public discourse.  They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, 
cooperative security, and primacy.”90  A model based upon these American “grand strategies” 
may also be utilized in order to determine the belief typologies of the leaders of the four major 
member states within the transatlantic security regime during the Bosnia crisis.  The neo-
isolationist group identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a “non-
intervention” typology within the transatlantic regime.  Similarly, their selective engagement 
group corresponds to a “limited intervention”  typology.  And finally, the American cooperative 
security group corresponds to an “active intervention” typology in transatlantic security policy 
making.  The primacy group is non-existent in this particular case study. 
Individual psychological belief systems are the central organizing principle for these 
typologies.  All three typologies have distinctive and very different belief structures.  These 
beliefs can effectively be organized in accordance with specific categories based upon research 
conducted and published by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith regarding advocacy 
coalition groups.91  Specifically, each policy belief structure/typology has a deep (normative) 
core,92 a set of fundamental policy beliefs,93 and instrumental beliefs.94   
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4.6 EVERYONE’S WILD CARD: DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES AND 
SECURITY REGIME POLICY CONGRUENCE 
The third aspect of the domestic level of analysis that is important to this study is that of 
domestic political pressures.  Public opinion and/or strong domestic political opposition can 
certainly be a powerful factor in foreign policy analysis.  And when studying a topic as 
controversial as the use of military force, I do not believe that any serious analysis can 
reasonably leave out such domestic political pressure as a potential explanatory variable.  Thus, 
the last hypothesis is as follows.       
H6: The collective level of agreement of public opinion and opposition political parties among 
the major regime member states regarding the use of military force can increase the likelihood 
of adopting a single collective regime policy (H6A).  Conversely, strong differences in public 
opinion among major member states or strong disagreement between domestic political parties 
of member states can decrease the likelihood of adopting a single collective regime policy 
(H6B). 
 
In other words, as the collective public opinion and/or domestic political elite support 
among the member states of the regime for a particular intervention policy increases, the 
likelihood of the regime adopting that policy also increases.  And as the collective public opinion 
and/or domestic political elite support regarding a given policy declines (or opposition 
increases), the likelihood of the regime adopting a unified policy will also decline.  The key here 
is that collective regime public opinion and/or domestic opposition support must increase or 
decrease.  If significant differences in public opinion or domestic political opposition among 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 Fundamental policy belief structures are views concerning the general issue-area (in this case European security) 
rather than the specific policy under discussion.  They are derived from the core beliefs, and individuals are unlikely 
to deviate from them—but more willing to do so if their core values/beliefs are threatened.  
94 Instrumental beliefs represent views about a specific policy under discussion (in this case military intervention 
and/or the use of force in Bosnia) and are derived from an individual’s fundamental policy beliefs.  Individuals are 
more willing to compromise on these beliefs than any others.    
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member states exist, collective regime policy formation should logically be more difficult (if not 
impossible) to achieve. 
 
 63 
5.0  CHAPTER FIVE: BOSNIA 
This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans.  If one problem can be solved by the 
Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem.  This is a European country, and it is not up to the 
Americans.  It is not up to anyone else. 
Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg and  
Chair of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, July 1, 1991 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia.  Attempts made by the 
Yugoslav Army to stop this were ineffectual, and the war soon spread to Croatia.  In an uneasy 
compromise to end the fighting, Slovenia and Croatia gained their independence but did not get 
back territory seized by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal army.  The Bosnian Civil War that 
followed close behind Slovenian and Croatian independence lasted more than two years and left 
an estimated 150,000 dead and over four million homeless (almost a quarter of the pre-war 
population).95  In the years following these events, the memory of the crisis was made even more 
bitter because of the nagging criticism that perhaps much of the death and suffering could have 
been avoided if the transatlantic security regime had used military force more quickly and more 
effectively.  Yugoslavia was not some distant former colonial possession or trading partner in 
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Africa or Asia.  It was in the heart of Europe, and it was a place that had seen political violence 
too often before. 
As the Balkan debacle unfolded, all the members of the transatlantic security regime were 
characterized by their quick moral outrage over events in Bosnia but also by a shared limited 
willingness to commit lives, money, and political capital in the Balkans.  All of the regime 
members were also subject to deep confusion and divisiveness over questions about the 
legitimate and effective use of military force.  Theses common traits would continue to haunt the 
regime throughout the historical period covered by the case studies in this dissertation—and to a 
high degree, remain unresolved today. 
The shared confusion and divisiveness was particularly striking at the outset of 
Yugoslavia’s breakup.  The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush had no strong 
views about how to handle the crisis distinct from the general European view.  The only policies 
the members of the regime could agree on at the outset of the crisis were: 1) not to intervene 
militarily; 2) to use diplomacy to support Yugoslav territorial integrity; and 3) to keep NATO out 
of it.96  Both Americans and Europeans were preoccupied with the impending disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and feared the precedent that the collapse of Yugoslavia might set.  There was 
thus a general transatlantic agreement that federal unity should be preserved in both cases—at 
least until Germany started unilaterally pressing for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia in mid-1991. 
The Bush administration was inclined to leave the problem to the Europeans.  Bush had 
spent a great deal of political capital on the prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War but (despite the 
impressive diplomatic and military victory) was finding his domestic approval ratings steadily 
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declining, due mainly to domestic economic factors.97  Moreover, European leaders appeared 
confident and eager to take on the Balkan crisis by themselves.  In addition to the now infamous 
quote by Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chair of the EC’s Council of Foreign Ministers 
Jacques Poos, European Commission President Jacques Delors went so far as to actually issue a 
warning to the U.S. in the summer of 1991 that any active American engagement would be 
regarded as meddling in European affairs: “We do not interfere in American affairs; we hope that 
they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours.”98      
For many West European politicians, it was the “wrong war at the wrong time.”  By any 
set of objective standards, EC/EU political intervention was a complete failure—except perhaps 
for the fact that the EU ultimately held together as a semi-unitary international political actor 
despite the mishandling of its first foreign policy crisis.  The priority given by the EU to 
developing a compromise policy (i.e. one accommodating widely divergent national views and 
interests) came at the expense of developing and implementing an effective policy.  And this did 
not conform to the intended new image crafted in the Maastricht Treaty of a new European 
Union able to assert itself not only in European matters but in global politics, as well.  The 
failure to find a “European” solution to the crisis cast a long shadow over attempts to put a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy at the heart of the European integration project. 
The EU failure, however, was not unique.  All international institutions with some role in 
preserving security and stability within Europe were tarnished in some way by their involvement 
(or lack thereof) in the Yugoslav crisis.  The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) was very quickly sidelined by virtually all of the major actors.  The WEU showed that it 
could not handle “out-of-area” military operations (for which only NATO had any real 
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capacity—and then only if led by the United States).  And NATO itself was torn between 
adopting and implementing military operations that were severe enough to influence Serb 
behavior but not so severe as to risk open warfare with Serbia or an unraveling of the Alliance.  
And things were muddled even more by a complicated, slow-response UN leadership and 
command system.  The UN Security Council maintained its role at the top of the “hierarchy” of 
international institutions throughout the crisis, but its impotence in actually implementing its 
own resolutions derived it of much real credibility.  For its part, the U.S. was initially only too 
happy to let the Europeans take the lead in handling the Yugoslav crisis.  However, as the 
situation escalated beyond the Europeans’ ability to manage it, American involvement at some 
level became nearly unavoidable.   
All of these issues and problems before and during the Bosnia crisis provide the first case 
study in this dissertation.  The case illustrates that involvement in any conflict wherein there is 
no major direct or immediate traditional security threat to a country (and/or its allies) considering 
military intervention is likely to provoke contradictory pressures within the transatlantic security 
regime that can combine to produce unsatisfactory results for everyone.  The case also provides 
the first test of whether and how these pressures may be overcome.           
5.2 PRELUDE TO DISASTER: SLOVENIA, CROATIA, AND THE 
DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
5.2.1 Initial Responses 
To the extent that the West had a collective policy toward the Yugoslav crisis before the 
outbreak of fighting, that policy was generally aimed at discouraging the use of violence (by all 
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sides) to achieve political goals and peaceful resolution of the conflict.99  By the spring of 1991, 
however, growing popular support for independence in Slovenia and Croatia set the stage for 
violent confrontation in Yugoslavia.  The Serb-dominated federal Yugoslav government made it 
clear that it would not voluntarily allow the country to dissolve into its component parts.100   
As the two republics began to move toward independence, both individual Western 
countries and international institutions appealed for a peaceful settlement, hoping to maintain (at 
least in some form) Yugoslavia’s unity.  The European Community sent Commission President 
Jacques Delors to Belgrade but also gave its first indication of the difficulty in adopting a 
common EC position.  Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos (whose country held the 
rotating EC presidency at the time) stated that the EC would not recognize a unilateral 
declaration of independence by Slovenia or Croatia; but Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den 
Broek (whose country would succeed Luxembourg to the EC presidency) also warned that the 
EC would not support the Yugoslav federation “at any price.”101  U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker also visited Yugoslavia, returning to have the State Department issue a statement 
emphasizing the U.S. goal of preserving the unity of Yugoslavia and opposing any changes in 
internal borders.102  But these preliminary efforts to prevent the crisis were primarily rhetorical 
and ultimately unsuccessful. 
The Yugoslav crisis exploded when the governments of Slovenia and Croatia decided to 
declare independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991.  The initial confrontation centered on 
Slovenia, which sought to assert independent control over its international border crossings, and 
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this led to clashes with the Yugoslav Federal Army.103  These actions raised alarm throughout 
the West and set into motion a series of efforts by various actors to diffuse the crisis. 
European leaders reacted to the outbreak of violence by initially pursuing diplomatic 
efforts through two parallel institutional tracks: the CSCE and the EC.  As the crisis began to 
unfold, Austria (which was not yet a member of the EC) notified Belgrade of its concern over 
“unusual military activity” in Yugoslavia, and this formal diplomatic action triggered a 
requirement that Yugoslavia clarify its intentions through the CSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center 
(CPC) in Vienna.104  At the same time, the European Council (EC heads of state and 
government) agreed on June 29 to send the “troika” (Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands)105 
on a mediating mission to Yugoslavia.  Germany and Italy took the lead in pushing for EC 
action.  On the night before the EC summit, Germany proposed that the EC hold “urgent 
consultations” on the Yugoslav crisis, and Germany and Italy together asked the Council to 
authorize a high-level EC mission to Yugoslavia; Germany also raised the issue of suspending 
EC aid to Yugoslavia.106  The Council also decided to support Austria’s request to convene the 
CSCE emergency mechanism and to freeze aid to Yugoslavia unless there was an immediate 
cessation of violence.107  As the troika departed for Belgrade, the EC called on Slovenia to 
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suspend its declaration of independence, asked Serbian leaders to support installing Stipe Mesic 
as head of the collective presidency,108 and proposed a cease-fire with forces returning to their 
barracks.109  
The overnight mission to Belgrade and Zabreb seemed to produce the EC’s first 
diplomatic success: an agreement to suspend hostilities and a three-month moratorium on 
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s move toward independence.  It was hailed by several senior European 
officials as a sign of the EC’s political maturity, expertise, and independence from the U.S.  In 
addition to Jacques Poos’ bold quote about the “hour of Europe,” Italian Foreign Minister Gianni 
de Michelis also remarked: “From our point of view, it is a good sign for the future of 
(European) political union.  When a situation becomes delicate, the Community is able to act as a 
political entity.”110  De Michelis even went so far as to publicly point out that Washington and 
Moscow had been “informed,” not consulted, about the EC diplomatic mission to Yugoslavia.111    
However, the fragility of the agreement was apparent from the beginning.  Slovenes were 
not entirely prepared to back away from a struggle for independence that had already cost them 
blood, and the various parties in Yugoslavia disputed among themselves just what they had 
agreed upon with the troika.  As the violence continued, Poos, on behalf of the EC, threatened to 
freeze all aid unless the agreement was implemented immediately.  In an effort to salvage its 
earlier agreement, the troika returned to Yugoslavia on June 30 to nail down in concrete terms 
each side’s responsibilities.112  Some, especially the British, believed that the troika should have 
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remained in Yugoslavia on its first visit until the cease-fire was assured.113  On July 1, Mesic 
was confirmed as the head of the federal presidency.  In response to the troika’s initial mission, 
Slovenia called on the EC to send observers to monitor the terms of the agreement, and this was 
immediately supported by Germany.114   
Meanwhile, the CSCE began to consider what actions it might take, and representatives 
to the CPC met in Vienna on July 1.  They (including Yugoslavia) agreed to an immediate cease-
fire and return of troops to barracks but reached no agreement on Austria’s proposal that the 
CSCE send observers.115  Two days later, representatives of 35 CSCE countries met in Prague 
(the seat of the CSCE secretariat).  At the Prague meeting, CSCE officials reached an agreement 
on two diplomatic missions.  The first sought to promote a dialogue among the parties “in 
consultation and agreement with the Yugoslav authorities”; and the second was an approval for 
the idea of sending observers to monitor the cease-fire, with the logistical arrangements and 
details to be carried out by the EC.116  
In response to the CSCE’s endorsement of an EC-led observer mission, a group of senior 
EC officials was sent to lay the groundwork for a group of civilian observers to monitor the 
cease-fire.  The EC also agreed to send the troika to Yugoslavia on a third diplomatic mission, 
place an embargo against arms shipments to Yugoslavia, and suspend EC aid.117  Prior to the 
July 5, 1991, EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Van den Broek and EC External Relations 
Commissioner Frans Andriessen met with Secretary of State Baker in Washington, where Baker 
gave his support to the EC’s efforts and indicated that the United States would join in suspending 
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aid and imposing an arms embargo.118  The EC ministers also held out the prospect of 
recognizing Slovenia and Croatia if violence from the federal government continued.   
On July 7-8, the troika met with representatives of the Yugoslav government, Serbia, 
Slovenia, and Croatia on the Adriatic island of Brioni and hammered out a “Common 
Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis.”  The Brioni Declaration 
(“accepted” but never actually signed by the various parties) contained four points: 1) the 
Yugoslav parties alone should decide their future; 2) negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future should 
begin no later than August 1; 3) the Yugoslav presidency would assert authority over the federal 
army; and 4) all parties would refrain from unilateral acts, especially the use of violence.119    
Throughout the crisis thus far, NATO had maintained a low profile.  On June 27, a 
NATO spokesman stated that NATO was “greatly concerned about the deterioration of the 
situation” and indicated that NATO was “following the situation closely.”120  NATO’s Political 
Committee held an emergency session in order to discuss the crisis.121  The Alliance’s reluctance 
to get involved was attributable in large part to the United States’ inclination to allow Europeans 
to take the lead.  The Financial Times quoted one U.S. official: “After all, it’s not our problem; 
it’s a European problem.”122  Throughout July, NATO’s Political Committee continued to meet, 
primarily as a forum for exchanging views and as a channel between the U.S. and the NATO 
members that were also members of the EC.  The U.S. did not waver from its determination to 
leave the initiative to the EC and CSCE, and there is no indication that NATO discussed playing 
any sort of military role or initiating any sort of contingency planning at that time.    
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In the first months of the conflict, the UN also maintained a low profile.  Secretary 
General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stressed that the crisis was an internal matter that the Yugoslavs 
should resolve on their own.123  He specifically rejected the idea of sending UN observers in 
response to any Slovene request on the grounds that Slovenia was not an independent member of 
the UN, and that view was echoed by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, who 
stated, “The UN has no role in Yugoslavia” unless the EC and CSCE efforts fail.124
5.2.2 Divergent Actor Preferences 
Almost from the beginning, the EC’s efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis were hindered 
by divergent views among key member states on the appropriate course of action.  Initially, the 
EC focused on trying to find a solution that would maintain some form of federal state, and this 
led the EC to avoid supporting Slovenian or Croatian independence.  The first step toward a 
more sympathetic attitude toward independence came from growing pressure against what was 
perceived as the EC’s undue support for the federal government.   
The reaction was strongest in Germany, where a number of Bundestag members called 
for a policy more supportive of Slovenia and Croatia.  In a strongly worded statement, the Chair 
of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) stated: 
We won our unity through the right to self-determination.  If we Germans think 
everything else in Europe can just stay as it was, if we follow a status quo policy and do 
not recognize the right to self-determination in Slovenia and Croatia, then we have no 
moral or political credibility.  We should start a movement in the EC to lead to such 
recognition.125
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These criticisms were echoed by senior Social Democrat (SPD) officials after a trip to 
Yugoslavia.  This emphasis on self-determination in both the German government and in 
German public opinion was reinforced by strong historical and cultural ties with the Croats 
(including the presence of 500,000 Croats living in Germany).126  Similar concerns were also 
voiced in Italy, especially among political leaders in the region near the border with Slovenia, as 
well as by the leader of the Italian Republican Party.127
 By contrast, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Greece appeared most determined 
to hold Yugoslavia together.  There were a number of reasons for this reluctance to support 
Croatian and Slovenian independence: fears that it would inflame separatist movements in their 
own countries; concern that dissolving Yugoslavia would set a dangerous precedent throughout 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and, in the case of France, its historical ties to Serbia.128  
Greece was the strongest supporter of maintaining the federal state, driven by its fear of a 
potential conflict with an independent Macedonia, as well as its increasingly strong political ties 
with and support of Serbia.129  Although EC leaders strove to maintain the appearance of unity, 
the strains increasingly showed through.  Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl noted that some 
(unnamed) EC countries had “considerable problems in separatist ideas in their own countries” 
and thus were “more interested in projecting any decisions in Yugoslavia to their situations at 
home.”130   
 In response to these internal pressures (as well as continued Serbian intransigence in 
diplomatic negotiations) Germany and Italy, along with Belgium and Denmark, moved toward 
supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.  France, Spain, Greece, and the Netherlands (in 
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its role as EC president) remained the most resolute in favor of preserving Yugoslavia’s unity 
(although criticism in the French press grew as the crisis dragged on), while the United 
Kingdom’s position seemed to float somewhere in the middle.131  In a strongly worded statement 
clearly aimed at Germany, Van den Broek said, “It is easy from behind a desk to recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia and leave the rest of the work aside.”132   
5.2.3 The Spread of War 
The EC’s efforts to implement the Brioni accord initially focused on bringing an end to 
the fighting in Slovenia and a withdrawal of federal Yugoslav troops from that republic.  On July 
10, the EC foreign ministers met and endorsed a decision to send 30-50 observers to Yugoslavia 
in order to monitor the proposed cease-fire; the ministers also rejected Germany’s suggestion to 
include observers from other CSCE countries.133  Initially, the observers were sent to Slovenia.  
But with the Yugoslav government’s decision to withdraw all federal forces from Slovenia (a de 
facto acceptance of Slovenia’s independence), attention shifted to Croatia.  There was confusion 
over what role the observers should or could play in Croatia, and federal Yugoslav authorities 
resisted any effort to extend their mandate.   
As fighting in Croatia escalated, the EC foreign ministers met again on July 29 in 
Brussels, joined (at the EC’s invitation) by representatives from the Yugoslav federal presidency 
and the Yugoslav prime minister and foreign minister.  France suggested a European 
peacekeeping force for Yugoslavia, perhaps under WEU auspices, but this was rejected by Van 
den Broek and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd; the ministers instead decided to extend 
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the observer mission to Croatia and to increase its number to 300 observers and 300 support 
personnel (and to permit participation by other CSCE countries).134
This was met with resistance from Serbia, however, and from pro-Serb forces in Croatia, 
who refused to allow EC observers to enter contested areas.  On August 4, the troika left 
Yugoslavia, announcing, “There is nothing more we can do here.”135  The EC foreign ministers 
met again on August 6 and debated further economic sanctions (such as a trade embargo) against 
any Yugoslav republic that opposed EC peace efforts; they also discussed the French 
peacekeeping proposal and asked the CSCE to support the EC’s efforts.136   
On August 6, the Yugoslav federal presidency announced a cease-fire agreement by the 
warring parties.  While the troika’s withdrawal and the threat of economic sanctions may have 
contributed to that decision, it is more probable that the heavy losses suffered by Croatian forces 
coupled with a threat of unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by 
Germany and Austria were the main factors.  On August 8, the CSCE met again in Prague and 
decided (with Yugoslavia’s agreement) to send 200 to 500 additional observers to help monitor 
the cease-fire in Croatia.137  Yugoslavia vetoed a British proposal to convene a peace 
conference.138  As the conflict in Croatia escalated, France once again called for a WEU 
peacekeeping mission (supported by Italy and Belgium), and the WEU ministers discussed the 
idea in a meeting on August 7 in London.139  The WEU decided that it would not act unless the 
EC concluded that its diplomatic efforts had been exhausted, with the UK, Germany, Denmark, 
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and Portugal voicing strong reservations about such a force.140  The British view was best 
expressed by former British Ambassador to West Germany Sir Oliver Wright: “It would be 
madness to send unwelcome troops into a dreadful quagmire.”141  Yet, ironically, this is exactly 
what the British and others would later decide to do as part of the UNPROFOR mission to 
Bosnia.  
With any further CSCE involvement effectively blocked by a Yugoslav veto, the EC 
attempted to organize its own peace conference.  This was endorsed by the foreign ministers on 
August 27.  When fighting broke out again in mid-August, the EC also threatened to impose 
economic sanctions against Serbia if it rejected the peace conference.142  This action marked the 
first time that Serbia was clearly singled out as the main cause of the continued violence in 
Yugoslavia.  Both Germany and Italy threatened to recognize Slovenia and Croatia if Serbia did 
not agree to a cease-fire and to the peace conference.  Although Serbia initially opposed the 
proposal, the peace conference finally convened on September 7, even though fighting continued 
in Croatia. 
As the fighting continued, the Dutch foreign minister proposed that the EC send a 
“lightly armed” contingent of up to 30,000 peacekeepers to Yugoslavia under the aegis of the 
WEU.143  The Dutch proposal was supported by France, Germany, and Italy, although many in 
the French government were skeptical.144  The UK agreed to support a proposal for the WEU to 
develop contingency plans for deploying peacekeeping forces in the event that a lasting cease-
fire could be arranged, but it opposed armed intervention.145   
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 5.2.4 Enter the UN 
With the EC’s failure to find a means to stop the fighting, efforts turned to the UN.  Even 
before the EC decision of September 19, Austria formally called on the UN Security Council to 
take the lead in organizing a peacekeeping effort—an idea with backing from France and 
Germany.146  France, in its capacity as chair of the Security Council for September, proposed 
that the UN establish an emergency force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and impose an arms 
embargo.147  The Security Council agreed to an arms embargo on September 25 but did not 
include any provisions to enforce it.148
 The EC-sponsored peace conference reconvened on October 18, while fierce fighting 
continued around Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia.  The EC proposed a new constitutional 
plan (the Carrington Plan) for Yugoslavia, with much more autonomy for the republics but still 
maintaining Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, and the U.S. and Soviet Union issued a joint 
communiqué in support of the EC’s efforts.149  All of the Yugoslav republics accepted the plan 
except for Serbia, which rejected it on numerous grounds.  In response, the EC agreed to impose 
sanctions against Yugoslavia and to ask the UN Security Council to impose an oil embargo; a 
NATO summit in Rome (held at the same time) also endorsed the EC efforts.150
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 However, the collapse of the EC peace plan and the need for UN support to impose 
effective trade sanctions against Serbia151 refocused attention on the UN.  In October, four 
Security Council members (the UK, France, Belgium, and Austria) renewed their appeal for UN 
intervention, and on October 8, UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar appointed former U.S. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia.152  After Vance’s return, 
the Secretary General presented a report to the Security Council, calling the fighting in 
Yugoslavia a threat to international peace and stability.153   
 Both Croatia and the Serbian-dominated rump Yugoslav presidency appealed to the UN 
to send in peacekeeping forces.  The UK introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council 
calling for an oil embargo against any of the Yugoslav parties that refused to halt the fighting, 
while Lord Carrington, Vance, and Marrack Goulding (the UN official in charge of 
peacekeeping) traveled to Belgrade to make another attempt at negotiating a cease-fire.   
 On November 23, Vance negotiated a new cease-fire (the first with direct UN 
involvement) and offered a compromise plan on deploying UN peacekeepers.154  On November 
27, the Security Council adopted Resolution 721, urging the Secretary General to present “an 
early recommendation” for a peacekeeping force if the conflicting parties observed the truce.155  
Although the UN sent a small observer group to Yugoslavia to determine whether conditions for 
sending in a full peacekeeping contingent were being met, continued fighting blocked any further 
moves toward establishing a peacekeeping force.  
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At the same time, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher repeated warnings that Germany would unilaterally recognize Slovenian and Croatian 
independence by December 25 if an agreement was not reached by the EC-imposed December 
10 deadline.156  Italy’s prime minister stated that his country would act “in close solidarity and at 
the same time” as Germany.157  Pérez de Cuéllar and Carrington, supported by the United States, 
strongly opposed the German proposal on the grounds that it would exacerbate the conflict.158  
Several EC leaders, including French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, argued that unilateral 
German action was inconsistent with the recently concluded Maastricht agreement meant to 
strengthen the EC’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).159  But Germany remained 
insistent, and on December 17, the EC foreign ministers reluctantly agreed to recognize Croatia 
and Slovenia—as well as any of the other four republics that sought recognition by December 
23—on January 15, 1992, on the condition that the republics provide adequate assurances on 
human rights and democracy, as well as a commitment to not alter borders by force.160  Germany 
announced its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on December 19.  Chancellor Kohl called the 
decision “a great triumph for German foreign policy.”161   
For months, EC policy had been that Yugoslavia should remain intact as a sovereign 
entity.  Germany forced the issue by its unilateral statements and actions, and other EC members 
had reluctantly felt compelled to follow suit.  EC recognition had also been opposed by the Bush 
administration, which feared that fighting in Croatia would spread to multi-ethnic Bosnia.162  
The recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence may well have sealed the fate of 
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Bosnia.  The decision almost guaranteed continued violence and may have possibly violated 
international law.163  The EC expected to play a special role in the recognition of Bosnia, yet it 
had no intention of playing a role in protecting it as an independent entity.164  The Pandora’s Box 
of self-determination had been opened; out would come the Bosnia war.                        
5.3 DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA 
5.3.1 Self-determination and Diplomatic Failure 
Despite its eventual (if reluctant) support of self-determination in the former Yugoslavia, 
the EC continued to promote talks between the rival factions.  At a conference held in Lisbon on 
February 22-23, 1992, a compromise seemed to be within reach.  The Serbs agreed to respect the 
existing borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Muslim Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, 
promised to establish national territorial units within Bosnia—in effect, a sort of Balkan version 
of Switzerland.165  But the details of the plan (in particular, the degree of autonomy such units 
would possess) were left unresolved, and no final agreement was reached.  
 A referendum held in Bosnia between February 29 and March 1, 1992, produced no 
surprises.  Of the 63 percent of Bosnians who voted, 99 percent opted for full independence; as 
expected, the overwhelming majority of Serbs boycotted the referendum.166  Radovan Karadzic, 
leader of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia and a close ally of Serbian President Slobodan 
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Milosevic, warned: “We are not going to accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.”167  
Izetbegovic ignored the warning and declared Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence from 
Yugoslavia on March 3, 1992.  In the meantime, violence between Serbs and Muslims began to 
escalate in Sarajevo, while clashes in other parts of the republic between Croats and Serbs also 
occurred.   
The Bosnian Muslim leadership believed that the outcome of the referendum would lead 
to international recognition.168  However, the both the UN and the EC were hesitant and now 
worked desperately to delay the inevitable.  On March 18, UN envoy Cyrus Vance and José 
Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat who chaired the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
brokered an agreement in Sarajevo that provided for three autonomous ethnic provinces, similar 
to those discussed in Lisbon.169  But the details were, once again, left vague.  Both the Muslims 
and Serbs had serious reservations about the plan—the former because it might lead to the 
disintegration of the republic, and the latter because there was no attempt to link the proposed 
national units to a confederation arrangement within Yugoslavia.170  Despite EC pressure to sign 
the agreement as a condition for recognition, Izetbegovic publicly renounced the deal a short 
time later.  On March 27, 1992, Karadzic announced the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb 
republic (Srpska Demokratske Bosnei-Hercegovine), and the violence continued to spread.     
 The crisis came to a head with EC and American recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
April 7, 1992.  Both the U.S. and EC (despite all evidence to the contrary) continued to believe 
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that recognition would stop the fighting and preserve a unified Bosnia.171  There was also an 
implicit warning to the Serbs that they would not be allowed to pursue an aggressive course in 
Bosnia.  Without a believable threat of force to back them up, however, such warnings were 
completely ignored by the Serb leadership.   
 As the fighting spread, the EC desperately tried to bring the main factions back to the 
negotiating table.  However, a truce brokered by Cutileiro on April 12 was effectively ignored; 
likewise, a cease-fire negotiated by Lord Carrington two weeks later was broken within hours of 
its signing.  Thus began a pattern that was to be repeated over and over for the next twenty 
months.  The war was soon raging out of control.   
 
5.3.2 Enter UNPROFOR 
Meanwhile, the UN Security Council had been reluctant to become directly involved in 
the spiraling violence in Bosnia and remained content to let the EC take the lead in peace efforts.  
But as EC mediation efforts continued to fail, and the international media increased coverage of 
the Serb siege of Sarajevo and the plight of Muslim refugees, the pressure to act (especially in 
the U.S.) increased.   
 From the outset of the crisis, even before large-scale fighting had broken out, Bosnian 
officials had encouraged the UN to intervene in some way.  When Cyrus Vance traveled to 
Sarajevo on January 2, 1992, the Bosnian President requested the “preventive deployment” of 
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2,000-3,000 UN peacekeepers to act as a deterrent to war.172  New UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali refused, stating that the UN’s peacekeeping mandate was limited to 
Croatia and that the EC should play a larger role in Bosnia.173  However, soon after, on February 
21, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 743, adopting and establishing the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an interim arrangement for a twelve-month period in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to “create the conditions of peace and security necessary to reach 
an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis.”174  The original UNPROFOR had been 
stationed only in Croatia (where a peace agreement had been signed before the forces were 
deployed), and by the spring of 1992, there were 14,000 UN troops deployed in four areas 
(UNPAs—UN Protected Areas) in the parts of Croatia occupied by Serbian forces.175   
As the EC struggled on the diplomatic front and the UN debated a possible 
“peacekeeping” role in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs quickly gained the upper hand on the ground, 
making huge advances in eastern Bosnia and laying siege to Sarajevo.  Serb “ethnic 
cleansing”176 was now attracting major international media attention, as was the indiscriminate 
shelling of Sarajevo by the besieging Serb forces.  And with each new Serb military success, the 
flood of Muslim refugees increased.  As the death and refugee toll steadily increased, the Serbs 
came to be seen by most in the West as the aggressors, even though their original causus belli 
(preservation of Yugoslavian territorial integrity and sovereignty) may have been valid.   
 Of particular concern in the West was the emerging role of Serbia in supporting the 
Bosnian Serbs.  Both the UN and EC agreed that one possible way to sever the link between 
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Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs was through the imposition of targeted economic sanctions.  
Thus, on May 27, 1992, the EC imposed a small package of sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro, froze all export-credit guarantees, and suspended scientific and technical 
cooperation.177  On May 30, the UN Security Council followed the EC lead and condemned 
Belgrade authorities for failing to fulfill the requirements of Resolution 752 (passed on May 15), 
imposing an economic embargo against Serbian and Montenegran products as well as demanded 
the establishment of a “security zone” around Sarajevo and its airport to protect the delivery of 
humanitarian aid through Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992).178  Humanitarian goods (food, medical 
supplies, etc.) were exempt from the embargo. 
The UNPROFOR mission was thus expanded in the summer of 1992.  The first step came 
in June 1992 with a UN effort to secure a cease-fire between Serb and Muslim forces in Sarajevo 
in order to open the airport there to humanitarian aid.179  Under the proposal agreed to by both 
sides, UNPROFOR would secure and operate the airport while unloading humanitarian aid and 
ensuring its safe delivery to Sarajevo’s inhabitants.  UNPROFOR would also be responsible for 
overseeing the removal of anti-aircraft weapons from within range of the airport and monitoring 
the concentration of artillery, mortars, and surface-to-surface missiles.  On June 8, 1992, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 758, which enlarged the mandate and strength of 
UNPROFOR so that it could perform these functions.180  Canadian Brigadier General Lewis 
MacKenzie was promoted to Major General and appointed to command UNPROFOR’s new 
Sarajevo sector.   
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  The agreement broke down almost immediately, however.  In a dramatic and flamboyant 
gesture, French President François Mitterand paid an unexpected six-hour visit to Sarajevo on 
June 28, and this finally convinced the two sides to honor the agreement.  Despite the agreement, 
there was still near continuous fighting around the airport in the next couple of days.  But this 
died down by June 30, and UNPROFOR was able to gradually build up its presence over the 
next week.  By July 3, the airport was fully reopened for humanitarian relief supplies.  And by 
the end of the month, a land corridor was also opened to the city from Croatia. 
UN peacekeepers were now on the ground, but their exact role still remained unclear.  
The Security Council passed Resolution 764 on July 13, 1992, defining the humanitarian nature 
of their mandate.181  But despite the presence of UNPROFOR, UN aid convoys continued to be 
attacked and looted by local warlords who showed little respect for the UN presence in Bosnia, 
and the UNPROFOR soldiers were powerless to respond.  As a result, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 770, on August 13, 1992, which authorized “all measures necessary” to ensure 
the delivery of humanitarian relief, including military force.182  Discussion of the use of force 
made UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali very nervous, however.  He expressed such 
fears in a letter to the Security Council, arguing that the use of force resolution could endanger 
UN peacekeepers already operating in Bosnia (or even in Croatia) and demanded “adequate” 
advance warning of military intervention so that any threat to UN peacekeepers could be 
minimized.183   
 On September 14, the UN went one step further when the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 776, which increased the number of UN troops in Bosnia by up to 6,000—in addition 
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to the 1,700 peacekeepers already deployed—and all drawn solely from NATO countries; the 
UK, Canada, France, and Spain provided combat troops, and the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Denmark, Belgium, and the U.S. provided support personnel.184  The total UN force in the 
former Yugoslavia at this point stood at 21,000—its largest peacekeeping operation ever.  
UNPROFOR’s Sarajevo mission was to escort humanitarian aid convoys, only using its weapons 
in self-defense if fired upon first.  This limited authorization, however, led to obvious difficulties 
ensuring the passage of aid where the way was blocked by combatants.  While the Serbs were the 
most frequent offenders in this respect, all sides frustrated the work of aid delivery to some 
degree or another.  Although there was growing impatience with the situation, there was also a 
lack of will among those countries with troops on the ground to accept a shift towards peace 
“enforcement.”185  
 At the same time, UNPROFOR’s mission was also expanded into Macedonia, where the 
UN deployed a preventative peacekeeping force, driven by the twin threat to Macedonia of war 
spilling over the border and/or of an internal disintegration of the republic along ethnic 
Macedonian/Albanian/Serb lines.  In this UN operation, the U.S. committed combat forces to the 
Balkans for the first time, deploying 300 Marines in support of a 700-strong multinational 
Scandinavian battalion.    
While the UN began to pursue a more proactive policy of humanitarian intervention in 
Bosnia, the general fighting worsened and led to increasing brutality on both sides of the 
conflict—but especially from the Bosnian Serbs.  “Ethnic cleansing” of Muslims by Serb forces 
soon became widespread and well known.  And discovery of mass Muslim civilian graves and 
alleged Serb concentration camps drew comparisons with Nazi Germany in the international 
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media.186  It became a human catastrophe of incredible proportions.  The death toll steadily 
mounted into the tens of thousands, and by the end of July 1992, more than one million Bosnian 
civilians were homeless; the total for all the former Yugoslavia was close to two million 
refugees, and nearly 500,000 had fled the region completely, seeking refuge in other countries.187  
On August 13, 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 771 (and the first of many) condemning the 
detention camps and reminding all parties of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.188  
On August 13-14, the UN Human Rights Convention (UNHRC) strongly condemned the policy 
of ethnic cleansing and began investigating human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.189    
 There was obviously a much more direct way in which the suffering taking place in 
Bosnia could be reduced or even eliminated: direct military intervention.  But at this point (mid-
1992), both the U.S. and Europeans agreed that they were not even contemplating using military 
force to halt the conflict.  However, as the various EC and UN diplomatic efforts and sanctions 
failed to reduce (much less halt) the fighting or the practice of “ethnic cleansing,” increasing 
numbers of Americans and Europeans began to argue that the use of military force was the only 
answer to resolving the crisis.  Many began to view the conflict in very simple (but accurate) 
terms: heavily armed Serbs waging an unjust war of aggression against not only Bosnian Muslim 
combatants, but against civilian populations as well.   
 There were a number of military options available, but nearly all of them possessed their 
own unique problems.  NATO, with enough ground troops, could have undoubtedly defeated the 
Serbs, but that would require tens of thousands of troops, and there was no guarantee of a quick 
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or easy victory.  Bosnia, with its mountainous terrain, was tailor-made for an entrenched 
defender and/or for insurgent warfare, and the Serbs were quite skilled at both traditional and 
guerrilla warfare.  Thus, for the Americans (who would most likely have to contribute the largest 
share of ground troops), the specter of “another Vietnam” loomed quite large.   
Air strikes against Serb positions were also suggested.  While this might avoid the 
deployment of ground troops, it was questionable how useful it would prove, as most of the 
fighting was being done by light infantry forces in mountainous, woodland, or urban terrain and 
not more easily targeted mechanized troops in open desert, as in the Gulf War.  There was also a 
fear among the Europeans and Canadians that air strikes might provoke reprisals against UN 
troops already on the ground.  Another option was stepping in solely to protect civilians; but 
again, this would require large numbers of ground troops.  Finally, numerous Muslim countries 
were urging the UNSC to lift its arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia so that Bosnian 
Muslims could import the weapons they needed to fight the better-armed Serbs on more equal 
terms.   
In summary, then, at the outset of the Bosnian civil war, there were eight levels of 
potential/discussed military intervention policy (from lowest to highest) in the transatlantic 
security regime: 1) non-intervention; 2) delivery and escort of humanitarian aid; 3) peacekeeping 
(ground troops prohibited from offensive engagement); 4) surface interdiction (naval 
enforcement of sanctions; 5) air interdiction (enforcement of a “no-fly zone” and/or air support 
of peacekeepers); 6) punitive attacks (limited air strikes); 7) indirect use of force (providing arms 
and/or military training); and 8) peace-making (offensive ground troops with limited rules of 
engagement).  Note that “war fighting” (i.e. mostly unrestricted air strikes and/or ground troops 
with aggressive/offensive rules of engagement) was never an option considered by any major 
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member of the regime during the Bosnia crisis.  Changes over time in the transatlantic security 
regime’s cohesion regarding military intervention in Bosnia may be measured according to this 
ordinal scale.  As the historical analysis shows, from the beginning of the crisis and through 
1992, the regime’s collective policy was very limited.  However, this changed over time to 
surface interdiction in 1993, air interdiction in 1994, and finally to punitive attacks by 1995.        
5.3.3 NATO Joins the Fray 
By mid-1992, differences over how to handle the Bosnia problem were emerging in 
Washington.  There was increasing anxiety and disappointment in the Bush administration about 
how the Europeans were handling the Bosnia crisis, even though President Bush seemed to have 
no personal views on how to solve the problem and had thus far preferred to allow the Europeans 
to play the major role.  1992 was a presidential election year in the U.S., and Bush initially did 
not want to play a high profile role in the crisis that might result in the largest share of the blame 
should events turn out disastrously (as it seemed they already were).   
 Nevertheless, the continued Serb shelling of Sarajevo throughout the summer of 1992 
contributed to mounting tensions and created a crisis atmosphere in both Washington.  In 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 23, Secretary of State James Baker 
called the shelling of Sarajevo an “absolute outrage” and refused to rule out the use of force—but 
only taken multilaterally; he also confirmed that U.S. military planners were consulting their 
allies and the UN to see how humanitarian aid could be delivered into Sarajevo.190  But when 
President Bush, Baker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney met in the White House on 
June 26 to discuss possible military options, they were told by the Pentagon that it would require 
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35,000-50,000 troops to reopen Sarajevo airport by force and establish a security zone around 
it.191   
The Pentagon was extremely reluctant to support any direct U.S. military involvement, as 
it feared that any intervention would not only possibly drag the U.S. into a costly war of attrition 
against the Serbs but that it might also spread the war into other Balkan countries and destabilize 
the entire Balkan Peninsula.192  The U.S. policy that emerged from this debate was named 
“Prudent Planning.”193  The agreed upon compromise was that while the U.S. was prepared to 
involve its air force and navy, it would continue to refuse to provide ground troops and hope its 
European allies could be pressured into doing so.  Thus, on June 29, a flotilla of five U.S. Navy 
ships (from the Sixth Fleet) sailed into the Adriatic Sea.  Bush declared that this was merely a 
“show of force” that he hoped would persuade the factions involved to allow Sarajevo airport to 
be reopened for humanitarian aid; however, Bush also stated that he had no immediate plans for 
military action in Bosnia.194  
 Since President Bush had ordered the warships of the Sixth Fleet to be under NATO 
command, the U.S. administration was not amused when French President Mitterand unilaterally 
(without consulting the NATO allies) dispatched nine armed helicopters to Sarajevo.  Since the 
British were holding the EC presidency at the time, Prime Minister John Major wanted to exert 
some level of his own influence over events, but all he could come up with was to send a British 
destroyer to the Adriatic to join the U.S. flotilla.   
Perhaps seeing a new post-Cold War role for the alliance or perhaps under pressure from 
public opinion (and following a formal request made by the U.S.), NATO ministers voted to 
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authorize the naval flotilla in the Adriatic in July 1992—thus suddenly changing what started as 
a U.S. unilateral military operation into a multilateral NATO one.  The formal mission of the 
flotilla was to monitor the UN-imposed arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavia 
(Resolution 713) and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (Resolution 757).195  
Dubbed “Operation Maritime Monitor,” this was NATO’s first formal involvement in the crises 
in the former Yugoslavia and the first ever out-of-area NATO military operation.  The mission 
was expanded and renamed “Operation Maritime Guard” in November after the NAC authorized 
NATO to use force to enforce UNSC resolutions for the first time.      
Meanwhile, Germany began to criticize both British and French policy in Bosnia.  New 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also complained about aircraft returning empty from 
Sarajevo, suggesting that at least sick and injured children should be flown out.196  At the 
London conference on Yugoslavia, held in August, Kinkel also strongly insisted that tribunals be 
established to gather evidence and try war criminals; he left no illusions about Germany’s 
position regarding whom the primary aggressors were, referring to the government in Belgrade 
as “the main source of evil.”197          
 Several months went by, with various conferences held and peace initiatives proposed, 
and all the results were pretty much the same: continuation of the status quo.  As a result, on 
December 11, NATO defense ministers met in Brussels and debated an increased role for NATO 
in the Bosnia crisis.  Shortly thereafter (on December 14), the new U.S. Secretary of State, 
Lawrence Eagleburger, suddenly called for a military option to be taken against the Bosnian 
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Serbs.198  This was a complete U-turn for Bush administration, which so far had been against 
such a course of action.  Eagleburger formally called for strict implementation of the no-fly zone 
over Bosnia and proposed that an international war crimes tribunal be established—two policy 
changes the Bush administration had been publicly advocating only in the months immediately 
prior to the November elections.199   
5.3.4 Shift Change at the White House 
In contrast, to President Bush’s initially passive attitude towards the crisis, Democratic 
presidential nominee Bill Clinton’s pre-election speeches and promises regarding Bosnia and the 
Balkans gave one the impression that (if elected) he would step in and settle the matter with 
quick action and resolve.200  On July 26, 1992, Clinton’s campaign office in Little Rock, 
Arkansas had issued a policy statement on the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying: “The 
United States should take the lead in seeking United Nations Security Council authorization for 
air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort.  The United States should be prepared 
to lend appropriate military support to that operation.”201  Yet, many accounts of the Clinton 
administration suggest that the newly elected president was focused mostly on domestic political 
issues and not entirely prepared to back its foreign policy campaign rhetoric with concrete 
action.202    
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 Clinton (and Vice President Al Gore) took office on January 20, 1993.  He appointed 
Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, Anthony Lake as 
National Security Advisor, and Madeleine Albright as Ambassador to the UN.  Unlike Bush, 
Clinton was almost completely without experience in foreign affairs.  Despite their different 
backgrounds, all the members of Clinton’s National Security Council shared the general 
conviction that the Europeans had failed to successfully tackle the Yugoslav problem, and thus 
they saw a certain scope for American action in Bosnia.203   
 The Pentagon, however, advocated continuation of the initial (i.e. pre-election campaign) 
policy of the Bush administration, which was essentially non-intervention or very limited 
intervention, leaving the issue primarily to the Europeans to solve.  The Chair of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Colin Powell, was an especially strong and vocal advocate of non-
intervention.204  Lake, Albright,205 and Gore were the strongest proponents of military action in 
Bosnia, while Aspin urged caution, and Christopher seemed to initially have no clear opinion one 
way or the other.206  
The new administration took its first diplomatic action regarding the crisis in February, 
when it persuaded the Geneva Conference peace negotiations to be moved to New York.  It also 
expressed serious reservations about the most recent peace plan, the Vance-Owen Plan, which it 
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argued rewarded ethnic cleansing.207  Reginald Bartholemew, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 
was appointed U.S. special envoy to these international peace talks.   
 The UK was eager to cooperate with the new U.S. administration in diplomatic or 
military efforts, but it disliked the increasing signs of a potentially aggressive attitude, as 
expressed by candidate Clinton during the American election campaign.208  The British 
government believed that the military option (i.e. bombing Serb artillery positions and airfields 
and shooting down Serb aircraft) would only worsen the situation on the ground by inflaming the 
Serbs.209  This could, in turn, mean British casualties, which would be unacceptable to the 
Parliament.  France was also opposed to any stronger military action for the same reason.210   
On coming to office, however, Clinton was appalled to find that the EC (now EU) had no 
plan of its own and seemed to have little intention of doing anything (other than continue 
negotiations) to settle the crisis.211  Differences, however, existed within his own administration, 
with Anthony Lake and Les Aspin, especially, differing strongly over any military option.212  
When Christopher was questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the 
differences of opinion between the U.S. and its European allies, Democratic Senator Joe Biden 
told him: “What you’ve encountered, it seems to me, was a discouraging mosaic of indifference, 
timidity, self-delusion, and hypocrisy….I can’t even begin to express my anger for a European 
policy that’s now asking us to participate in what amounts to a codification of a Serbian 
victory.”213  With many in his own political party so strongly opposed to it, President Clinton 
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said that the Vance-Owen Plan was “flawed” and rejected it.  British Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd, however, insisted that it was the “only plan available” and should be accepted.214   
 On February 10, 1993, the U.S. administration announced that it was going to become 
more “actively and directly engaged” in peace efforts in Bosnia, and its policy was put forward 
by Christopher, in what became known as the “Six Point Program.”215  These points were even 
more idealistic and vague, however, than the other peace plans that had already been proposed.  
After Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic walked out of the New York peace talks on 
February 12, Clinton scrapped any ideas about military intervention and sought Russian support 
in the peace process.  It was hoped that Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who needed 
considerable economic aid from the U.S. and Europe, might use Russia’s traditional influence to 
curb the Serbs.216  Clinton also reasoned that it would be better to involve the Russians in the 
negotiations than to exclude them in case they were provoked or convinced into openly siding 
with Serbia.217
 By this time, Clinton was growing increasingly troubled by the Bosnian crisis and 
irritated by the lack of support from the European allies for his more aggressive ideas regarding 
the use of force.  The UNSC had authorized a no-fly zone (Resolution 781) over Bosnia, but as 
of yet, no subsequent resolution had been passed giving authorization to actually enforce it.  
NATO ambassadors, meeting on February 17 to discuss the issue, still could not agree among 
themselves on what further role NATO should or could play.  Stymied by the lack of progress in 
NATO, Clinton then turned his attention to airdropping humanitarian supplies to besieged 
Muslim towns.  The UK and Boutros-Ghali were both against this idea due to the fear that low 
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flying planes might be shot down by Serb anti-aircraft weapons.218  Since the Bosnian Serbs 
were using starvation as a weapon of war, airdropping supplies might be seen by them as the 
West or the UN openly siding with the Muslims; and this might provoke hostile reactions against 
the UN troops and personnel on the ground. 
Under orders from Clinton, however, the Pentagon immediately began drawing up plans 
for such an operation, including combat aircraft escorts and AWACS (Airborne Warning and 
Control System) aircraft to shoot down any Serb violators of the no-fly zone.  Clinton wanted 
(and asked for) allied participation, but most European countries refused; only Turkey and non-
NATO, non-European Pakistan offered direct assistance.219  Clinton was thus forced to tone 
down the operation, but it was named Operation Provide Promise and launched on February 
25—with no combat (only transport) aircraft involved.  The initially (like the Adriatic NATO 
mission) solely American operation was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers the next day, but 
none offered any specific help.  Aspin had never been in favor of Provide Promise, but he had 
been overruled by Clinton, who was supported more strongly by Christopher and Albright.220  
After the operation continued a while with no serious threat to American aircraft or peacekeepers 
on the ground, the UK and France became involved on a much smaller scale; however, the 
operation was suspended by the end of the month.221
 Meanwhile, NATO’s military command and planning staff were preparing for a possible 
“peace enforcement” role if the Vance-Owen Plan were accepted and implemented, even though 
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no one had formally asked (or tasked) it to do so.222  Boutros-Ghali, especially, was strongly 
against any role for NATO in what he believed should be a UN operation.223  NATO command 
of such a postwar military force would take away his power and authority over the troops on the 
ground.  The European allies also showed great reluctance to commit troops for such a purpose 
or to have their soldiers removed from national control. 
 UNSC Resolution 816, introduced by France and strongly backed by the U.S., 
authorizing the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, was approved on March 31, 1993.  It 
did not pass without some difficulty, however, as several countries (especially Russia, China, 
and even the UK) were initially reluctant to accept it.224  But it did pass, and the UN formally 
asked NATO to coordinate its enforcement, which the NAC agreed to on April 1.  However, the 
UN laid down very restrictive rules of engagement, and NATO aircraft were not to attack any 
Serb aircraft on the ground.  These restrictions were due to Russia’s insistence, as part of a 
bargain to get its approval for the resolution.  Thus, on April 12, NATO combat aircraft from the 
U.S. (24), the Netherlands (18—later 24), France (14), and the UK (12—later 20) began 
NATO’s first out-of-area combat mission in its history, dubbed Operation Deny Flight.225  
Turkey also later participated in the effort with 18 aircraft.  Although no German combat aircraft 
participated, the German Constitutional Court ruled on April 8 that they could do so, and several 
Germans served in the crews aboard five NATO AWACS and supply aircraft. 
On April 17, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 819 to impose stronger 
economic sanctions against rump Yugoslavia if the Serb leadership failed to endorse the Vance-
Owen peace plan by April 26.  The embargo would ban trans-shipments of any goods through 
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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); impose stricter controls on barges 
along the Danube River; ban all ships entering Yugoslavian territorial waters and create a 
twelve-mile exclusion zone; impound all trucks, ships, aircraft, or rolling stock in other 
countries; and freeze all Yugoslav financial assets in foreign countries.226  The day after the 
resolution was passed, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic publicly rejected the Vance-
Owen plan, and the UN sanctions took effect soon after.227                             
 On May 6, 1993, the UNSC approved Resolution 824, declaring six locations in Bosnia 
to be “safe areas” and ordered all parties to ensure that they were free from “armed attack or 
other hostile act” and UN military observers be allowed access to monitor the sites; these were 
Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa.228  Again, however, nothing was 
mentioned in the resolution about how the UN intended to enforce the safe areas.229  Clinton still 
strongly backed some sort of direct military action against the Serbs, if necessary, but the 
Europeans were still equally opposed to this idea.230
 Clinton and Boutros-Ghali also continued to argue over who should command any 
peacekeeping mission sent to Bosnia.  Boutros-Ghali sent an open letter to all members of the 
Security Council, insisting that ultimate command must remain with the UN, and that the UN 
must be actively involved in monitoring day-to-day operations.231  He suggested that the 
commander of a NATO (or any other force) must report daily to the UN senior representative in 
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Yugoslavia, who ultimately reported to the Secretary General and UNSC.232  Clinton did not like 
the idea at all; the President (and the Pentagon) just wanted UN authority to act—not to be 
subjected to UN interference, which could restrict American/NATO freedom of operational 
movement or run contrary to American national interests.233
 The U.S. administration by this time was pushing for the lifting of the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and for NATO to conduct air strikes against Serb artillery and other heavy 
weapons, as long as these were used to continue the war.  However, this “lift and strike” proposal 
met with vigorous opposition from Europe—particularly from the UK and France, which had the 
largest number of peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia.  They were adamantly opposed to 
lifting the arms embargo, fearing that this would only intensify the war and thus increase the 
already significant risk to their peacekeeping troops.234
Having failed to convince the Europeans to adopt “lift and strike,” the U.S. subsequently 
concentrated its efforts on securing an allied agreement to use air power for a variety of limited 
tasks.  These included the enforcement of the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia, protection 
of UN peacekeepers from attack, and the defense of the six UN-designated “safe areas” 
(including Sarajevo) from Serb shelling or attack.235  Again, the Europeans were reluctant to 
consent to the American request, fearing that the use of air power would increase the risk to their 
forces—a risk that the United States (which had refused to deploy American troops on the 
ground) did not share.  Nevertheless, the allies eventually did concede a role for NATO air 
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power for these limited purposes—provided, however, that the ultimate decision to resort to air 
strikes reside with the UN rather than NATO (the so-called “dual-key” command structure).236  
 The gap between the U.S. and Europeans was thus widening, not converging at this time, 
and this hampered NATO efforts to openly commit to respond to Serb acts of aggression and to 
demonstrate resolve.  Although Karadzic had promised to respect UN “safe areas,” the lack of a 
serious and credible UN/NATO threat to retaliate essentially presented him with a free pass.  
Thus, in early May, Bosnian Serb forces broke through the defensive lines that surrounded Zepa, 
killing more than 500 people in the offensive.237     
Finally, after this act of blatant defiance, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
836 on June 4, 1993, authorizing UNPROFOR to use force—including air power—in response 
to future attacks against the six “safe areas” or in response to any obstruction of humanitarian 
convoys.238  At a NATO ministerial meeting in Athens on June 10, the Alliance offered aircraft 
to defend UNPROFOR, if necessary; and throughout the summer, the use of air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs was frequently threatened.239  However, it became apparent that Boutros-
Ghali was not going to give his permission or cooperation in such an effort.240  The primary 
disagreement was that the U.S. (which would carry out the majority or air operations) wanted to 
use “decisive force,” while Boutros Ghali insisted that if force were to be used at all, it must only 
be a “proportional response.”241   
 Warren Christopher wrote to Boutros-Ghali indicating that the U.S. only wanted the UN 
to select the timing and targets of any air strikes in Bosnia and then let NATO carry out the 
                                                 
236 Gow, op. cit. in note 119, pp. 136-137; and Kaufman, op. cit. in note 195, p. 104. 
237 New York Times, May 8, 1993, p. A4. 
238 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), p. 501. 
239 Owen, op. cit. in note 201, pp. 144-149 and pp. 152-153. 
240 Ibid. 
241 O’Ballance, op. cit. in note 162, p. 199. 
 101 
missions without any further UN interference; Boutros-Ghali replied sharply, telling Christopher 
that it was essential that the UN (i.e. Boutros-Ghali himself) should remain in full control of all 
military operations related to UNPROFOR.242  In response, the Clinton administration declared 
on August 1 that it was prepared to use air power unilaterally if necessary.243   
At a meeting on August 2-3, however, NATO agreed to act but only under direct UN 
authority (i.e. command).244  This pleased not only Boutros-Ghali but the UK and France, as 
well.  The UK’s Ministry of Defense had expressed anxiety over possible “friendly fire” from 
U.S. air strikes; and France (which disliked NATO anyway and had always favored a WEU 
operation instead) retained its powerful veto as a permanent member of the Security Council.  
Also, the NATO members had to be unanimous in their agreement to take any military action, 
thus allowing any single member to veto a proposed mission.  Both Denmark and Greece spoke 
out against military action; and Germany was prepared to be included in any post-conflict 
peacekeeping missions, but its government firmly insisted that it would not be drawn into any 
combat role.245  This marked the beginning of a new, more assertive U.S. strategy to mount a 
more credible threat by attempting to create consensus within the transatlantic security regime 
and not simply wait for it.  In essence, this meant that the Clinton administration had shifted its 
policy approach from one of broad multilateralism to renewing the traditional leadership role 
played by the U.S. in transatlantic security affairs.   
On August 5, both the UN and NATO announced that they had agreed on a “dual-key” 
command arrangement for air strikes.  Basically, any combat operation would require dual 
approval from both institutions at all levels of the operation.  A request would first have to come 
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from a UN commander on the ground, then approved by the regional UN commander, the 
approved by either Boutros-Ghali or the UNSC (or both), and then approved and executed by 
NATO forces.  Despite all of the bluster and planning, however, the rest of the year passed with 
no air strikes being launched.  The following summary illustrates American frustration with the 
European allies: 
Clinton did periodically call for air strikes between mid-1993 and mid-1994, 
usually in response to visible, televised attacks on Bosnian civilians, which generated 
outrage in the U.S.  Each time Clinton pushed for air strikes, however, America’s allies 
demurred and worked out diplomatic solutions with Bosnian Serb forces.  In August 
1993, when Bosnian Serb forces captured the strategically crucial Mt. Igman protecting 
the Bosnian capital, Clinton called for air strikes.  Before the threat was carried out, the 
Bosnian Serbs agreed to a partial withdrawal and a replacement of Bosnian government 
troops on the mountain with French peacekeepers.  In February 1994, when a Serb mortar 
attack killed 61 at Sarajevo’s central market, Clinton called again for air strikes.  Before 
air strikes could commence, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy artillery 
from a twenty-kilometer radius surrounding Sarajevo.  Only in April 19, when the 
Bosnian Serbs had launched an offensive against the safe haven Gorazde, did NATO 
warplanes launch an air strike, but then only against a few tanks and artillery pieces.  
Serb forces accepted a twenty-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde, 
but only after they had defeated the local Bosnian government forces.246  
 
In February 1994, NATO aircraft did shoot down four Serb aircraft that had violated the no-fly 
zone.  This was the first time in its history that NATO had ever “fired shots in anger.” 
 Following a Serb offensive against the Bihac “safe area,” in October 1993 (and which 
threatened to drag Croatia and Serbia into the war), President Clinton announced that the U.S. 
would unilaterally stop participating in the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia on 
November 10.247  This came as a complete surprise to many in Europe, and allied reaction was 
swift and angry.  A French foreign ministry spokesman said that “This action by the Americans 
could ruin chances of maintaining a common approach and lead to a lot of nasty finger-pointing 
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across the Atlantic.”248  The British also expressed concern, but additional motives behind 
France’s heated opposition were revealed when Foreign Minister Alain Juppé announced in late 
November that “The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity of moving beyond NATO and 
American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common 
foreign policy interests….This crisis has revealed the doubts we had all along that Europe’s 
interests are not necessarily those of America.”249     
As fighting continued to escalate, and Serb aircraft repeatedly violated the no-fly zone, 
NATO was obliged to act more aggressively or face losing all credibility.  On November 21, 
NATO aircraft targeted a Serb airfield in Croatia.  On orders of the UN commander (General 
Michael Rose), however, the attack was limited to destroying the airport’s runway, leaving the 
aircraft themselves unscathed.250  Another attack against Serb anti-aircraft missile sites was 
launched on November 23.  Even the French were becoming more belligerent.  A spokesman for 
the French foreign ministry warned that the “offensive against Bihac must stop” and added that 
France would back any UN call for military action.251   
 The air strikes, however, provoked the Bosnian Serbs into a series of countermeasures.  
They blockaded 200 UN peacekeepers at nine sites around Sarajevo, detained 50 Canadian 
troops north of Sarajevo, and stopped the movement of all other UN military observers 
throughout Bosnia.  At a meeting of NATO ambassadors in Brussels on November 24, the U.S. 
tried to persuade its allies to take additional military action against the Bosnian Serbs—who by 
now were in open and direct violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, but again 
the U.S. failed to persuade the Europeans.  
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 Following the shelling of Sarajevo’s main market on February 5, 1994, however, the 
EU’s foreign ministers adopted a statement that supported “a very early meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council,” with the aim of achieving “the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, 
using all means necessary, including the use of air power” (italics added by author).252  Despite 
such strong rhetoric from the EU, further NATO action remained problematic due to continued 
internal European disagreements.  France, Belgium, and the Netherlands now strongly advocated 
military action to lift the siege of Sarajevo; but others in the EU (notably Greece and Lord 
Owen) opposed the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs.  The British remained cautious, while 
the Germans agreed that something had to be done—just not with the use of any German troops.   
 The issue of some form of response to the massacre of civilians in Sarajevo was raised by 
the U.S. and France in NATO.  The alliance, through passing a joint French-American 
communiqué on February 10, gave its full support to Boutros-Ghali’s request to implement any 
future air strikes and also issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs stating that if heavy weapons 
(i.e. artillery pieces and rocket launchers) in a thirteen-mile “exclusion zone” around Sarajevo 
had not been withdrawn or submitted to UN control by midnight February 20, then NATO would 
launch air strikes against any remaining heavy weapons.253  The ultimatum was opposed by the 
UK and Greece for different reasons.  Greece was concerned about the domestic political 
ramifications of supporting air strikes against the Serbs (who were traditional Greek allies); 
while the UK continued to favor negotiations.254  The vote in the North Atlantic Council was 
fifteen in favor with one abstention (Greece).255  The British, despite being reluctant to support 
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NATO air strikes, consented to such a move in order to prevent confrontation with the French 
and to preserve the credibility and solidarity of NATO.256  
On March 1, the Clinton administration, acting on its own and outside of international 
institutions, finalized an alliance between the Bosnian government, Bosnian Croats, and the 
Croatian government.257  The Washington agreement provided for a Muslim-Croat Federation, 
with a powerful central government, to comprise slightly more than half of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s prewar territory; the federation was also to merge in a loose economic union with 
Croatia.258  Three weeks later, on March 18, at a ceremony in Washington, President Clinton and 
representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia signed an accord on the creation of a 
Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, as well as a further “preliminary agreement on the 
establishment of a confederation” linking this new federation to Croatia in a loose 
confederation.259
 In response to a call on April 19 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin for an international 
summit on the Bosnia crisis between the U.S., EU, and Russia, the “Contact Group” was formed 
in London on April 26, comprising senior American, British, French, German, and Russian 
officials, with the aim of working “as a matter of urgency towards full cessation of hostilities for 
four months.”260  As Lawrence Freedman suggested however: “The need for a common policy 
often overruled the requirements of an effective policy in terms of the proclaimed 
objectives….At times, the Contact Group seemed to be sustained only by the shared reluctance 
to admit total failure.”261   
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 President Clinton warned on August 11 that if the Bosnian Serbs had not accepted the 
Contact Group’s plan by October 15, the U.S. would urge the UN Security Council to lift the 
arms embargo on Bosnia.262  The Bosnian Serbs refused to accept the plan.  In response, the U.S. 
announced on November 11 that it would no longer enforce the arms embargo against the former 
Yugoslavia, but (once the midterm election was over) he also publicly rejected the congressional 
insistence that the U.S. unilaterally lift the arms embargo.263  However, not willing to see a total 
military collapse of Bosnian government forces (which appeared fairly imminent if nothing 
further was done to help), the Clinton administration secretly supported efforts by Muslim 
countries (especially Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) to violate the arms embargo and 
provide badly needed weapons and munitions to the Bosnian Muslims through Croatia and 
through direct flights into Bosnia.264  In addition, U.S. active and former military personnel had 
covertly began advising and training the Bosnian Muslim-Croat army.265  This infusion of arms 
probably prevented an all-out Serb victory in late 1994/early 1995. 
By early 1995, the military balance was beginning to swing in favor of the Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats, even as extensive fighting took place around the “safe area” of Bihac.  A 
successful Muslim-Croat counteroffensive in late 1994 took back nearly sixty square miles of 
land from the Serbs; but in early 1995, the Bosnian Serbs, with help from Croatian Serbs, 
attacked and regained most of this land.266  With continued NATO resistance to the use of air 
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strikes (due mainly to opposition from the UK and France),267 the U.S. was faced with a 
dilemma.  As Joyce Kaufman writes: 
It could defy its allies and authorize air strikes (unilaterally) in support of the Bosnian 
Muslim forces and, in doing so, risk precipitating the withdrawal of UN forces from 
Bosnia; it could choose to abandon the idea of air strikes and risk losing the enclave of 
Bihac but also probably save the Alliance; or it could deploy the ground forces necessary 
to ensure that the UN could effectively protect the safe areas.  None of these options was 
desirable politically, but, forced to choose, the United States opted to ensure the 
continuation of the Alliance and abandoned the push for air strikes, at least for the 
present.268  
  
During this time, the UN and NATO eventually (and reluctantly) permitted limited air strikes 
against an airfield from which Croatian Serb aircraft were flying over Bihac’s no-fly zone and a 
few Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile sites that threatened NATO aircraft.269   
In March and April, Bosnian Serb forces launched a spring offensive, which included 
massive bombardments of the Tuzla and Sarajevo “safe areas.”  The NATO SACEUR (who was 
urged by President Clinton) requested permission to launch air strikes, but this was denied by the 
UN.270  When the Serbs ignored a NATO ultimatum, the UN finally approved limited punitive 
air strikes in late May.271  The first of these were flown on May 25 and 26, consisted mostly of 
American aircraft, and attacked Serb ammunition dumps and military installations near Bosnian 
Serb headquarters at Pale.272  In retaliation for the air strikes, however, the Serbs began detaining 
UNPROFOR personnel and using them as human shields.  NATO stopped its combat air strikes 
entirely after Serbs captured approximately 400 UN soldiers and used them as human shields at 
their military installations.273  Taking advantage of the absence of NATO air cover, the Bosnian 
                                                 
267 New York Times, November 25, 1994, p. A1. 
268 Kaufman, op. cit. in note 195, p. 115. 
269 Daalder, op. cit. in note 203, p. 32. 
270 Kaufman, op. cit. in note 195, p. 118. 
271 Finlan, op. cit. in note 235, pp. 52-53. 
272 New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A14 and May 26, 1995, p. A1; and Washington Post, May 26, 1995, p. A1. 
273 New York Times, May 27, 1995, p. A1. 
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Serbs launched an all-out offensive against the “safe area” of Srebrenica.  Despite pleading by 
the commander of Dutch UNPROFOR troops (Lieutenant Colonel Thom Karremans) at 
Srebrenica for direct air support to save his command, NATO refused to resume air strikes.274  
What eventually followed was the overrunning of Srebrenica and the massacre of an estimated 
7,000-8,000 Muslim males of various ages in July.275   
In the meantime, a major political change occurred in France, where Jacques Chirac 
replaced François Mitterand as President on May 17.  (He was elected in April.)  Chirac was 
much more critical of the problems with previous EU/UN policies in Bosnia than his predecessor 
was, and he persuaded UNPROFOR to revise its operational tactics to include a more aggressive 
set of rules of engagement.276  Chirac was also much less opposed to using air strikes against the 
Serbs than Mitterand277 and even went so far as to suggest that the UNSC approve the recapture 
of Srebrenica by force.278  This is no doubt a direct reason why there was a significant change in 
French (and thus UN, NATO, and EU) policy in May 1995.  Following the capture of 
UNPROFOR troops, Chirac felt that the crisis had reached an impasse and that the regime 
principals needed to decide whether to strengthen their forces and take more assertive action or 
to withdraw completely.279  Favoring the former, Chirac proposed the creation of a new force 
specifically designed to protect UNPROFOR forces by being capable of taking offensive 
action.280    
                                                 
274 Finlan, op. cit. in note 235, pp. 53-54. 
275 A well documented incident.  See Allin, op. cit. in note 96, p. 26; and Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia 
and Its Aftermath (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 63. 
276 Brune, op. cit. in note 234, p. 104. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Burg and Shoup, op. cit. in note 168, p. 326. 
279 Kaufman, op. cit. in note 195, p. 118. 
280 Ibid., p. 119; also New York Times, May 29, 1995, p. A5. 
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Thus, from late May through mid-June, the Contact Group (May 30), NATO (June 3), 
and the UNSC (June 16) jointly agreed on the creation of a 10,000-strong rapid reaction force 
(RRF), to consist of French, British, and Dutch troops and be under the command of 
UNPROFOR.281  The tasks of the RRF were set out in the Paris meeting as follows: 1) to 
retaliate in the event of an attack on UN forces; 2) to assist isolated units to regroup; 3) to 
support the besieged enclaves of eastern Bosnia; 4) to resupply besieged peacekeepers; and 5) to 
police UN-declared weapons-free zones, notably that around Sarajevo.282  Oddly enough, at 
about the same time, the UN indicated (on June 9) that UNPROFOR would return to “traditional 
peacekeeping principles” and would not interfere with Serb efforts to end the war by finishing 
off the eastern enclaves.283
 In July, following the UN declaration, the situation on the ground (not surprisingly) grew 
worse, as the Bosnian Serbs overran the “safe areas” of Zepa and Srebrenica.  The fall of 
Srebrenica and subsequent massacre prompted an urgent appeal from French President Jacques 
Chirac to use the RRF to retake the Muslim enclave.284  However, his request received little 
support from anyone else.  As Malcolm Rifkin, the British Foreign Secretary put it: “The RRF 
(had) neither the size nor the capacity to be a war-fighting machine.  We would be responsible 
for a cruel deception if we implied otherwise.”285   
On July 21, foreign and defense ministers of the Contact Group and the eleven other main 
contributors to UNPROFOR met in London for a one-day “crisis meeting.”  The conference 
                                                 
281 New York Times, May 30, 1995, p. A1 and June 4, 1995, p. A14; and Washington Post, May 30, 1995, p. A1 and 
June 4, 1995, p. A1.  
282 Ibid. 
283 The statement was issued by UN Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi, following a 
meeting with UNPROFOR commanders in Croatia, and supported by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.  See 
Daalder, op. cit. in note 203, p. 67. 
284 See note 270. 
285 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 71. 
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produced two major decisions.  First, NATO would “draw a line in the sand”286 around the 
enclave of Gorazde and respond to any Serb attack against it with a significant and sustained air 
campaign, which could include targets throughout Bosnia; and second, the decision to use air 
power and, if so, how much, would be made by NATO only, thereby removing the UN from 
direct decision-making authority and ending the inept “dual-key” command structure.287  This 
agreement was also formally approved by NATO at a meeting of the NAC on July 25.   
 NATO faced increased pressure to take action following a Serb mortar attack on 
Sarajevo’s Markale Market on August 28, 1995, which killed 37 civilians and wounded 88.288  
The deliberate attack against civilians became the focus of a great deal of media attention in the 
U.S. and Western Europe, and it increased the already widespread public outrage over human 
rights abuses inflicted by the Bosnian Serbs during the war.  This proved to be the proverbial 
“straw that broke the camel’s back” for NATO, and it responded to the attack by initiating its 
first ever sustained bombing campaign, called Operation Deliberate Force, which lasted for three 
weeks against Bosnian Serb military targets throughout the country.  These strikes were also 
followed by a Croatian offensive against the Krajina Serbs, which succeeded in retaking that 
territory that Croatia lost in the previous conflict.     
 Following Croatia’s successful Krajina offensive and the NATO air campaign, the U.S. 
called for a meeting of the Contact Group and the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and 
Yugoslavia, held in Geneva on September 8.  At the end of the talks, the parties signed an 
agreement covering the basic principles of a peace accord, including the continued existence of 
                                                 
286 A quote attributed to U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke; ibid.  
287 New York Times, July 22, 1995, p. A1; and Washington Post, July 22, 1995, p. A1.  Note that these decisions 
were made by the principals at the meeting, which was held outside of formal international institutions, although 
representatives from the UN and EU were invited and attended the conference.  Authority for air strikes now rested 
jointly with the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia (British General Rupert Smith) and the NATO AFSOUTH 
(Allied Forces South) commander (American Admiral Leighton Smith).   
288 New York Times, August 29, 1995, p. A1. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina within its prewar borders consisting, however, of two entities: the Serb 
Republic (Republica Srpska) and the (Muslim-Croat) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
 On October 5, a sixty-day ceasefire was announced by President Clinton.  This was 
followed a month later by three weeks of intense negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base in Dayton, Ohio, at the end of which, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed by the 
participants.  (See Appendix Three for the major points of the agreement.)  The peace agreement 
was negotiated mainly by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, with the UN, EU, 
and Russia permitted observer status but allowed no direct role in the negotiations.289  As part of 
the agreement, NATO deployed a 50,000-strong peacekeeping force (IFOR—later SFOR) to 
Bosnia.  The Bosnia war was over, but many of the policy-making, policy coordination, and 
implementation challenges it posed for the transatlantic security regime would be revisited only 
four years later during the Kosovo crisis.      
5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES 
5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Measuring Regime Policy Preferences in Bosnia 
Interestingly, the regime in this case viewed the indirect use of force as a higher level of 
escalation than punitive attacks.  Collective regime policy shifted over time.  Those shifts were 
as follows.  (Note that a given level of escalation also includes acceptance of all lower levels of 
intervention.)  
1992: Humanitarian Aid (1) + Peacekeeping (2) = 1.5  
1993: Surface Interdiction (3) + Defensive Air Interdiction (4) = 3.5 
                                                 
289 For detailed coverage of the Dayton negotiations and agreement, see Richard Holbrooke, op. cit. in note 285.  
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1994: Offensive Air Interdiction (5) = 5.0  
1995: Punitive Attacks (6) = 6.0   
 
USA/President George H.W. Bush 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Non-intervention (0)/Humanitarian Aid (1) 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Offensive Air Interdiction (5)   
• Average Preferred Intervention Rating = 0.5 
 
USA/President Bill Clinton 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Offensive Air Interdiction (5)/Punitive 
Attacks (6)/Indirect Use of Force (7)  
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Indirect Use of Force (7) 
• Average Preferred Intervention Rating = 6.0 
 
France/President François Mitterand 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping (2) 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Defensive Air Interdiction (4) 
• Average Intervention Rating = 1.5 
 
France/President Jacques Chirac 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Defensive Air Interdiction (4)/Offensive Air 
Interdiction (5) 
• Maximum Acceptable Rating = Punitive Attacks (6) 
• Average Intervention Rating = 4.5 
 
United Kingdom/Prime Minister John Major 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping (2) 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Punitive Attacks (6) 
• Average Preferred Intervention Rating = 1.5 
 
Germany/Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
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Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention=Humanitarian Aid (1)/ Peacekeeping 
(2)/Surface Interdiction (3)/Defensive Air Interdiction (4) 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Punitive Attacks (6) 
• Average Intervention Rating = 2.5 
 
5.4.2 Independent Variable 1: Power as Influence in Regime Policy Congruence 
The first hypothesis stated that collective regime policy would increasingly become 
easier to form as relative power within of the regime became increasingly concentrated with the 
hegemon (i.e. the U.S.).  Likewise, collective regime policy would increasingly become more 
difficult to form as relative power inside of the regime became more diffuse.  Unlike the Kosovo 
case, the Bosnia case study covers an extended period of time (approximately four years of 
European and transatlantic diplomacy).  As such, possible changes in the regime’s distribution of 
power can be analyzed within this particular case, as well as across the cases.  See Appendix 
Four for the complete breakdown of distribution of power within the regime across time. 
 At first glance, it does not seem that the distribution of power had any direct influence in 
formation of a collective policy regarding use of force in Bosnia.  First, the share of relative 
power among the major regime members remained relatively static over time, never fluctuating 
more than seventeen percent (in the case of France between 1994 and 1995).  And the American 
share of relative power never fluctuated more than 2.8 percent (a drop between 1994 and 1995).  
The lack of any significant change in relative power during the time period suggests one of two 
possibilities; either the first independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable, or the 
measurement of power being used is inappropriate (i.e. there is a measurement error).  To deal 
with the possibility of the second, I analyzed the power relationships a second time over the 
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same period, but this time using only MS (military spending) as the measurement criterion.  This 
was done to test the possibility that measurement of relative power as influence within a security 
regime—and especially with regard to issues concerning the collective use of force and military 
intervention—may be better measured in purely military power, rather than a combination of 
military and economic power.  (Again, see Appendix Four.) 
 Using only military spending as a measurement of intra-regime relative power does make 
for a more interesting analysis, as a change of as high as 29.8 percent took place (in France, from 
1994-1995).  However, overall, this measurement is still inconclusive.  Despite one or two fairly 
large changes in military power distribution, no country showed a constant increase or decrease 
across the time period.  Each of the four countries showed one or two years of increase in 
relative power and one or two years of decrease.  And the United States, as hegemon, 
demonstrated very little remarkable change one way or the other over the time period.   
 In this case, the United States was clearly dominant in the most relevant power 
resource—military capability—but that seems to have had little relevance.  The transatlantic 
balance of power seems to have had little impact on this particular regime policy change.  
Instead, power resources seem to have been important only to the extent that the regime 
(collectively or individual members) was willing to use them, not to influence each other, but to 
address the fighting in Bosnia.   
Thus, in conclusion, both realist, material-oriented measures of relative power as 
influence failed to demonstrate any correlation with the steady, measurable change in regime 
intervention policy over the time period of the Bosnia crisis.  Of particular interest is the fact that 
the U.S., despite having an overwhelming relative share of power (measured in either manner) 
among the major regime members was not able to translate that power into influence under the 
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Clinton administration.  This may indicate one of two things.  First, that realist assumptions 
about the distribution/concentration of power in the international system is not translatable into 
influence between or among regime members (and thus the first independent variable fails).  Or, 
it may indicate that the materialistic measurement of power is simply not an adequate one, and a 
more intricate and less materialistic measurement is necessary for further study (something, in 
fact covered by Volgy and Bailin290 as well as in the literature more generally).  However, the 
second possibility is beyond the limited scope of this dissertation.  For purposes of the first case 
study, the distribution/concentration of power in the transatlantic security regime has no 
correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, and the H1 hypothesis 
may be rejected.  
 
5.4.3 Independent Variable 2: Threat Perception and Regime Policy Congruence  
In realist theory, one of the strongest assumptions is that the presence of an external 
threat will cause greater cohesion among allies.  Indeed, the Soviet threat has often been credited 
with providing the glue that kept NATO together during the Cold War.  But there was no similar 
threat to enforce transatlantic cohesion on the issue of Bosnia.  Of course, both the United States 
and Western Europe were concerned about instability on the continent in the aftermath of the 
Cold War.  And both ultimately identified the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors in the Bosnia war.  
But the truth was that as long as the conflict was contained within the former Yugoslavia, there 
was little direct threat to the interests of most regime members.  As David Gompert noted: 
“Neither the United States nor any other power saw its vital interests imperiled by the conflict.  
                                                 
290 Op. cit. in note 79. 
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The West had a political and moral interest in humanitarian relief and a strategic interest in 
containment—and in fact, the United States and EC have been successful in protecting those two 
interests.”291   
The major members of the transatlantic security regime maintained that three critical 
issues justified their involvement in Bosnia: massive movement of refugees, the humanitarian 
crisis brought on by the war, and the Bosnian Serbs’ human rights violations.292  Moreover, the 
major regime members were concerned that the spillover of fighting and mass refugee 
movements would continue to spread to Kosovo and/or Macedonia and draw in more parties to 
the conflict.293  This would seem to indicate that the major regime members saw at least two 
direct security threats from the war in Bosnia: refugee flows and possible spillover of the 
conflict.  However, the regime initially decided not to use military force in Bosnia, based, in 
large part, on the belief that Yugoslavia was no longer strategically important and that the 
conflict was not worth risking lives.  Instead, non-aggressive intervention was undertaken earlier 
in the conflict, including economic sanctions and humanitarian relief.  From a threat assessment 
perspective, the question then is how similar was individual regime members’ threat assessment, 
and did the regime’s collective perception of the threat arising from conflict in Bosnia change 
over time?  
In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to a continuum of threat level 
intensity, regime participation in military intervention responding to the Bosnia conflict 
represented a low level of threat to regime members (as defined in Chapter Four).  Table One 
                                                 
291 David C. Gompert, “How to Defeat Serbia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, p. 42.  
292 James B. Steinberg, “International Involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict” in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), 
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293 Susan L. Woodward, “Upside-Down Policy: The U.S. Debate on the Use of Force and the Case of Bosnia” in 
H.W. Brands, Darren J. Pierson, and Reynolds S. Kiefer (eds.), The Use of Force after the Cold War (College 
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(see below) demonstrates a rather interesting observation, in that out of the four states, Germany 
had the highest level of threat perception.  While Germany was the most politically active of the 
three states at the outset of the crisis, it was always the most reluctant to commit its own military 
forces.  This has no direct bearing on my dependent variable, but it does lead to interesting 
intellectual questions regarding national (as opposed to international or regional) security, threat 
perception, and the use of military force.   
Additionally (and more specifically relevant to this dissertation), while one could argue 
based on this threat assessment that Germany had the most at stake in the crisis in terms of 
national interest, one could also argue that (out of the four) Germany was the least cooperative in 
terms of facilitating the advancement of a collective regime policy.  Finally, given the nearly 
complete lack of debate among the major regime members about a specific security threat (or its 
absence) during the time period of the case study, this variable may also be classified as 
irrelevant (or at least non-causal).  Thus, for purposes of the first case study, perceived external 
threat to the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence or 









Table One: Threat Matrix for Bosnia Case Study294
 Imminence295 Probability296 Proximity297 Severity298
France Low to Medium Low Low Very Low 
Germany Low to Medium Medium Medium Very Low 
United Kingdom Low to Medium Low Low Very Low 
United States Low to Medium Very Low Very Low Very Low 
 
5.4.4 Independent Variable 3: International Institutions and Regime Policy Congruence 
One of the major differences between realism and neoliberal institutionalism is the 
emphasis placed by the latter on international institutions.  The main argument (as outlined in 
Chapter Four) is that the creation and maintenance of such institutions can affect the interests of 
states and may come to be more important to a national government than achieving immediate, 
short-term interests that may run counter to the interests of the institution or its collective 
                                                 
294 In this case, specifically the dual threats of conflict spillover and/or refugee exodus that would directly threaten 
that country.  Note that there are, in effect, no real security “threats” to individual states in the traditional military-
based view of security.  Rather, the threats being analyzed are to regional stability as it would impact the state and 
domestic economic stability.    
295 Imminence is the amount of warning time available for the country to prepare for or respond to a security threat.  
Very High=Warning/reaction time measured in seconds or minutes; High=Warning/reaction time greater than one 
hour but less than one day; Medium=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one day but less than one week; 
Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one week but less than one month; and Very 
Low=Warning/reaction time measured in more than one month.   
296 This is easily the most difficult type of threat to estimate.  The estimates are based on the historical evidence as 
provided in this chapter.  Probability indicates likelihood of occurrence without any outside intervention.  Very 
High=Greater than 80%; High=60-80%; Medium=40-60%; Low=20-40%; Very Low=Less than 20%.   
297 Geographic proximity of potential threat.  Very High=Bordering country; High=Nearby country separated only 
by major geographic impasse; Medium=Nearby country separated by a single interposed country; Low=Country is 
in same continent; Very Low=Countries are in different continents. 
298 Likely number of short-term (i.e. within hours, days, or weeks) human casualties or economic costs suffered if 
threat is actuated.  Very High=Tens of thousands of deaths (or more) and/or tens of billions of dollars in economic 
costs; High=Thousands of deaths and/or billions of dollars in economic costs; Medium=Hundreds of deaths and/or 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in economic costs; Low=Scores or dozens of deaths and/or tens of thousands of 
dollars in economic costs; Very Low=Few or no deaths and/or thousands of dollars or less in economic costs.     
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membership as a whole.  In the case of Bosnia, there were three main international institutions 
involved: the UN, NATO, and the EC/EU.    
 The first important finding regarding this variable is that some of the major political 
decisions of the four major individual states within the regime came unilaterally and despite 
protests by representatives of international institutions such as the UN, as well as individual 
governments.299  This is interesting, because the literature on international institutions would 
suggest that institutional participation creates norms that constrain the actions of member states.  
While each of the four major powers did consult individual NATO allies and EC/EU member 
states, as well as the organizations themselves about the details of various diplomatic and 
military proposals (especially regarding implementation of any specific decisions), the overall 
policy making process was primarily national and/or bilateral.  The EC/EU played no role 
whatsoever in the debates surrounding and decisions leading up to use of force.  And once 
NATO actually became involved in the crisis, its primary role was to accommodate and manage 
policy decisions rather than initiate them.  In contrast to the international institutions literature, 
the major regime member states acted within some institutional constraints, but those constraints 
were frequently overshadowed by perceived national interest.                       
 The second important finding is that while the United States (which was the only regime 
member truly capable of unilateral military action) might have been tempted to unilaterally use 
military force (to unilaterally initiate “lift and strike,” for example), this was never a serious 
consideration.  Throughout the entire crisis (including the administrations of both U.S. 
                                                 
299 Specifically the following actions: Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia; France’s unilateral 
deployment of attack helicopters to Sarajevo; and the U.S.’s unilateral decision to cease enforcement of the arms 
embargo against rump Yugoslavia. 
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presidents), American policy makers consistently and repeatedly emphasized that the U.S. would 
not act unilaterally with regard to the use of force.   
In early April 1993, for example, President Clinton acknowledged differences with the 
NATO allies but reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to work through the UN: 
“(The United States has) in many cases been more aggressive in what we were willing to 
than the European neighbors of the former Yugoslavia….The United States is not capable 
of solving the problem alone….If you believe that we should engage this problem in a 
multilateral way…then the reverse has to be true too….The United States has got to work 
through the United Nations, and all our views may not always prevail.”300   
 
In short (and more specifically regarding use of military force rather than purely political or 
economic issues), although some aspects of this case appear inconsistent with this hypothesis, 
there was no attempt to appeal to the UN as an external (i.e. outside of the transatlantic security 
regime) institution in order to facilitate collective policy formation and implementation, nor was 
there a threat to the formal rules and operating procedures of either of the two international 
institutions within the regime (NATO and the EC/EU) that any regime members felt the need to 
resist.      
Such an institutional threat (albeit a modest one) did surface during this period as the 
regime principals discussed the options of air strikes.  The U.S. State Department sent a letter to 
Senator Joe Biden, an outspoken supporter of stronger military action in Bosnia, saying that 
because UNSC Resolution 770 permitted members to use “all necessary means” to deliver 
humanitarian supplies, no further authorization was needed for air strikes.301  This was not the 
view of most European regime member governments, which believed that a new UNSC 
resolution would be required.  Thus, it is possible that the Europeans resisted the idea of air 
strikes because they believed such action would damage NATO credibility without a specific 
                                                 
300 Washington Post, April 7, 1993, p. A1. 
301 Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. A1. 
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UNSC resolution.  It is more likely, however, that the Europeans were simply skeptical about the 
utility of air strikes and concerned about the safety of their own ground forces.   
It is also possible that various policy advocates and advisors may have appealed to 
institutional solidarity—and thus to the relevance and cohesion of both NATO and the EU—as 
part of the attempt to form a cohesive collective policy.  There is evidence that at least two such 
appeals affected the position of at least some European governments.  The first, as discussed 
previously in this chapter, was the political pressure leveraged by Germany in leading the EC to 
recognizing Croatian and Slovenian independence before a common EC position could be 
debated and adopted.  The argument was that the EC had to follow Germany’s lead or risk 
jeopardizing its newly agreed upon CFSP.   
Additionally, one can see similar logic within NATO specifically regarding decisions to 
use military force.  Just before Warren Christopher’s May 1993 trip to Europe, British Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons: “We have to stick together as we consider 
these options.  We are not going to allow the Atlantic alliance to fracture on this issue.”302  In 
theory, this provided an opening for the United States to make just such an appeal—i.e. to 
emulate Germany in militarily leading NATO into using stronger military force, just as Germany 
had politically led the EC/EU into recognizing Croatian and Slovenian sovereignty.  It appeared 
that, just as with the debate over recognition, some of the Europeans (most notably the UK) were 
willing to change their policy preferences and position rather than endanger NATO or EC/EU 
cohesion.   
However, while Europeans (on both sides of the debate) used the institutional cohesion 
argument, the Americans were apparently not ready to use this as a bargaining mechanism.  Both 
                                                 
302 New York Times, April 30, 1993, p. A1. 
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before and after Christopher’s trip, it appears that the Clinton administration explicitly rejected 
putting NATO cohesion in jeopardy in order to gain regime support for U.S. policies.  As one 
U.S. official put it: “If we’d bet the ranch, said to the French and the English (sic), ‘This 
threatens a fundamental breach in our relationships,’ we could perhaps have got (sic) the 
Europeans—kicking and screaming—involved.  But this would have made it an American 
problem.”303  If anything, the unwillingness of the Clinton administration to make such an appeal 
may have delayed the ability of the regime to formulate a collective policy regarding the use of 
force.   
Thus, different aspects of this case appear to be both consistent and inconsistent with the 
hypothesis; but those aspects of the case do support the hypothesis do so in a corollary rather 
than a causal manner.  There is enough cursory and counterfactual evidence that merits further 
investigation.  Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the presence of an “enforcing” regime 
institution has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, 
but it does not conclusively prove to be a causal factor.  The H3 hypothesis should not be 
rejected.  
Additional research and analysis is necessary to make any further assessments, in 
particular, the differing roles played by simple institutional membership versus actual 
institutional participation.  Specifically, further research should examine a larger selection of 
regime member states in order to evaluate if this type of institutional constraint is more 
applicable (or applicable at all) to smaller regime member states, which the institutionalist 
literature argues are more susceptible to such constraint and have less freedom of action.  The 
argument developed here would expect to see that many of the smaller regime member states 
                                                 
303 Elizabeth Drew, op. cit. in note 206, p. 156. 
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would be unable or unwilling to make the kinds of unilateral decisions that the larger regime 
members made during the crisis.   
5.4.5 Independent Variable 4: Risk Assessment and Regime Policy Congruence  
As discussed earlier, the member states of the transatlantic security regime were 
extremely reluctant to contribute direct military assistance to Bosnia.  This reluctance was in part 
due to the risks and/or costs that might accompany multilateral military intervention, and these 
risks/costs were very evident before and during the civil war.  Both the demography and 
geography of Yugoslavia presented enormous challenges to any military operation.  Thomas 
Mockaitis points out that, “The unique political/military geography of Yugoslavia guaranteed 
that the conflict would be bloody even by the standards of a civil war.”304  Moreover, animosities 
between the three ethnic groups can be traced back for centuries.  Thus it was fairly evident to 
most Western powers that any deployment of ground combat troops in support of a multilateral 
intervention would require a long-term (and therefore costly) commitment.   
 Costs of potential military intervention may be measured in terms of expected economic, 
human, and political costs/risks.  The long-term military commitment (through NATO’s IFOR 
and SFOR missions and now through the EU peacekeeping mission—EUFOR) did result in a 
number of costs.  The U.S. contribution alone to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia 
(1996-2003) cost approximately $12.5 billion.305  On the other hand, the human costs of 
peacekeeping in Bosnia have been extremely light, although there were fears and predictions of 
                                                 
304 Thomas R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?  (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), pp. 82.  
305 Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2003).  
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NATO forces suffering heavy casualties.  In contrast, domestic political costs had the potential 
for being high.   
Participation in multilateral military intervention in Bosnia constituted a significant risk 
to the members of the transatlantic security regime—economic, military, and political.  High-
level risks/costs were present as a result of the conflict being a civil war, the level of long-term 
involvement expected (time of operation), the fact that intervention would have to take place 
during an active conflict, the nature of the physical environment, the potential for negative 
consequences to the regime’s relationship with Russia, the perceived (if not actual) human costs, 
uncertain public support in case of failure or serious setbacks, and the extent (size) of the 
operation.  The perceived benefits of increased military intervention were the obvious 
humanitarian crisis, the need to maintain the credibility of the regime (as well as the UN), and 
the need to address/alleviate widespread Western public concern/opinion.   
The case of Bosnia seems to support the hypothesis regarding the cost-benefit conditions 
under which the transatlantic security regime will adopt a cohesive, collective policy regarding 
military intervention.  When UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia in 1992, neither the United 
Nations nor the countries contributing troops believed that the force’s protection of aid convoys 
would provoke armed, organized resistance from the warring factions.  Thus, the perceived 
military and human costs were initially low, and there was little disagreement among the major 
regime members.  As the Bosnian Serbs began an increasingly systematic campaign of 
interference with UN relief operations, the Europeans began planning for the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR.  However, once it became clear that retreating was likely to provoke even more 
opposition and human rights abuses (which translated into greater human and political costs) 
than remaining in Bosnia under the current conditions, the regime members began to disagree 
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about options for military escalation or intervention.  Faced with the variety of possible military 
options mentioned earlier, the regime members chose to adopt the use of NATO air strikes to 
pressure the Bosnian Serbs—a very rational option that reflected a balance between the 
increasing political and human costs of continuing the status quo and the higher military and 
economic costs of more large-scale intervention.  But it was changes in the perceived cost-
benefit analysis that (in part) pushed the regime members to move from agreement to 
disagreement and back to agreement.  When European costs of escalation were higher than 
American costs, there was disagreement; but when the costs were more equally shared, there 
was stronger agreement. 
The Bosnia case thus seems to provide (qualified) support for this hypothesis.  In this 
instance, the major regime members were in agreement on the need to avoid armed, organized 
resistance in order to lower the costs of intervention (although Americans and Europeans had 
different types of costs).  For example, by waiting until a peace agreement was in place before 
deploying IFOR, the regime members undoubtedly sought to avert a significant number of 
casualties (i.e. reduce the military and human costs of intervention).   
In the final analysis, it is obvious that once the Europeans committed ground troops to the 
UNPROFOR mission, they faced a completely different risk and associated costs than the U.S. 
did with regard to escalating the use of military force.  The Europeans, by the very act of 
committing ground forces, expressed a higher degree of perception of utility gained by military 
involvement in Bosnia.  However, through its equally obvious reluctance to commit its own 
ground troops to any intervention in Bosnia (initially even to a post-conflict peacekeeping role), 
the U.S. demonstrated a perception of higher costs associated with ground intervention—but 
lesser costs associated with the use of air power and the “lift and strike” proposal.  In other 
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words, the U.S. and Europeans had diametrically opposite views of perceived costs and benefits 
associated with increasing military intervention and the nature of such intervention.  This clearly 
led to complete intransigence in forming a common intervention policy until the Europeans 
changed their position and agreed to NATO air strikes, and the U.S. changed its position and 
agreed to commit ground troops to peacekeeping operations.   
The greater the perceived costs of intervention in Bosnia compared to the benefits, the 
more unlikely any individual regime member was to support increased intervention.  It was 
differences among major regime members in this cost-benefit analysis that caused (to some 
degree) the lack of a congruent policy.  When those perceptual differences changed, so too did 
the ease of policy congruence.  What this variable cannot seem to explain, however, is what 
caused the changes in utility perception among various members?  For an answer to that 
question, other variables must be examined.  Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the 
perceived risk analysis or cost-benefit ratio of the policy also has a strong correlation with 
regime policy congruence (and, in fact, seems to play a relatively strong causal role)—but not 
necessarily with changes over time therein.  The H4 hypothesis should not be rejected.  
5.4.6 Independent Variable 5: Perceptual Lenses and Regime Policy Congruence  
When the Clinton administration sought European agreement on its more aggressive 
policy of “lift and strike,” it had little in terms of shared political ideology or personal 
relationships with European leaders to fall back on.  The Clinton administration was a center-left 
Democratic one, and the major leaders of Europe were either from center-right political parties 
(Major in the United Kingdom and Kohl in Germany) or even farther left than Clinton and his 
advisors (Mitterand’s socialist government in France).  Furthermore, the policy was largely 
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devised and decided upon at the highest levels of U.S. government, and no major administration 
officials (Lake, Christopher, Albright, Aspin, Powell, Gore, and Clinton) were “Europeanists.”306  
As members of a new (and very domestically-oriented) administration, they had not yet had time 
to develop firm relationships with their European colleagues.  Table Two outlines the various 

















                                                 
306 John Peterson, “Europe and America in the Clinton Era,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 
(September 1994), pp. 416-417.  See also “Cool Winds from the White House,” Economist, March 27, 1993, in 
which Lake admitted that he had never heard of the Transatlantic Declaration.   
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Table Two: Transatlantic Belief Structures in Bosnia Intervention Policy 
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Each of the leaders of the four major regime members had strong political/ideological 
core values that appear to translate into their varying positions on military intervention during the 
crisis in Bosnia.   The key members of each typology are as follows.  The non-intervention 
typology included American Republican President George H.W. Bush, British Conservative 
Prime Minister John Major, and French Socialist President François Mitterand.  The limited 
intervention typology included French President Jacques Chirac, German Christian Democrat 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and American Democrat President Bill Clinton. 
Using the measurements discussed previously, the political/ideological typologies may be 
placed within the parameters of the dependent variable in a ratio manner: 0-2=non-intervention 
typology; 2.1-5=limited intervention typology; and 5.1-8=active intervention typology.  Thus, 
President Bush, President Mitterand, and Prime Minister John Major all fall ideologically within 
the non-intervention typology; President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl fall within the limited 
intervention typology; and President Clinton falls within the active intervention typology.  
Ideologically, then, during the Bosnia crisis, one can see a sort of horseshoe-shaped ideological 
graph in which political leaders may be placed based upon the joining of their political beliefs 
and policy preferences about military intervention and use of force during the crisis.   
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                    (President Clinton)                  (President Chirac, Chancellor Kohl) 
 
“Leftist”          “Rightist” 
Political Ideology       Political Ideology 
 
 
          Non-intervention                           Non-intervention 





The question still remains, however, of what impact (if any) these ideological 
typologies/belief structures had on regime policy congruence.  Policy core beliefs clearly came 
into conflict during the crisis in Bosnia.  In competition were the non-interventionists’ core 
beliefs of the national interest and staying out of “peripheral” wars versus (both groups of) the 
interventionists’ core belief in maintaining regional balances of power and/or upholding human 
rights.  All three groups protected their normative core beliefs by making adjustments in 
secondary (policy core) aspects of their belief systems, and this may be why a sort of “middle 
ground” of limited intervention evolved as regime policy—especially after the change of 
governmental leadership in both the U.S. and France, from non-interventionists to active 
(former) and limited (latter) interventionists.  It required the least amount of change (in terms of 
secondary beliefs) on behalf of the non-interventionists and active interventionists.  It is clear, 
based on this analysis, that not only did each major political leader possess his own set of belief 
structures regarding the issue-area but that the change in leadership (and therefore belief 
structures) in two of the major leadership positions coincided with changes in regime policy.  
Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the degree of congruence in the ideological 
beliefs/structures of the leaders of the major regime member states also has a strong correlation 
with regime policy congruence and, in fact, also seems to play a relatively strong causal role—
including influencing changes in regime policy over time.  The H5 hypothesis should not be 
rejected.    
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5.4.7 Independent Variable 6: Domestic Political Pressures and Regime Policy 
Congruence 
Although much of international relations theory treats states as unified actors, this is not 
often the case in reality.  State governments (particularly democratic ones) are often divided.  
Additionally, public opinion can play a strong role in influencing national decision-makers 
regarding national foreign policies.  It is therefore only logical to assume that such pressures may 
also influence regime-level policy formation and cohesion.  Thus, an important variable to 
examine regarding regime policy congruence (or lack thereof) regarding use of force in Bosnia is 
the domestic political considerations of the four major members.   
 
The United States 
 In the United States, the first public response to the civil war in Yugoslavia was that the 
U.S. had no stake or responsibility in the conflict.  This was followed by sustained indifference 
to the extraordinary amounts of coverage given the war by the US media.  As the brutality 
intensified, the longer-term reaction was a growing feeling among many (but not most) 
Americans that the U.S. was avoiding a broader moral responsibility in the Balkans.  However, 
this was not accompanied by a consensus on what exactly the U.S. should do.   
 At the outset of the civil wars in Yugoslavia, in a December 1991 Times Mirror survey, 
fewer than ten percent of Americans said they were paying “very close” attention to news of the 
conflict.307  The indifference remained high throughout the spring of 1992, even as the war in 
                                                 
307 Data from Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “The People, the Press, and the Use of Force” in The 
Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, Maryland: 
The Aspen Institute, 1995), p. 149. 
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Bosnia was given extensive television coverage, including reports of ethnic cleansing, rapes, and 
other atrocities.   
Most polls taken in 1993 suggested that, while relatively ambivalent about the issue 
generally, the public would strongly oppose unilateral intervention and/or use of ground troops 
but would moderately support some form of multilateral action to alleviate the growing 
humanitarian crisis.  A January 1993 CBS/New York Times poll, taken as U.S. air drops of food 
had begun, found that 67 percent said that the United States does not have “a responsibility to do 
something about the fighting between Serbs and Bosnians,” while 24 percent said it did.308  A 
similar result was found at the same time by a Times Mirror survey, when the public was asked 
if U.S. forces should be used “in Bosnia to help end the fighting there”; 55 percent said no, and 
32 percent said yes.309  In the same poll, only slightly more support came when the element of 
fighting aggression was introduced; 47 percent opposed using U.S. forces “to prevent Bosnia 
from being taken over by the Serbs,” while 36 percent favored it.310   
An early May poll found twelve percent of the public favored and 86 percent opposed the 
United States taking “military action alone to try to stop the fighting in Bosnia.”311  Another poll 
found that 65 percent favored and 32 percent opposed “carrying out air strikes” along with the 
NATO allies against the Bosnian Serbs.312  After President Clinton announced in February his 
pledge to send U.S. troops to enforce a peace agreement, 41 percent favored the decision and 51 
percent opposed it; but support rose to 58 percent favoring and 32 percent opposed if the troops 
were part of an “international peacekeeping force.”313  Little support existed for unilateral action 
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by the United States to end the war.  In an April 1993 poll, only 35 percent favored, while 52 
percent opposed the U.S. “sending troops to Yugoslavia to try to help stop the civil war there.”314  
But the public that was giving pollsters its opinions was still an uninformed one, as only around 
fifteen percent of the public said that they were tracking the news from Bosnia “very closely” in 
1993, and this figure did not change much in 1994 or 1995, despite the intense media coverage 
of the war.315  Indeed, the level of public interest in Bosnia over the course of the conflict 
demonstrates little correlation to the nature and extent of media coverage.  Only once (prior to 
the Dayton Accords) did the proportion of the public who followed news of the Bosnia conflict 
“very closely” climb above twenty percent, and that was in May 1993, when U.S. military action 
appeared likely.316  Mostly, it hovered at the fifteen percent level throughout 1993, dipping to 
twelve percent in 1994.317
Over the course of 1993, a majority of Americans continued to believe that the United 
States did not have a responsibility to do something about the fighting in Bosnia in the polls.  By 
1994, with the prospects of U.S. air strikes and the slaughter of 68 civilians in an outdoor market 
in Sarajevo, there was a steady rise in the view that the United States did have a responsibility to 
do “something”—although this was still a minority.  Despite many hours of television coverage, 
as well as commentary in the print media, the prevailing attitude in 1994 still remained that this 
was not an American problem.  Specific questions about the use of force in Bosnia in 1994 
revealed responses along the following lines.318  Questions that asked if U.S. forces should be 
employed to make peace were rejected.  Questions that tested participation in multilateral 
peacekeeping generally drew more support unless the wording suggested that U.S. forces might 
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become involved in a shooting war.  Questions that tested whether U.S. forces should be used to 
protect UN peacekeepers received strong support. 
 Even limited U.S. air strikes for humanitarian purposes had drawn little support initially.  
A Gallup poll in August 1992 found only 35 percent agreeing that the United States should “take 
the lead” in seeking UN-backed air strikes to unblock relief efforts to Sarajevo; (45 percent said 
it should not).319  Similarly, a CBS/New York Times poll found that the use of U.S. planes to 
bomb targets to get food and medicine to civilians was favored by only 39 percent and opposed 
by 43 percent.320  Using non-combat aircraft to distribute humanitarian aid was favored by 67 
percent in a Los Angeles Times poll in the same mid-1992 period. 
 Throughout much of 1993, Gallup found U.S. air strikes against Bosnian Serb military 
forces opposed by majorities—62 percent in April and 56 percent in May—who said the United 
States should not get militarily involved.321  With rising Bosnian Serb attacks and heightened 
Bosnian Serb intransigence toward peace efforts, however, support increased for air strikes more 
broadly.  Once actual U.S. air strikes were carried out through NATO against Bosnian Serbs 
attacking Sarajevo, they drew 51 percent and sixty percent support in August 1993 polls by 
Gallup/CNN/USA Today and ABC/Washington Post, respectively.322  A June 1993 CBS/New 
York Times survey found that using U.S. planes to bomb targets that were attacking UN 
peacekeepers was favored by 61 percent of the public.323  But these narrow majorities of support 
only came after the decision was made by the Clinton administration and the actual air strikes 
had begun.  
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Although public attitudes towards U.S. air strikes were somewhat ambivalent, use of air 
power was still clearly favored over using U.S. ground troops (except as part of a post-conflict 
peacekeeping force).  In early 1993, Times Mirror found that by a 55 percent to 32 percent 
margin, the public opposed the use of force to help end the fighting in Bosnia or to prevent 
Bosnia from being taken over by the Serbs (47 percent to 36 percent).324  Support for deploying 
U.S. “armed forces” as part of a UN operation to deliver relief supplies was 57 percent in a 
December 1992 Gallup poll.325  But when the possible risk of U.S. forces being subject to hostile 
fire was introduced into the question, a September 1993 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found 
opposition to deployment of U.S. forces—even as peacekeepers—rose to 59 percent.326   
 When a mortar shell struck the marketplace in Sarajevo on February 5, 1994, the grizzly 
scenes of civilian deaths and injuries were displayed on television screens around the world.  The 
gruesome coverage of the shelling of Sarajevo seemed to shift public support in favor of air 
strikes.  Although a January 1994 poll about U.S. participation in multilateral air strikes found 
only 35 percent of Americans favoring such action and 56 percent opposing it, polls shortly after 
the shelling found the public virtually deadlocked on support for multilateral air strikes (48 
percent in favor to 45 percent opposed).327     
 By early June 1995, the public still overwhelmingly opposed sending U.S. troops to 
Bosnia to “try and end the fighting,” with 21 percent in favor and 73 percent opposed.328  At the 
same time, however, the public rallied around the policies the administration had selected.  The 
public supported sending American troops to “maintain peace and protect relief operations” (61 
percent to 32 percent), favored “the use of U.S. military forces to help UN peacekeepers move to 
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safer places in Bosnia” (65 percent to 29 percent), approved of sending ground troops to “help 
UN forces to withdraw safely” (68 percent to 27 percent), and, regarding more aggressive action, 
favored multilateral air strikes if the Serbs continued “to attack Bosnian cities or UN 
peacekeeping troops” (56 percent to 33 percent).329  
 There were distinct differences in attitudes among Americans, however, depending on the 
type of proposed intervention in Bosnia.  Support was strongest for sending U.N. peacekeepers 
(eighty percent in July 1992), airdrops of humanitarian relief (67 percent in February 1993), air 
cover for U.N. peacekeeping troops (61 percent in August 1993), and shooting down Serbian 
planes violating the October 1992 no-fly zone (61 percent in April 1993).330  Support for lifting 
the September 1991 arms embargo (57 percent in June 1994), bombing by NATO to protect safe 
havens (54 percent in April 1994), and U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping after a peace 
settlement (54 percent in June 1993) has at times ranged above 50 percent.331   
Although support for allied air strikes against Serbian military forces in Bosnia was 
initially low (30 percent in April 1993), approval rates grew over time.332  During the summer of 
1993, a majority approved of retaliatory strikes in response either to Serbian attacks (54 percent 
in August 1993) or to threats against UN peacekeepers (85 percent in August 1993), and to 
protect humanitarian shipments (69 percent in August 1993).333   Ironically, there was at that 
time less sentiment for strikes to protect the Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo (50 percent in August 
1993) or to force the Bosnian Serbs out of territory occupied during the war (40 percent in 
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August 1993).334  Thus, Americans were more willing to use air power to protect UN soldiers 
providing aid than to save Bosnian civilians or punish the Serbian military. 
In sum, between 1992 and 1995, there was generally majority support for U.S. assistance 
in providing humanitarian aid and protecting peacekeepers.  Most Americans also were willing 
to use U.S. air power to protect UN troops and Bosnian Muslims in safe havens.  Support did 
grow for more active U.S. involvement (and specifically for the use of U.S. combat troops), but 
this always remained in the minority.  There was somewhat more support for allied military 
actions in which the United States might participate and considerable approval for U.S. soldiers 
protecting U.N. forces.  Yet as the risks grew, support generally dropped. 
American attitudes toward Bosnia and the issue of intervention were clearly influenced 
by events and changes in U.S. policy, rather than the other way around.  Contradictory 
pronouncements from the White House, inconsistent UN policies, and the multiple peace 
proposals, threats, and cease-fires all contributed to the inconsistency of American public 
opinion.  When the Clinton administration took a clear position against Serbian aggression in 
May and August 1993, in February 1994, and in August 1995, the public moved in the direction 
of supporting military action.335  For instance, during the spring of 1993, when the Clinton 
administration began talking about possible American intervention, support for military action 
rose from 23 to 40 percent.336 
Wariness of ground force engagement aside, measures of support for multilateral 
participation increased despite the clear consensus that Bosnia was not an American problem.  
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While the war in Bosnia, and especially the subsequent atrocities, created a huge surge in media 
coverage in the United States, that media coverage did not seem to initially affect American 
public opinion to any great extent.  Increased television and other media coverage of Bosnia only 
seemed to increase Americans’ willingness to become more involved after years of bloodshed 
and only after changes in official U.S. policy occurred.  As noted by the polls, the vast majority 
of Americans had virtually no interest and/or knowledge of the events in Bosnia throughout the 
time period.  Thus, public opinion polling about specific policy preferences tended to fall into 
three categories: 1) a strong desire to avoid getting too involved (and risking loss of American 
lives); 2) a moderate desire to do something to help; and 3) a simple rallying effect of supporting 
the administration’s policies as long as they met conditions one and two.     
Throughout the Bosnia crisis, the Clinton administration focused heavily on domestic 
considerations during deliberations over policy goals and means, and these debates, public 
opinion was an important constraining influence.  Public opinion affected choices concerning 
foreign policy priorities, goals, and means regarding intervention in Bosnia.   
Thus, while President Clinton favored “doing something” about the Bosnian conflict, the 
core problem remained what to do.  For Clinton, public opinion was the concern that provided 
context for any action.  He therefore ruled out two options.  First, because he feared any 
unilateral action would erode domestic support, he rejected acting without allied support.  
Second, other than to enforce a peace agreement, he also removed U.S. ground troops from the 
table because of the lack of public support coupled with fears of a possible quagmire.  This 
narrowed the U.S. policy options regarding use of force.  While public opinion did not determine 




Meanwhile, in Europe, the German government had strong domestic support for 
supporting more aggressive military action—but only if that action was taken by someone else; 
Germans were staunchly opposed to any direct German military involvement in the crisis.  
Despite strong domestic support for intervention, French President Mitterand worried about his 
slippage in public opinion polls with upcoming elections, and his Socialist government was wary 
of any action that might impose serious domestic political costs if it went badly—such as 
adopting a more aggressive military option.  The French and British alike also had to concern 
themselves over the effect that casualties among their UNPROFOR troops (possibly arising as 
retaliation for NATO air strikes) would have on public opinion.   
European governments, however, generally had a stronger base of support for potential use 
of force in Bosnia.  Since at least late 1992, the publics of France, the United Kingdom, and 
(usually) Germany supported military intervention in Bosnia.  For the most part, European 
publics were thus more willing than their governments to take military action against the Bosnian 
Serbs.  In January 1993, a significant number (47 percent) across Western Europe held very 
negative images of the Serbs, and a majority supported the use of force against them.337  
European publics, like the American public, also preferred multilateral action and leadership.  
Majorities in each European country in January 1993 thought “the United Nations should 
authorize a multinational force to intervene militarily in the former Yugoslavia.”338   
European citizens also were more supportive of direct military intervention than the 
American public or European leaders.  In particular, there was strong support among the citizens 
of Western Europe for the use of force.  In late 1992 and early 1993, pluralities to majorities in 
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France, Britain, and Germany supported the authorization of multilateral U.N. intervention in the 
crisis (44 to seventy percent).339  Large majorities supported humanitarian intervention, 
particularly by a multilateral force (64 to 92 percent), but majorities also supported even 
unilateral humanitarian intervention by their own governments (64 to 79 percent).340  Majorities 
supported multilateral intervention to enforce a cease-fire (51 to 87 percent), and the French and 
British publics supported cease-fire enforcement by their own troops alone (63 to 77 percent), 
though initially only a minority of Germans concurred (42 to 52 percent).341  Similar majorities 
supported using force to separate the warring parties multilaterally (52 to 78 percent) or 
unilaterally (53 to sixty percent) except in Germany (forty percent).342  
There was substantial support for imposing a military solution on Bosnia multilaterally (52 
to 79 percent).343  Moreover, near majorities in Britain and France supported imposing a military 
solution unilaterally (48 to 56 percent); however, only a minority in Germany (40 percent) 
favored imposing a unilateral solution.344  Overall, in January 1993, roughly half of the French 
(54 percent), British (47 percent), and German (45 percent) publics supported the use of 
multinational forces for all proposed actions, from protecting aid shipments to imposing a peace 
settlement by force.345   
At the end of 1993, public support remained high for intervention, even unilaterally.  In 
November 1993, a majority of citizens in each of the three major regime members approved of 
NATO's enforcing a cease-fire (68 to 77 percent), and a majority in each approved of their own 









troops’ participating (52 to 77 percent).346  Majorities in Britain and France also approved 
sending NATO troops to help establish peace (59 to 64 percent), while only a minority in 
Germany approved of doing so (44 percent in western Germany and 28 percent in eastern 
Germany).347   
Interestingly, despite expressing overall support for stronger military action, in late 1994, 
when Bosnian Serbs set up antiaircraft guns around Bihac, the majority of the German public (54 
percent) opposed the sending of Luftwaffe Tornado aircraft with the capacity to evade Serbian 
defenses; at the same time, 75 percent of Germans thought the international community should 
not remove its troops.348  Between January and June 1995, support for UN “reinforcement of 
military intervention" grew from 47 percent to 51 percent, but it dropped to 43 percent in July.349  
By October 1994, still only 55 percent felt German participation in NATO military action was 
“right.”350  Thus, German public opinion was the most erratic and least willing of the “big three” 
West European states to actually commit to military intervention—despite expressing a desire for 
others to do so.   
British public support for intervention in Bosnia actually grew over time.  From June 1993 
to February 1994, approval of British troops’ providing humanitarian aid grew from 67 to 74 
percent, although it then dropped to 62 percent in June 1995.351  From April 1993 to February 
1994, support for sending British troops as a part of an international contingent force to enforce a 
peace settlement grew from 67 to 75 percent, then dropping to 62 percent in June 1995.352  
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Nearly half (47 percent) of those surveyed in February 1994 thought that the UK should help to 
impose a peace settlement if an agreement were not reached.353  
In fact, support for joint European military intervention to establish peace grew from 1993 
into 1994 in all three nations (sixty to 65 percent in Britain, 59 to 75 percent in France, and 43 to 
57 percent in Germany).354  There remained majority opposition to withdrawing troops (52 to 72 
percent) and majority support for fighting to assure that aid convoys get through (58 to 90 
percent).355  Small majorities in Britain, France, and western Germany supported air strikes (51 
to 57 percent), but only a minority in the eastern Germany (34 to 49 percent) did.356  However, 
opposition to lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims ranged from 44 to 67 
percent; it remained a plurality in Britain in July 1995 (36-47 percent).357   
 
In sum, majorities of the French, British, and German publics generally supported the use 
of multinational forces for actions ranging from protecting aid shipments to forcefully imposing 
a solution on the parties to the conflict.  However, German support, especially in the east, was 
consistently lower than British or French support.  This surprisingly strong approval of European 
publics for the use of force contrasts sharply with the reluctance of their governments to 
intervene forcefully.   
 
Analysis 
As James Gow points out: 







“The political worries of Western politicians concerned popular opinion and the need to 
win votes at the next election.  The prospect that the mission might go wrong, given the 
complexity of the problem and its apparently intractable nature, made these political 
leaders reluctant to contemplate intervention seriously enough.”358  
 
While European regime members deployed ground forces to act as “peacekeepers,” 
opposition mounted in the U.S. Congress regarding sending U.S. troops to Bosnia.  A bipartisan 
majority in Congress strongly favored lifting the military embargo against Bosnia unilaterally 
and opposed any direct U.S. involvement on the ground.  Even after the Dayton agreement, 
many members of Congress still favored lifting the military embargo as a “cost-free” solution, 
because it would not involve U.S. ground troops.  While conflict intensified between the 
President and Congress over U.S. policy in Bosnia, ultimately, Congress “left full responsibility 
for the success or failure of U.S. involvement in the hands of the President.”359   
It is clear from the survey data given above and gathered throughout the period of the 
Bosnia crisis that there were two distinct gaps within the transatlantic security regime regarding 
public opinion and the issue of using military force in the conflict.  The first gap was between 
public opinion in the U.S. and public opinion in Europe.  Public opinion in the U.S., while 
increasing in support for military action over time, was generally detached and rather isolationist, 
viewing the whole crisis as not really America’s problem and certainly not one into which 
America should commit its “blood and treasure.”  American public opinion only shifted in 
response to stronger presidential leadership.  Conversely, with the war taking place in their 
“back yard” and with the EC/EU initially taking on a very large and very public (but ultimately 
failing) diplomatic role in the conflict, Europeans seem to have been much more engaged in 
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No. 1, p. 303. 
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following the events of the crisis and much more willing to see their countries become more 
involved in it. 
The second gap is thus one between the publics and the governments of the major regime 
member states.  In the U.S., President Clinton and (most, if not all) of his administration wanted 
to see the U.S. play a larger role politically and militarily in resolving the crisis, but he was 
constantly held back by other forces, including allied governments, some members of the U.S. 
Congress, and an American public that showed varying signs of apathy, isolationism, and risk 
aversion.  Conversely, in Europe, it was national leaders who (for the most part) displayed 
apathy and/or risk aversion—especially in the earlier stages of the conflict.  In Europe, it was 
public opinion that created moderate pressure for increasing military involvement and 
government leaders who resisted such pressure.  But even with such moderate domestic pressure, 
European governmental policy only showed major changes when the French government 
changed hands.  One must ask the question if European public opinion helped to push national 
governments into adopting a more aggressive (more “American”) policy stance, then why did it 
take so long?  The European polls did not show much divergence in opinion regarding use of 
force over the four-year period.  Clearly, other factors were at play.     
In terms of the variable being tested, this sort of four-way dichotomy helps to dispel some 
common myths about Western responses to the crisis, but it only moderately helps to explain 
regime policy congruence and changes over time.  While there was strong domestic pressure in 
Europe, it was not constant, and (in the case of Germany) was often hesitant and/or conditional.  
In the U.S., there simply was no strong domestic pressure for increased action throughout most 
of the conflict (and until its later stages).  The polls in the U.S. clearly show that the public 
rallied behind presidential decisions to use force rather than drove those decisions.  While an 
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important factor (especially in terms of constraining policy options), public opinion simply did 
not drive or change regime policy congruence in a clear, causal manner.    
Thus, for purposes of the first case study, the degree of domestic political and public 
support congruence across the four major regime members has a moderate correlation with 
regime policy congruence but seems to play no strong causal role—including influencing 
changes in regime policy over time.  The H6 hypothesis should not be rejected but also cannot 
wholly be accepted as a causal factor by itself.    
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6.0  CHAPTER SIX:  KOSOVO 
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches…because of a quarrel 
in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing. 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 1938 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
On March 24, 1999, NATO went to war for the first time in its half-century history.  
NATO was originally designed as a military alliance whose primary purpose was to defend 
Western Europe against the communist threat from the Soviet Union.  (See chapter two.)  
However, its first (and to this date only) real “shooting” war was not a war against the Soviet 
Union or its Warsaw Pact satellite states; in fact, it occurred almost a decade after the collapse of 
communism in Europe.  Nor was it a war of collective self-defense.  No NATO members were 
attacked or even threatened.  Instead, NATO’s first war was fought for “humanitarian” purposes.  
It was a war ostensibly aimed at preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the southern Balkans.  
Through NATO, the transatlantic security regime intervened in order to save a whole ethnic 
group of people (Kosovar Albanians) from repression by another ethnic group of people (the 
Serbs).  The latter, for the second time in the decade, initiated policy of massive “ethnic 
cleansing” and indiscriminate killing of civilians.  Once NATO failed to prevent that catastrophe, 
it chose instead to try to reverse its consequences and was ultimately successful in doing so. 
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 However, beyond this “popular” dimension of the war, it has also been alleged by many 
scholars and policy analysts that there were other, more complex strategic reasons for the 
decision made to go to war.  It has been argued that NATO’s military intervention was dictated 
predominantly by the need to establish a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world.  Events 
in Kosovo, it is alleged, provided the ideal opportunity to do so.  Conversely, others argue that 
NATO, in responding to the obvious humanitarian crisis and in the absence of decisive UN 
action, moved preemptively in order to fill a dangerous vacuum and prevent the spread of further 
destabilizing events of a potentially more serious and wider nature.  In other words, the alliance 
“learned the lessons” of Bosnia and reacted accordingly.  
This chapter examines how NATO came to launch its first war and attempts to 
understand the complex international diplomacy that took place within the transatlantic security 
regime that led to the decision to go to war in 1999.  In doing so, it attempts to examine these 
views of motivations behind going to war over Kosovo in addition to pursuing the research 
question outlined at the beginning of this dissertation.  The Kosovo crisis not only provoked 
some serious questions for the individual member states of NATO but also (like Bosnia) raised 
important issues for the members of the EU as a political actor on the world stage.  As such, the 
Kosovo crisis is an excellent case study for the questions being explored in this dissertation.   
6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS  
The origins of the crisis have to be understood in historical context and in terms of a 
wave of nationalism that erupted in the 1970s and 1980s among both Serbs and Albanians in 
Yugoslavia.  Kosovo was an autonomous region within the Serbian republic in Yugoslavia—and 
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not a separate republic as were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.  Kosovo 
province has historically been very important to the Serbs, although they made up only ten 
percent of the population.  In 1389, Christian forces under Serbian Prince Lazar were defeated by 
the army of Turkish Sultan Murad I in the Battle of Kosovo.  Although they suffered a military 
defeat in the battle, Serbs historically came to regard Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian 
civilization, and Kosovo eventually became the core of Serbia’s medieval kingdom.  It is also 
still the location of many historic Serbian Orthodox churches.  It was Serbian nationalism that 
led to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian nationalist 
agenda.  Once the Serb nationalist agenda had become official government policy, civil war 
became a real possibility.   
 The conflict in Kosovo also has to be understood in the context of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia discussed in the previous chapter.  Kosovo was one of the eight constituent units of 
Yugoslavia; there were six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces in Serbia (ethnic Hungarian dominated 
Vojvodina and ethnic Albanian dominated Kosovo).  The stripping of Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s 
autonomous status by Milosevic in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to war. 
 After the Second World War, the new communist leadership of Yugoslavia declared 
Kosovo to be an autonomous “constituent part” of Serbia.  Before Tito’s rule, Kosovar Albanians 
experienced harsh persecution by the Serbs.  The effects of thirty years of prewar government-
sponsored colonization by Serbs of almost half of Kosovo’s arable land were mitigated when 
Tito returned a third of the land to its Albanian owners after 1945.  Also, some of the prewar 
measures employed to stifle the Albanian language were lifted.  This immediate postwar period 
was short-lived, however, as after Tito broke ties with the USSR in 1948, Albanians experienced 
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a new round of particularly harsh repressive measures, since they were suspected of 
sympathizing with Albanian President Enver Hoxha, who was a loyal Stalinist. 
 The situation began to change in the 1960s, when the “Serbianization” policy was no 
longer officially endorsed by the Communist Party’s Central Committee in Belgrade.  There 
were student demonstrations in 1968, as there were throughout Eastern Europe.  Although the 
demonstrations were dealt with harshly, a series of measures were taken during this period that 
greatly improved the situation of the Kosovar Albanians.  The culmination of these 
improvements was the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, under which Kosovo and Vojvodina were 
declared autonomous provinces of Serbia.  As an autonomous province, Kosovo was entitled to 
select its own administration, assembly, and judiciary, and it had a right of veto in the federal 
Yugoslav parliament.   
However, instead of cooling the desire of Kosovar Albanians for greater independence, 
these actions only seemed to further encourage a budding Albanian nationalism.  There were 
demonstrations calling for full republic status in the provincial capital of Pristina in 1976 and a 
number of riots, including some of the worst in 1981.  Among the demonstrators were a small 
number of radicals who favored unification with Albania.   
The 1981 demonstrations were brutally crushed.  Police and military units and the newly 
created territorial defense units were brought into Kosovo from all over Yugoslavia, and a state 
of emergency was declared in the province.  Hundreds of people were arrested, tried, and 
imprisoned.  A Communist Party purge was undertaken, and thousands of university professors 
and schoolteachers were fired.  Albanian professors and textbooks were removed from the 
classrooms.  The consequence was a growing polarization between the Albanian and Serbian 
communities in Kosovo during the 1980s.  During this time, the proportion of Albanians in the 
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population of Kosovo increased from 67 percent in the 1960s to nearly eighty percent in the 
1980s, due to a combination of a very high birth rate of Albanians and fleeing of some 100,000 
Serbs, who were being harassed and discriminated against by the Albanians.360
From the mid-1980s, Serb nationalists began to openly term the exodus of Serbs from 
Kosovo a “genocide.”  Public Serb and Montenegran protests also erupted.  The federal 
Yugoslav government resisted calls for “reigning in” Albanian nationalism and power in 
Kosovo.  However, a turning point came with the visit of Slobodan Milosevic, then Deputy 
President of the Serbian Party, to Kosovo on April 24, 1987.  Milosevic arrived in the middle of 
a clash between Serbs and the police.  He then uttered the now famous words: “No one should 
dare beat you” and proceeded to give a speech about the sacred rights of Serbs.361  The speech 
was later dubbed the “Field of Blackbirds” speech, based on the historic location where it was 
delivered, and Milosevic became a national Serb hero virtually overnight.  He was soon able to 
mobilize popular support and take control of the Communist Party leadership.  In addition to a 
majority of Serbs, Milosevic was also supported by the national media and the JNA (Yugoslav 
army).  After consolidating power, Milosevic instituted a series of measures, including pushing 
the Serbian assembly to take more direct control over Kosovo’s security, judiciary, finance, and 
social planning in 1989; this finally led to completely revoking Kosovo’s autonomy in 1990.  In 
July, the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, in violation of the 1974 constitution.  
The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy spawned an increase in human rights abuses and 
discriminatory government policies designed to “Serbianize” the province, including imposing 
anti-Albanian language policies and instituting pro-Serb education curricula in schools.  
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361 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Thousands of Albanians were dismissed from public and private employment, and special 
privileges were granted to Serbs who resettled in or returned to Kosovo.  Above all, there were 
widespread human rights abuses—arbitrary unrest, torture, and detention without trial.362   
At the time, many observers expected a war in Yugoslavia to begin in Kosovo.  There 
were already acts of apparent random provocation, including random shootings of villagers in 
central Kosovo.  One reason that war probably did not break out in Kosovo at the time is simply 
because conflict broke out elsewhere in Yugoslavia and continued through 1995, distracting 
Milosevic and the Serbs.  Another reason was the adoption of a strategy of non-violent resistance 
by mainstream Kosovar Albanian resistance leaders, such as Ibrahim Rugova.  According to 
Rugova, the dominant figure in the Albanian resistance movement: “The Serbs only wait for a 
pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out.  We believe it is better to do nothing 
and stay alive than be massacred.”363   
In 1990, the various strands of Albanian political movements in Kosovo came together to 
form a mass movement, which was to operate a self-organized parallel political system in 
Kosovo.  On July 2, 1990, three days before the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, 114 of the 123 
Albanian delegates met on the steps of the Assembly building, which had been locked.  They 
collectively issued a declaration giving the Albanians the status of a “nation,” entitled to their 
own republic within Yugoslavia.  On September 7, they met again at Kacanik and agreed on the 
proclamation of a constitutional law for a “Republic of Kosovo,” including provisions for a new 
assembly and elected presidency (but still within the state of Yugoslavia).  After the Slovene and 
Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991, the demand for a republic within 
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Yugoslavia was changed to a demand for full independence.  In September 1991, a referendum 
on independence was held.  87 percent of the Kosovo population participated, and the vote was 
99 percent in favor.364  And in May 1992, Kosovo-wide elections were held, using private homes 
as polling stations, for a new republican government and assembly. 
The dominant political organization was the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK).  It 
spread rapidly in 1990 and 1991 and claimed 700,000 members by the spring of 1991.  The LDK 
drew on village organizations and the traditional clan structure of Albanian society for support.  
In the May elections, the LDK won 96 of the 100 single constituency seats in the assembly.  Of 
the other four seats, two were won by members of the LDK who ran as independents, one by the 
Socialist Alliance (SDA), one by the Bosniak Party, and one by the Turkish Peoples Party.365  A 
further 42 seats were distributed by proportional representation, giving the Turkish Party twelve 
seats, the Christian Democrats seven seats, the Social Democrats one seat, and the SDA three 
seats; thirteen seats reserved for Serbs and Montenegrans were left empty.366  The LDK, under 
the leadership of Rugova, set about developing a unique parallel state apparatus—a sort of 
“shadow government.”  A government was established on October 19, 1991; initially it was 
based in Ljublijana, but it moved to Bonn in 1992.  “Voluntary” taxes were levied on all Kosovar 
Albanians, and a parallel education system was established.  During this period, some 400,000 
Albanians are estimated to have immigrated from Kosovo to Western Europe—many to avoid 
conscription into the Yugoslav army and others due to the widespread poverty in Kosovo; many 
also immigrated to the United States.367   
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The main goal of the LDK was always full independence for Kosovo.  The strategy for 
achieving this goal was to influence the international community and to deny the legitimacy of 
Belgrade institutions, both through the parallel government and through boycotting Yugoslav 
elections.  Rugova pressed for the establishment of a temporary protectorate, under UN auspices, 
which could oversee the transition to independence. 
6.3 THE PATH TO WAR 
From the mid-1990s, the situation began to deteriorate.  At about the same time that 
many Kosovar Albanians were losing patience with Rugova’s strategy of passive resistance and 
many of their leaders were becoming frustrated with maintaining the parallel government, the 
Dayton Agreement on Bosnia was signed—in which no mention was made of the status of 
Kosovo.  This was a profound disappointment to virtually all Kosovar Albanians.  For many of 
them, it seemed as though the strategy had failed.  It had been evident to many analysts 
throughout the Bosnia war that a lasting peace for the region would require a comprehensive 
approach to the issue of national minorities—one that took account of the problems of minorities 
across all of former Yugoslavia.368  The conclusions drawn by Kosovar Albanians from Dayton, 
however, were that ethnic territories in the former Yugoslavia can achieve international 
legitimacy and that international attention could only by obtained by war.  Several leading 
Kosovar Albanian figures began to openly criticize Rugova for excessive passivity and began 
                                                 




recommending a change in policy ranging from active civil disobedience to outright armed 
revolt. 
 It was during this period that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or known by its 
Albanian name, UCK—Ushtria Çlirimatare e Kosovës) first made its appearance.  The KLA 
grew out of a Marxist-Leninist political party formed in the early 1980s called the LPK (Levizja 
Popullare e Kosoves).  In 1992 and 1993, the LPK played a leading role in setting up a guerrilla 
group in secret meetings in Pristina and Macedonia.  The first planned, deliberate violent action 
committed by Kosovar Albanians was the killing of a Serb policeman in 1995.  But it was not 
until 1996 that an organization based in Switzerland and calling itself the KLA claimed 
responsibility for these acts.  At the time, most Albanians (much less the rest of the world) had 
not even heard of the KLA.  Its strategy, like Rugova’s, seems to have been directed at the 
international community.  But woefully prepared for a true guerrilla warfare campaign, the KLA 
seems instead to have adopted the deliberate strategy of provoking near-term international 
intervention rather than fight a protracted, long-term guerrilla war. 
 Indeed, until late 1997, active armed resistance groups in Kosovo were very small and 
without any permanent bases in the province.  They had few arms and do not seem to have had 
any clear leadership structure—a key component in organized versus random armed conflict.  
Individual operations consisted of hit-and-run terrorist attacks on Serbian police outposts and 
supposed Albanian “collaborators.”  These operations were planned and commanded by KLA 
members coming from abroad with only a few days of preparation with local fighters.   
The collapse of the Albanian state system in 1997, however, changed the situation 
dramatically.  Albanian Army and Interior Ministry warehouses and depots were looted, and 
arms and munitions were made available to the KLA by sympathizers or agents in Albania.  
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Because of the collapse of the security structure and ensuing lawlessness in Albania, it was 
possible (for the first time) to organize training facilities in northern Albania, near the border 
with Kosovo.  This proved to be the most important precondition for creating permanent 
recruitment and training facilities, organizing supply routes into Kosovo, and coordinate 
different regional and local resistance cells.  Organized crime also played an important role in 
organizing and financing the conflict, with much of the revenue coming from the sale and 
transport of illicit drugs. 
6.4 INITIAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
Kosovo was simply not a priority for the international community before 1998.  The 
province’s troubles almost appear to have been an inconvenience, adding further complications 
to negotiations about the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.  Kosovo seems to have been 
regarded as secondary to these conflicts in terms of both urgency and status.  The one strong 
statement that was made during this period was President George H.W. Bush’s “Christmas 
warning.”  On December 24, 1992, the American ambassador to Yugoslavia read the following 
message to Milosevic: “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action, the U.S. will be 
prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper.”369  The 
message was subsequently reiterated by Madeline Albright in the UN Security Council in August 
1993.370
 The comparatively low level of violence in Kosovo during the early 1990s was 
misinterpreted by the international community.  None of the main international actors, including 
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the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), EC/EU, CSCE/OSCE (the renamed 
CSCE—now Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), UN, or NATO paid much 
attention to Kosovo.  The little attention that was directed toward Kosovo by international 
organizations was in 1992-1993, when it was feared that the war in Bosnia might spillover into 
Kosovo.   
 As with Bosnia, the initial tone of the European response was set by the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington, which took place at The Hague in 1991.  In contrast 
to the stern warning from the U.S., the EC conference defined Kosovo as an “internal” problem 
for Yugoslavia, thus discouraging any further European interest or involvement.  Meanwhile, 
Rugova and other LDK leaders were managing to get increased attention from the international 
media and NGOs, from whom he received praise for his self-determination movement—
especially for its non-violent character.  But this public praise never translated into any real 
political or material support. 
 When the joint UN-EC International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) convened 
under Cyrus Vance and David Owen in 1992, a special working group was tasked with the 
Kosovo situation.  The group tried to mediate between the Serbs and Albanians, but the talks 
collapsed in late 1992.  The Helsinki summit of the OSCE called for “immediate and preventive 
action” and urged “the authorities in Belgrade to refrain from further repression and to engage in 
serious dialogue with representatives from Kosovo in the presence of a third party.”371  But like 
the Bosnia crisis, the Serbs simply ignored the OSCE, and its proclamations proved futile.  
Clearly, the intransigence of the Belgrade government hampered any non-coercive international 
attempts to deal with Kosovo, and little was done until late 1997.  In the desperation to halt the 
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bloodshed in Bosnia, Kosovo was deliberately sidelined.  Kosovo was not considered in the 
Dayton negotiations because Tudjman and Izetbegovic were not interested in it, and Milosevic 
would have refused to consider it.   
The result of this omission, however, was to indirectly legitimize Milosevic’s role in 
Kosovo and to send a clear signal to both Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo was 
off the current international agenda.  This message had three serious effects.  First, it gave Serbia 
a free hand in Kosovo.  Second, it demoralized and weakened the non-violent resistance 
movement in Kosovo, which felt betrayed by the international community and began to doubt 
the effectiveness of its own tactics.  And third, it led directly to a decisive surge of support 
among ordinary Kosovars for the path of violent resistance as the only politically realistic path to 
full independence.  
6.5 CIVIL WAR 
By the beginning of 1998, Kosovo was on the brink of open war.  Student demonstrations 
in August 1997 had made it clear that the LDK was no longer in control of Kosovar Albanian 
political activity.  In September, student protesters took further steps away from LDK control, 
refusing Rugova’s call to stop street protests and seeking contact with the KLA.  On October1, 
1997, Serbian police assaulted a peaceful protest of 20,000 students in Pristina and started to 
detain known opponents of Belgrade rule throughout Kosovo.  In October and November, the 
KLA began, for the first time, to make public appearances at funerals of its fighters and 
sympathizers.  These events began to draw tens of thousands of people.  Also during this time 
period, the KLA began to openly confront Serbian police control in the areas of Drenica and Pec, 
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declaring them the first “liberated areas” in Kosovo.  In response to these actions, the number of 
armed skirmishes in Kosovo increased dramatically.   
Despite numerous international calls for restraint and dialogue, Serb forces accelerated 
their repressive and counterinsurgency actions, including arming Kosovar Serb civilians and 
bringing in paramilitary groups from Serbia.  With the rise of the KLA, the already pervasive 
Serb police harassment increased.  The Serbian government proclaimed the KLA a terrorist 
organization, thereby leading to intensified searches, detentions, political trials, and torture.  This 
Serb police behavior was targeted not only at known or suspected members of the KLA but also 
at members of the LDK political party, peaceful activists, and other civilians.  The Clinton 
administration sent envoy Robert Gelbard to the region to meet with both sides.  In a meeting in 
Belgrade, Gelbard warned Milosevic that he faced a “downward spiral of darkness” if he pursued 
further violence.372   
Ignoring Gelbard’s warning, on February 28, 1998, the Serbs decided to arrest Adem 
Jashari, a local strongman in Kosovo who had joined the KLA.  Heavily armed Yugoslav forces 
attacked Jashari’s village of Likosane, in Drenica, using armored units and helicopter gunships, 
and the fighting continued in the area for several days.    Within a week, his entire extended 
family (58 people) was killed by the Serbs.  At this point, village militias all over Kosovo sprang 
up to defend their villages.  Many of them were linked to Rugova’s “shadow government,” but 
they called themselves the KLA, even though a number of them were not formal members.  This 
was the beginning of the war.  In response to the attack, a street protest was organized in Pristina 
on March 2.  Yugoslav forces violently broke up the protest with water cannons, tear gas, and 
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batons.  Human rights abuses committed by both sides began to be reported.  Within a week, 85 
people had been killed by Serb security forces, including dozens of women and children.373   
At this point in the conflict, the major regime member states completely ruled out 
threatening or using military force, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom.  
However, unlike Bosnia, this time NATO decided to involve itself early in the crisis (politically 
if not militarily).  The North Atlantic Council issued the first of many statements on the crisis on 
March 5, 1998—four days before the Contact Group convened for the first time to discuss 
Kosovo.  However, aside from the usual expressions of “concern” and condemnations of 
violence, the alliance at this point offered no concrete proposals for action—diplomatic, military, 
or otherwise.  
The Yugoslav government (to some degree rightfully) characterized the situation as an 
internal conflict that was under control and labeled the KLA a terrorist group.374  Yet, the crisis 
was increasingly drawing international attention and condemnation.  The United States withdrew 
certain diplomatic concessions made to Yugoslavia following Dayton.375  On March 9, 1998, the 
Contact Group (now including Italy) condemned the crackdown, demanded that Serbs cease all 
actions against the civilian population, and withdrawal of Serb forces within ten days; failure to 
meet these demands would lead to the imposition of an arms embargo and other measures 
against Yugoslavia.376  On March 31, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 
1160 (with China abstaining) imposing an arms embargo against Yugoslavia and calling for 
autonomy and “meaningful self-administration” for Kosovo; the UNSC also warned that 
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“additional measures” were possible if no progress was made toward a peaceful solution.377  
Conspicuously missing from the resolution, however, was any mention or threat of using military 
force.     
Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon argue that the quick reaction from the Contact 
Group was derived from four “lessons learned” from Bosnia by its Western members (i.e. 
excluding Russia).378  First, the five NATO Contact Group members agreed that they had to act 
rapidly in order to avoid a repeat of the Bosnian horrors.  Second was that successful 
intervention required unity of effort as well as American (rather than European) leadership.  
Third was that only concerted pressure on Milosevic would prove effective in convincing him to 
end the violence and commence a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians.  And fourth was to rule 
out independence for Kosovo.   
As Daalder and O’Hanlon also point out, however, inherent in these 
agreements/assumptions were three contradictions that hindered the transatlantic security 
regime’s policy cohesion.379  First, there was a conflict between the desire to act quickly and 
decisively and the perceived need to forge a consensus on policy not only with key NATO allies 
but also with Russia.  Second was the belief that a solution to the Kosovo crisis lay in pressing 
Milosevic to end the violent crackdown in Kosovo—while at the same time, NATO relied on 
him to negotiate a final settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.  And third was the contradiction 
of pressuring Milosevic to end the violence while hoping not to encourage the ethnic Albanians 
in Kosovo to push their claims for independence.        
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The KLA at this point had no political program, no accepted national representation in 
the shadow assembly, no international recognition, and no control over any military forces of any 
significance.  But reports of Serb atrocities suddenly made the KLA the driving force of national 
liberation in the eyes of a growing number of Kosovar Albanians, and, for the first time, the 
KLA could claim some level of significant political power due to its increasing support among 
the population.  To many Kosovar Albanians, Dayton had already demonstrated the limits of 
international support for their cause—and by extension, of Rugova’s own effectiveness.  
Rugova’s non-violent approach seemed to be producing no tangible results and did not even earn 
him a “seat at the table” in international diplomatic circles.  Many Kosovo Albanians simply 
concluded that their “reward” for using non-violent resistance was international neglect.380  
Thus, as the number of Kosovar Albanians who looked to the KLA for liberation and affiliated 
themselves with it increased, support for the LDK party’s non-violent strategy declined. 
In the aftermath of the Serb Drenica offensive, both sides increased the depth and scope 
of their operations.  Hundreds or even thousands of volunteers were crossing into Kosovo from 
Albania to join the KLA, and supply routes were organized to bring arms and munitions into the 
province.  Spring 1998 saw a widespread wave of small attacks on Serbian police stations, as 
well as direct fighting between armed Serb and Albanian villagers in some areas.  The KLA 
gradually gained control over the countryside, while Serbian forces maintained control of the 
towns and main roads.  Yugoslav forces also expanded their campaign of repression against the 
civilian population.  Facing a rapidly expanding KLA presence, the Yugoslav army sent massive 
reinforcements to Kosovo and began a large-scale operation coordinated with police and 
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paramilitary units.  This campaign was aimed not only at stopping the spread of KLA activities 
but intended to achieve this by directly targeting the Albanian civilian population in rural areas.  
These increases in military activity and violence directed specifically against civilians led 
to the first public consideration by NATO of possible military involvement in late May and early 
June of 1998.  Meeting in Luxembourg in late May, NATO foreign ministers announced, “In 
order to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm our willingness to take 
further steps if necessary, we have commissioned military advice on support for Un and ASCE 
monitoring activity, as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”381  Striking a more aggressive posture, NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana further stated that NATO “will consider further deterrent measures, if the 
violence continues.  Let me stress, nothing is excluded.”382   
On June 10, 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair (who had replaced John Major) 
stated support for military action if diplomacy were unable to end the crisis.  At this time, 
however, three obstacles to developing a regime policy consensus on the issue of using military 
force emerged.383  First, some NATO allies feared that military intervention against Serb forces 
would unfairly favor the KLA.  Essentially, intervention would mean choosing sides in the 
conflict.  Second, even among those who supported intervention in principle, there was 
disagreement on how to do so most effectively and with the least amount of risk.  And third, with 
Russia threatening to veto any UNSC resolution authorizing use of force, there was considerable 
disagreement on what (if anything) would constitute a legal basis for intervention. 
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Meanwhile, the tragedy on the ground began to unfold as the Serbs launched a major 
offensive in late July 1998.  The offensive was designed to deliver a punishing blow against the 
KLA, which had exploited the previous period of relative Serb restraint by succeeding in taking 
control of a substantial part of Kosovo.  While precise details were unavailable, various reports 
estimated that 460,000 Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from their homes by August 1998 
(260,000 internally and 200,000 externally) as a result of the Serb offensive, which included 
shelling of cities and villages.384  The international community was now faced with potentially a 
vast humanitarian crisis.   
It took more than a month, however (until September 23, 1998), for the UNSC to pass 
Resolution 1199, which demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav forces 
“used for civilian repression.”385  (China again abstained.)  The main problem with getting the 
resolution passed was Russian opposition to any implied threat to use force to enforce resolution.  
Thus, no mention was made of consequences of not abiding by the resolution, and it was, of 
course, ignored by Milosevic.   
The Yugoslav military campaign of the summer of 1998 in Kosovo was, in many ways, a 
success.  The KLA had been effectively uprooted as a military force and proven unable to protect 
civilians in contested areas.  The international response (in military terms) had been limited to a 
few NATO air maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia.386  Despite debating the subject for 
many months, by early October 1998, the NATO allies were no closer to agreeing on using 
military force than they had been at the start of the crisis.  The problem for many of the NATO 
members was simply that Russia and China had made it very publicly clear that they would veto 
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any UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force against a sovereign country for what they 
regarded as an issue that was purely the internal affair of Yugoslavia.387    
The lack of UN authorization was especially a problem for many European countries, 
which had long argued that NATO could not use force for anything other than self-defense 
purposes unless the UN Security Council first approved an explicit mandate for such an 
operation.  With UNSC action effectively blocked by the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto, 
achieving agreement as to what the legal justification for threatening or using force would be 
was no easy matter.  Of the four major regime members, France and Germany388 were initially 
most concerned about acting without a UN resolution.  The U.S. and UK, however, argued that 
the urgency of the humanitarian crisis, coupled with the Security Council’s inability to act, 
created a situation in which an exception to the agreed upon regime norm could be justified.389  
Unlike his Socialist predecessor, however, French President Jacques Chirac seemed more open 
to the latter position.  He stated on October 6: 
“Any military action must be requested…by the Security Council.  In this particular case, 
we have a resolution that does open the way to the possibility of military action.  I would 
add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an 
exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is.  And if it appeared that the situation 
required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in 
order to assist those that are in danger.”390
      
On October 13, 1998, however, the NAC finally voted to authorize air strikes if Serb 
military and security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours.391  After a period 
of intense negotiations, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke (representing the Contact Group 
and backed by the implied but still unofficial threat of NATO air strikes), concluded a cease-fire 
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deal with Milosevic.392  The agreement directly brought NATO into the crisis for the first time.  
Under its terms, the alliance would be responsible for enforcing the agreement through the 
continued threat of air strikes and by verifying its provisions through reconnaissance over-flights 
by unarmed aircraft; the OSCE also agreed to deploy 2,000 unarmed monitors to verify the 
agreement on the ground.393  The agreement was then submitted to the UN Security Council for 
approval.  
On October 24, 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1203, which affirmed the agreement 
between Holbrooke and Milosevic.  By the end of October, large numbers of Yugoslav forces 
had been withdrawn, and OSCE monitors were deployed.  Holbrooke boldly announced: 
“Anyone who’s alive is not, in my view, in danger anymore, and that couldn’t have been said a 
few weeks ago.”394  The Yugoslav troop strength was set to be reduced from 18,000 to 12,500 
and special police limited to 6,500; also, a series of steps toward autonomy were to be initiated, 
including elections within nine months and the development of Kosovar Albanian police 
forces.395   
Serbia initially implemented the agreement and withdrew its forces accordingly.  The 
KLA, by contrast, took advantage of the new situation and renewed military action.  In fact, 
KLA forces moved in to take up positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces.396  The UN, 
NATO, and OSCE were alarmed by the KLA’s actions.  According to UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan (who had replaced Boutros Boutros-Ghali): 
“Recent attacks by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have indicated their readiness, 
capability, and intention to actively pursue the advantage gained by the partial 
                                                 
392 See New York Times, October 5, 1998, p. A1; October 9, 1998, p. A6; October 19, 1998, p. A6.  Also Washington 
Post, October 10, 1998, p. A18, October 11, 1998, p. A39; and October 12, 1998, p. A14. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Washington Post, October 25, 1998, p. A38. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid., November 18, 1998, p. A3. 
 166 
withdrawal of the police and military formations….Reports of new weapons, 
ammunition, and equipment indicate that the capacity of those units to crisply defend 
themselves is still fairly good.  This development is disturbing.”397
 
NATO noted in a statement on December 8 that: 
 “both Belgrade authorities and the armed Kosovar elements have failed to comply fully 
with the requirements set out in SCR 1160, 1199, and 1203.  We call upon the armed 
Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions, and we call upon the 
FRY and Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in 
Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behavior.”398  
 
At the same time, the KLA was trying to strengthen its political influence by threatening LDK 
political representation in rural areas.  The organization kidnapped and, in some cases, executed 
both Serbs and Kosovar Albanian civilians.399  
 The situation got worse in December, as OSCE monitors began to report attacks made by 
both sides, increased tensions on the border with Serbia, and frequent border incursions from 
both Serbia and Albania.  According to UN Secretary General Annan’s December 24 report: 
“Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to 
reestablish their control over many villages in Kosovo, as well as over some areas near 
urban centers and highways.  These actions…have only served to provoke the Serbian 
authorities, leading to statements that if the (NATO and OSCE) Kosovo verification 
mission cannot control these units, the Serb) government would….There is now a new 
cycle of violence, and there are reports that suggest that the number of Yugoslav forces 
deployed in Kosovo may exceed agreed figures.”400  
 
The UN also reported that between 1,500 and 2,000 Kosovar Albanians had been detained by 
Serb authorities since the October agreement, and that an estimated 150 civilians had been 
kidnapped by the KLA.401  In clear violation of the October agreement, the Yugoslav army 
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positioned more than 12,000 men around the Kosovo borders.  At the end of the month, the army 
then moved them inside the province, once again firing on villages with heavy weapons.   
 It was becoming clear that, despite the apparent initial success of the Holbrooke-
Milosevic agreement, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was no longer in a position to 
address necessary peacekeeping issues.  American Ambassador William Walker, head of KVM, 
declared, “Both sides have been looking for trouble, and they have found it.  If the two sides are 
unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate 
their attempts to go after each other.”402  From aerial monitoring over the region, NATO was 
aware of violations of the cease-fire agreement made by both sides during this period.403
As the new year started, clashes intensified between the two sides, and Serb forces moved 
back into the province in force.  Serb military, paramilitary, and police units created three sealed 
areas inside Kosovo, using artillery and tank shelling to push ethnic Albanian civilian residents 
to leave their villages inside the three zones.  However, after being pushed out of their homes, 
the civilians were not allowed to leave the sealed areas.  By late January 1999, Serb forces with 
armor, artillery, and mechanized and light infantry established permanent positions along the 
Macedonian and Albanian borders with Kosovo.  Their main strategic goals were to block the 
borders with Macedonia and Albania, so as to deter any possible NATO ground attack and to cut 
off KLA supply routes from Albania.  The cease-fire agreement was in tatters, and now not only 
were the Serbs prepared for all-out war with the KLA but seemingly with NATO, as well.  
 Kofi Annan, the new UN Secretary General, met with the members of the NAC on 
January 28, 1999, and (unlike his predecessor) urged them to consider using military force if 
necessary, stating, “The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the 
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difficulty of halting internal conflicts—by reason or by force…nor have they left us with any 
illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed.”404  Annan’s statement 
suggested to the members of the NAC that NATO had his blessing to threaten or even use force 
against Yugoslavia, a sovereign UN member state, should that become necessary—and without 
the explicit approval of the UN Security Council.  Interestingly, this seems to be the first instance 
of any UN Secretary General deliberately and specifically giving his blessing to another 
international actor to militarily intervene in a civil war without a UNSC resolution specifically 
authorizing such action.        
6.6 FAILURE AT RAMBOUILLET 
Alarmed by the sudden collapse of the agreement it had backed, the Contact Group 
organized a peace conference to be held in Rambouillet, France, on February 6-23, 1999.  Serb 
and Kosovar Albanian (including both the KLA and LDK) leaders were invited, as well as 
representatives of the rump Yugoslavia.  The conference was sponsored by the Contact Group, 
hosted by France, and chaired by the British and French foreign ministers (Robin Cook and 
Hubert Védrine, respectively), but the agenda and diplomatic activity were essentially driven by 
the United States.  The actual negotiations were in the hands of three diplomats: Christopher Hill 
(representing the U.S.), Wolfgang Petristsch (representing the EU), and Boris Mayorski 
(representing Russia).  The European allies had deeply resented their being “shut out” of the 
1995 Dayton peace conference, where they were allowed a presence but were largely ignored by 
the American team of negotiators.  At Rambouillet, they thus took a more visible public role in 
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the negotiations and sought to project a more equal partnership with the U.S. in addressing 
Balkan security issues. 
The U.S. administration’s strategy at Rambouillet was to offer the Kosovo Albanians 
interim self-government for three years (but with no guarantee of independence), a NATO 
peacekeeping force to protect them from the Serbs, and the threat of NATO air strikes to induce 
Serbian cooperation.405  The self-government plan would establish democracy in Kosovo 
through a unicameral parliament, a president chosen by the legislature, and an independent 
judiciary.406  Various international organizations were invited to help reinforce implementation 
of the political agreement. 
On January 30, before the conference began, the North Atlantic Council issued a 
declaration stating that: 
“The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region.  
NATO’s strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an 
interim political settlement, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe.  Steps to this end 
must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations at 
Rambouillet by 6 February 1999 and the completion of the negotiations on an interim 
political settlement within the specified timeframe; full and immediate observance by 
both parties of the cease-fire and by the FRY authorities of their commitments to 
NATO…and the ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance 
with these commitments. 
 If these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are 
necessary407 in light of both parties’ compliance with international commitments and 
requirements…to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the 
demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement.  
The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorize 
air strikes against targets on FRY territory.  The NATO Secretary General will take full 
account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovo armed 
elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military action.”408
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The Rambouillet draft agreement did not include any mechanism to determine the final 
status of Kosovo, however.  Instead, the Kosovar Albanians were expected to put aside their goal 
of independence for at least three years while implementing self-government.  Because the 
Kosovar Albanians demanded language on a referendum on the province’s status, the U.S. 
delegation ultimately provided them with an informal bilateral letter promising a referendum 
after three years, although this was certainly not binding.   
The security annex409 to the agreement would have NATO peacekeepers ensure the 
withdrawal from Kosovo of most Serbian security forces and supervise those forces allowed to 
remain.  Yugoslavia was allowed to retain 2,500 army troops indefinitely for border security.  
These forces would be assigned to specific areas and be under the supervision of the NATO 
peacekeepers.  The Serbs would also be permitted to keep up to 2,500 Interior Ministry special 
police in Kosovo for up to two years.  This police force was to be placed under OSCE 
supervision, with OSCE consultation with NATO.  A 3,000-person multiethnic police force was 
also outlined in the agreement.  Serbian and Albanian paramilitaries were to be disarmed and 
disbanded by NATO peacekeepers.  The KLA delegates at the conference firmly refused to 
accept this clause, as it would essentially mean the complete dissolution of their group and thus 
the loss of their newly found political power.    
When the conference opened on February 6, several problems immediately became 
apparent.  First, the Kosovars protested the absence of any official NATO representation.  They 
learned that the French, with the full acquiescence of the Americans, had insisted on NATO’s 
nonparticipation in order to accentuate the “leading” role of the Europeans at the talks.  The 
Kosovar Albanians immediately requested the presence of NATO SACEUR General Wesley 
                                                 
409 See ibid., pp. 246-247. 
 171 
Clark at the negotiations, but the chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Christopher Hill, bowing to 
the wishes of the French, refused their request.  Another warning sign was the selection of the 
leadership of the sixteen-man Kosovo Albanian delegation.  With no protests from the U.S. or 
other conference organizers, the five KLA members secured the chairmanship of the delegation 
for their political director, Hashim Thaci.  Thaci dominated the delegation and all but pushed out 
the views of Rugova and other moderates. 
When U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright arrived at Rambouillet on February 20 
for final negotiations, she found that the conference was on the verge of collapse, as the Serbs 
(showing their somewhat expected intransigence) were unwilling to accept the final agreement.  
Unexpectedly, however, Thaci was also refusing to sign on, despite pleas from most of the other 
members of the delegation to sign.  As a result, the conference was extended for three extra days 
to February 23.  Thaci claimed that the proposed agreement contained insufficient guarantees for 
independence.  But others have argued that Thaci’s real concern was the desire to keep the KLA 
intact rather than accepting its dissolution as called for by the agreement.410   
Finally, on February 23, as the result of a last-minute compromise proposal, the Kosovar 
Albanians said they would conditionally accept the agreement, pending their return to Kosovo to 
obtain the reaction of the Albanian people during the next two weeks.  The Serbian delegation, 
however, still refused to sign the agreement.  The conference was to be reconvened on March 15.  
But in the meantime, the Serbs had begun another major military buildup in and around Kosovo. 
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6.7 NATO GOES TO WAR   
As late as March 22 and 23, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan continued to demand that 
the Yugoslav armed forces immediately cease their offensive in Kosovo.  On March 23, 1999, 
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, in a letter to Annan, outlined a series of incidents 
demonstrating a rapid decay of the situation in Kosovo.  In particular, he noted the dramatic 
increase in Yugoslav military activities following the pullout of the OSCE KVM.  Solana also 
warned of a humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the excessive force used by the Yugoslav 
forces.  On the same day, the Yugoslav government declared a state of emergency.  On March 
24, NATO aircraft started the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, dubbed Operation Allied 
Force.   
 President Clinton articulated the goals of the NATO campaign in a television speech on 
March 24: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s response to aggression, to deter 
Milosevic’s escalating attacks in Kosovo, and to seriously damage Yugoslavia’s military 
capacity to wage war in the future.411  Clinton also stated at the time that the U.S. government 
had no intention of deploying ground troops to fight a war, and the other NATO governments 
took the same position.  Congressional approval for the air campaign was barely achieved, as the 
U.S. House of Representatives only passed a resolution endorsing it after a 213-213 tie was 
broken (in favor).412   
European leaders said about the same as Clinton but also stressed more that the NATO 
intervention was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.  From the very beginning, the 
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French government justified the war by arguing that it was a battle for a certain conception of 
Europe and European values, for human rights, for “European civilization,” and/or, more simply, 
a defense of European security and regional stability.413  Throughout the conflict, however, 
French leaders felt uncomfortable with the decision to bypass the United Nations and took great 
pains to insist that NATO’s intervention represented an exception that should never be construed 
as a precedent.  
For Germany, the war was a watershed event.  For the first time since 1945, German 
armed forces undertook offensive military operations against a sovereign state—and without a 
UN Security Council resolution authorizing it.  Yet the German debate over and decision to go to 
war still reflected three of the core features of its political culture: a deeply ingrained 
antimilitarism, an almost instinctive multilateralism, and a commitment to human rights.414  In 
the fall of 1998, the newly elected Social Democratic-Green coalition government, which had 
strongly committed itself to human rights, was eager to avoid any impression that it would 
pursue an independent foreign policy that would set it apart from its Western friends and allies.  
When it became clear that coercive diplomacy meant resorting to war, the German government 
saw no alternative to participating in limited NATO air strikes, despite heavy opposition from 
the its own Green Party.415  Participation was seen as a precondition for preserving the 
multilateral framework of transatlantic and European security.  And the humanitarian 
justification for the war made it easier for Germany to follow NATO’s lead.  Thus, the Social 
Democrats and Greens in the coalition government supported the decision made by the outgoing 
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Kohl government to support NATO air strikes on October 12, 1998.  An October 16 vote in the 
Bundestag to authorize Luftwaffe aircraft to participate in the operation passed 500 to 80, with 
the bulk of the dissenting votes coming from the former Communist Party in East Germany (the 
Party of Democratic Socialism or PDS).416     
The United Kingdom was not only an enthusiastic supporter of the NATO action in 
Kosovo, but Prime Minister Tony Blair quickly assumed the role of the leading hawk in the 
transatlantic security regime.  Far from being a case of the United States “imposing its will” on 
its closest ally, it was the British leadership that repeatedly tried to strengthen U.S. resolve.  As 
General Clark described, there was “a stormy discussion on ground troops between President 
Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, the result of which was that there would be no (further) 
discussions of the ground option.”417  More specifically, throughout the military campaign, the 
UK argued relentlessly that the allies had to consider the option of sending ground troops to evict 
the Serbs from Kosovo and enable the return of the ethnic Albanians.  The UK was in no real 
position to take a military lead in Kosovo, but Blair led the charge on the issue of ground troops.  
Even before the fighting broke out, the British already had such a plan.418  British officials were 
convinced that the Americans consistently undermined the position of the West (both during the 
negotiations at Rambouillet and subsequently throughout the bombing campaign) by failing to 
demonstrate a credible threat of a ground invasion.     
The underlying NATO assumption was that a relatively short bombing campaign (a few 
days of limited and relatively precise air strikes) would persuade Milosevic to come back to sign 
                                                 
416 Peter Rudolf, “Germany and the Kosovo Conflict” in Martin and Brawley (eds.), op. cit. in note 412, p. 134. 
417 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 268. 
418 Louise Richardson, “A Force for Good in the World? Britain’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis” in Martin and Brawley 
(eds.), op. cit. in note 412, p. 146.  
 175 
the Rambouillet agreement.419  Failing that, NATO would increase the pressure, moving from 
phase one attacks on air defense systems to phase two attacks on Serb forces in and around 
Kosovo to phase three attacks on military and strategic targets throughout Serbia, including 
Belgrade.420  However, no one seriously considered what would happen if this escalation failed 
to force Milosevic to halt Serb attacks on Kosovo’s population and return to negotiations to 
restore autonomy for ethnic Albanians.  Asked what would happen then, one senior U.S. official 
admitted after one week of bombing, “There is no phase four.”421  As a result of this NATO 
miscalculation, NATO had initially only developed a two-day air strike plan.422  It soon became 
apparent, however, that American and NATO officials had vastly underestimated the amount of 
force needed to induce Milosevic to capitulate.  The Serbs believed that NATO would not have 
the political cohesion to be able to agree on more than a few days of bombing.  And the 
Americans believed that a brief, two or three-day bombing campaign was all that it would take to 
ensure Yugoslav compliance.  Both were proven tragically wrong.  The British believed that by 
failing to demonstrate resolve by ruling out a ground invasion, NATO actually enabled the Serbs 
to withstand the bombing campaign.   
In addition, NATO also obviously underestimated the obvious risk that Milosevic would 
reciprocate by more aggressively attacking Kosovar Albanians.  In what seems to be a dramatic 
failure of Western intelligence, there was no contingency planning for refugees.  Milosevic’s 
goals were simple: keep NATO out of rump Yugoslavia, maintain control of Kosovo, crush the 
KLA, and use the war as a pretext to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo—hopefully for 
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good, but at least as a bargaining card in future negotiations.423  Milosevic clearly seemed to be 
counting on the NATO alliance splitting and may also have expected more help from Russia; in 
addition, he had his own brutality to use as an advantage over the West.  As he allegedly once 
told German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, “I can stand death—lots of it; but you can’t.”424
 The war quickly took a direction that surprised (although it should not have) and shocked 
the world.  As General Clark put it, “We thought the Serbs were preparing for a spring offensive 
that would target KLA strongholds….But we never expected the Serbs would push ahead with 
the wholesale deportation of the ethnic Albanian population.”425  The Yugoslav military and 
paramilitary forces launched a well-planned, vicious campaign of terror and expulsion against 
the Kosovar Albanian population.  This campaign of “ethnic cleansing” was intended to drive 
many, if not all, ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, destroy the foundations of their society, and 
prevent them from returning.426  The Yugoslav forces could not hit NATO, but they could hit the 
Albanians who had asked for NATO’s support and intervention.  It was thus both revenge 
against the Albanians and a deliberate strategy of the Serbs at the same time. 
 The horror and devastation inflicted upon the Kosovar Albanian civilian population 
between March and June of 1999 has been documented in detail by numerous organizations, but 
a brief summary will be provided here.  During the course of the NATO air campaign, 
approximately 863,000 civilians sought or were forced into refuge outside of Kosovo, and an 
estimated additional 590,000 were internally displaced.427  Together, these figures demonstrate 
that over ninety percent of the Kosovar Albanian population was displaced from their homes—
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virtually all of them forced from their homes by members of the Yugoslav armed forces or 
Serbian police or paramilitary units, in a process routinely accompanied by shelling by heavy 
weapons, physical abuse (including rape), extortion, killings, pillaging, and looting. 
For all intents and purposes, the U.S. conducted the war on behalf of its European allies, 
dominating both the operation’s planning and its execution.428  Throughout the conflict, there 
were doubts about whether the Yugoslav regime would ultimately comply with NATO’s 
demands to withdraw from Kosovo.  The NATO allies were in danger of losing policy cohesion 
had the war dragged on much longer than it did, since this most likely would have led to a 
ground invasion—at least by some NATO members (namely the U.S. and UK), if not all.  
Several allies, including Germany, Italy, and Greece, strongly opposed any ground intervention, 
and there was little enthusiasm for it in the U.S.429  The lack of coordination among the major 
allies on targeting before the air campaign began also made decisions taken during actual 
operations more contentious.  Parallel U.S. and NATO command-and-control structures 
complicated the operation’s planning and execution, while the absence of allied casualties only 
reinforced the misguided belief in the West that the war was relatively free of risk.430  
 NATO’s limited preparations were quickly replaced by ad hoc operational planning, and, 
as the campaign went on, the responsibility for target selection and mission planning steadily 
shifted from NATO to the U.S. joint task force “Noble Anvil.”431  While the target approval 
process was multilateral, target selection remained almost entirely in U.S. hands.432  The 
bombing campaign was eventually stepped up to include civilian “dual-use” strategic 
infrastructure targets such as bridges, roads, communications networks, oil and gasoline depots 
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and refineries, and electric power plants.  Target selection and approval for all targets was slow 
and difficult.  Although General Clark was ultimately given the authority to approve most 
military targets, those that were politically sensitive or where higher collateral damage was 
possible (which included most dual-use targets) required unanimous approval of the NAC.  As 
Clark put it, “Once we moved past the obvious air defense target set, every target—headquarters 
buildings, communications towers, ammunition storage sites, and military maintenance 
facilities—was, in one way or another, likely to become controversial.”433   
These delays made it difficult for NATO to efficiently use its air power, as there was 
usually a time gap in target selection and approval that reduced the overall effectiveness of the 
air strikes.  In addition, air strikes were severely limited by President Clinton’s insistence that 
allied aircraft bomb from no lower than 15,000 feet in order to avoid being shot down.434  The 
bombing ultimately had little effect on Serb military and security forces in Kosovo, and they 
mostly left the province undamaged and operationally intact.435           
Russia was infuriated by the air war against the Serbs.  Many Russians viewed it not only 
as an attack on a long-term ally but as a direct threat to their own security and an insult to their 
perceived position as a great power.  At an emergency UN Security Council meeting, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin condemned the action, saying: “This is, in fact, NATO’s attempt to enter 
the twenty-first century as global policeman.  Russia will never agree to it.”436  Russia threatened 
to veto any UN Security Council specifically authorizing use of force against Yugoslavia (as did 
China), and thus, none was ever passed.  
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Allied consultations during the war produced numerous disagreements among the major 
regime member states.  At every stage of the conflict, France attempted to exert its influence 
within the international organizations involved (the UNSC, NATO, EU, and Contact Group) and 
took full advantage of its potential veto power in each of them.  After the war, French President 
Jacques Chirac boasted of France’s role in vetoing various dual-use targets in the NAC not only 
as attempts to limit the escalation of violence but also as a demonstration of his country’s 
“capacity for independence.”437  Throughout the war, France intervened to halt attacks on 
Yugoslav civil installations.438  French strategic independence thus seems more important to 
Chirac than either maintaining NATO unity and cohesion or winning the war.   
The UK and Germany also disagreed with the U.S. over issues such as targeting.  For 
instance, the UK allowed U.S. B-52 bombers based at Fairford, England to be used only against 
airfields and other isolated military targets, so as to avoid collateral damage.439  For the same 
reasons, Germany had reservations about targets proposed by the U.S. in Serb cities.440  These 
tensions sometimes became public and led to the gradual erosion of regime political and policy 
cohesion.        
From the start of the crisis, the leaders of the major regime member states excluded the 
possibility of using ground forces in a “non-permissive environment,” that is, in a combat role.  
President Clinton had repeatedly stated in 1999 that he did not intend to put ground troops into 
Kosovo and that an air war would bring the Serbs back to the negotiating table.  This sentiment 
was shared by France and Germany, as well, and Prime Minister Blair, while pressing for at least 
a plausible threat of a ground invasion, went along with the consensus.  Before the start of the 
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bombing campaign, there was thus a clear regime consensus to rule out using ground troops for 
anything other than helping to implement a peace agreement reached by the Serbs and ethnic 
Albanians at the negotiating table.  As Daalder and O’Hanlon argue, publicly ruling out the use 
of ground forces at the outset of the war was necessary to keep both the fragile alliance 
consensus on and domestic support for the use of force intact—a consensus and support that 
would have shattered if the U.S. or anyone else had raised the possibility of having to go in on 
the ground.441    
NATO’s bombing campaign produced many challenges within the regime—including 
among some of the smaller regime member states.  There were massive demonstrations against 
the war in Greece—a member of both NATO and the EU.  In fact, the Greek population 
remained strongly opposed to Operation Allied Force throughout its course.442  Greeks felt 
solidarity with their fellow Orthodox Christians in Serbia, with whom they shared not only a 
religion but also a long history of struggle against Muslim expansion in the region.  Greek 
leaders, by contrast, believed that their country’s long-term interests were best served by being a 
good ally within NATO and thus supported the war effort, despite widespread domestic 
opposition.  
The governments of the new NATO members (Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) 
generally supported the war, although they too faced difficulties doing so.  The Czech 
government was divided on the war.  President Vaclav Havel supported it, but Prime Minister 
Milos Zeman did not; and only 35 percent of the Czech public supported air strikes.443  The 
Polish government strongly supported the operation, and sixty percent of its population did 
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too.444  Hungary, with 300,000 ethnic Magyars (Hungarians) living in Vojvodina, Serbia, was 
divided.  Budapest officially supported NATO’s air war, and its government opened Hungarian 
airspace, military bases, and transportation routes for NATO use.445  However, the Hungarian 
government opposed any ground invasion, and opinion polls showed that two-thirds of the public 
opposed NATO’s launching air strikes from Hungary.446   
As the air war went on with little sign of Milosevic capitulating, pressure mounted for 
NATO to use ground forces or lose credibility in its attempt at armed coercive diplomacy, and 
President Clinton finally changed his mind, while characteristically denying that he was doing 
so.  He said, “I don’t think that we or our allies should take any options off the table, and that has 
been my position from the beginning.”447  But, of course, it had not been his position from the 
beginning.  The war polarized opinion (both inside and outside of government) in the U.S., but 
many increasingly advocated the use of ground forces the longer the war went on.  Notable 
proponents of a ground invasion in the U.S. included Republican Senators John McCain, Richard 
Lugar, and Chuck Hagel, and Democratic Senators Chuck Robb, Joe Biden, Joseph Lieberman, 
and John Kerry.448  Within the Clinton administration itself, Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright became a staunch advocate of a ground invasion.449  
In France, most official public declarations indicate that President Chirac strongly 
opposed the idea of a ground invasion.  There seemed to be a great deal of internal debate, 
however, especially in the early stages of the war.  For example, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin refused to rule out the possibility of a ground offensive even just one week after the 
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beginning of the air war—despite a claim to the contrary by Foreign Minister Védrine the day 
before—and then one week later announced that the question was “completely premature.”450  
Less than a week afterward, in an apparent reference to the use of ground forces, President 
Chirac talked of the need to use “additional means” in an address to the nation.451  Ultimately, 
however, Chirac seems to have rejected the idea due to a combination of domestic opposition 
(especially from the political left) and fear of provoking Russia.452   
The German government was adamantly opposed to any sort of ground invasion, and the 
idea was rather bluntly publicly rejected by Chancellor Schröder.453  Indeed, the biggest concern 
within NATO at this point was that Germany or Greece might veto the use of ground troops in 
the NAC.  Chancellor Schröder made little effort to hide his annoyance at any British 
suggestions concerning the use of ground troops.  He stated at a press conference at NATO 
headquarters, “I will not participate in this specifically British debate on war theory.”454  He 
argued that since the Bundestag was unanimous in its opposition, change in NATO strategy was 
“impossible.”  He pointed out: “The strategy of an alliance can only be changed if all the parties 
agree, so I trust that NATO’s strategy is not going to change”; he then went on to blame the UK 
for rifts in NATO unity.455           
By late May (coinciding with President Clinton’s abrupt about face), however, the allies 
were finally persuaded that plans for a ground invasion should be prepared.  NATO officials 
began discussing the possibility, and General Clark was told to devise a plan for a ground 
invasion of Kosovo.  The NATO plan that emerged called for 150,000 troops for such an 
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operation.456  On May 31, President Clinton gave General Clark permission to make preparations 
for a ground invasion.  But then, on June 3, Milosevic suddenly ended the war.  
 President Yeltsin had first responded to the air war by threatening the West but then 
(when that did not do any good) intervened diplomatically to bring the war to an end.  Initially, 
Yeltsin went so far as to warn that NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia could lead to World War 
III, but he later backed away from such bombastic statements.457  Former Russian Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin worked out a deal with Milosevic to stop end the war, and the rest 
of the Contact Group, NATO, and the UNSC eventually agreed to most of it.  The negotiations 
produced most of what NATO demanded.  All Serb police and military had to leave Kosovo, all 
refugees would return, and Kosovo would remain within the Yugoslav republic.  In addition, the 
UN (and not NATO) would control the peace accords and administration in Kosovo.  But the 
final agreement was only possible because NATO did not insist on a vote on autonomy after 
three years—as the Rambouillet Accord had called for (and the Kosovar Albanians had 
demanded).   
Much debate exists even to this day as to why Milosevic ultimately capitulated—and did 
so at the time that he did.  While interesting and of serious policy importance, such debate is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  In summary, there are three basic explanations as to why 
the war ended when it did.  The author personally believes that no one explanation is likely 
sufficient, and a combination of the three is the most likely answer.  The first reason is the 
intensified NATO bombing campaign.  While tactically/militarily ineffective, the air war did 
inflict serious economic damage on Serbia and degraded some degree of support for both the war 
and Milosevic among the Serbian people over time.  Second, the Russian diplomatic intervention 
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must have not only applied political pressure on Milosevic but also led to a realization that 
Russia was not prepared to risk war with NATO over Kosovo.  In short, the Russians made it 
clear to him that he was on his own.  The third (and perhaps strongest) explanation is the shift in 
NATO planning and policy from strictly fighting an air war to at least the implied decision to 
initiate a ground offensive.  Such a ground war would have led to a serious rift in NATO—and 
may very well have led to its collapse.  But the threat of a ground war was perceived as being 
sufficiently legitimate by both Milosevic and Russia that it intimidated Belgrade enough to back 
down, lest he risk complete collapse of his own regime in Yugoslavia.  
6.8 ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES 
6.8.1 Dependent Variable: Measuring Regime Policy Preferences in Kosovo 
As in the Bosnia case, collective regime policy shifted over time (although the time 
period of consideration/deliberation is much condensed compared to the Bosnia case).  Those 
shifts were as follows.  (Note that a given level of escalation also includes acceptance of all 
lower levels of intervention.)  
Through Early-Mid 1998: Nonintervention (0) 
Mid-1998 through Early-1999: Punitive Attacks (6) = 6.0 
Early-Mid 1999: Sustained Air Bombardment (7) = 7.0  
Mid-Late 1999: Regime Split over Possible Active Use of Ground Forces (9)    
 
USA/President Bill Clinton 
Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)  
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Active Use of Ground Forces (9) 
• Average Preferred Intervention Rating = 7.5 
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United Kingdom/Prime Minister Tony Blair 
Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)  
 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Active Use of Ground Forces (9) 
• Average Preferred Intervention Rating = 7.5 
 
France/President Jacques Chirac 
Preferred Level of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6)  
• Maximum Acceptable Rating = Sustained Air Bombardment (7) 
• Average Intervention Rating = 6.5 
 
Germany/Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
Preferred Levels of Regime Intervention = Punitive Attacks (6) 
• Maximum Acceptable Level = Sustained Air Bombardment (7) 
• Average Intervention Rating = 6.5 
 
6.8.2 Independent Variable 1: Power as Influence in Regime Policy Congruence 
Relative power was a factor in the Kosovo case but not in the way that might be assumed 
from traditional international relations theory.  The regime was so heavily dependent on U.S. 
military power that no serious escalation to a sustained bombing campaign (or higher) could 
have been seriously contemplated by NATO without American participation and leadership.  
Given the highly unequal distribution of military resources (with the U.S. being preponderant), 
this should lead one to expect that any debate or decision about using military force would have 
been dominated and driven by the U.S.  But, as discussed earlier, this is not what happened.     
The data (see Appendix Four) clearly show that the United States’ share of aggregate 
power had remained relatively static during the time period between the end of the Bosnia crisis 
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(1995) and the beginning of regime debate over the crisis in Kosovo (1998).  A slight increase 
between 1998 and 1999 is seen, but not enough to be significant.  Likewise, despite some 
moderate fluctuation, the U.S. share of military power alone also remained similar in size as that 
during the Bosnia crisis.   
It does not seem that (like Bosnia) the role of relative power distribution had any direct 
influence in formation of a collective policy regarding use of force in Kosovo.  Once again, the 
share of relative power among the major regime members remained relatively static over not 
only the two-year Kosovo period but also since the time of the Bosnia crisis.  Relative power 
fluctuated even less than in the Bosnia case, the highest fluctuation being a drop of 14.3 percent 
in the case of France between 1995 and 1998, followed closely by a drop of 13.7 percent in the 
case of Germany between 1998 and 1999.  The American share of relative power was generally 
higher in comparison to the time period during the Bosnia crisis, but it never fluctuated more 
than 4.4 percent (an increase between 1998 and 1999).  Using only military spending (MS) as a 
measurement of intra-regime power does not seem to have much effect on the analysis, as the 
largest change was a drop of 17.9 percent that took place with Germany, from 1995-1998.   
 In this case, the United States was once again clearly dominant in both measurements of 
power, but that is difficult to apply in this case, since regime policy was relatively congruent at 
the outset of the crisis—quite unlike the situation in Bosnia.  In fact, with Kosovo, one can see 
the opposite of the “Bosnia effect.”  That is, with Bosnia, regime policy was incongruent early 
on and then coalesced over time.  With Kosovo, regime policy was initially congruent but 
became less cohesive over time.  As such, according to this hypothesis being tested, the U.S. 
should have remained uninfluenced by other regime members in its policy preferences, and if it 
did change preferences, it also should be able to sway other members to adopt a similar 
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preference.  In fact, the opposite of both occurred.  First, the U.S. did change its intervention 
policy preference later in the war, moving from being opposed to any ground invasion to 
supporting the possibility of such.  Thus, the U.S. moved toward the British position despite an 
overwhelmingly preponderant power/influence advantage over the UK.  And second, once the 
U.S. did change its policy preference, it was unable to use the combined power/influence of the 
U.S. and UK to sway Germany, which was adamantly opposed to that position—and whose own 
relative regime power had dropped significantly since Bosnia.     
The transatlantic balance of power once again seems to have had little impact on this 
particular regime policy change.  Thus, in conclusion, both realist, material-oriented measures of 
power as influence failed to demonstrate any correlation with either the formation of the original 
regime policy preference or its steady decline in cohesion over time during the period of the 
Kosovo case study.  Once again, the U.S., despite having an overwhelming relative share of 
power (measured in either manner) among the major regime members was not able to translate 
that power into influence under the Clinton administration.  This may indicate one of two things.  
First, that the realist perception of state power is not translatable into influence between or 
among regime members (and thus the first independent variable fails).  For purposes of the 
second case study, power as influence in the transatlantic security regime has no correlation 
with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, and the H1 hypothesis may be 
rejected.  
6.8.3 Independent Variable 2: Threat Perception and Regime Policy Congruence 
Similar to the Bosnia crisis, the transatlantic security regime justified multilateral military 
intervention in Kosovo as necessary to promote humanitarian efforts, prevent a wider European 
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war, curb refugee flows, and preserve NATO credibility.  In fact, although widely disputed, 
officials (especially in the U.S., UK, and NATO headquarters) argued that the struggle in 
Kosovo was vital to the security of NATO member states.  Many scholars, in contrast, argue that 
only the remotest geopolitical interests were at stake in Kosovo.   
In regards to a “wider European war” as a specific security threat to the region, the fear 
(real or imagined) was that somehow Greece and Turkey—both members of NATO—would get 
dragged into the war on opposite sides of the conflict.458  Yet, there is virtually no historical 
evidence to support this argument.  While certainly sympathetic to and politically and 
economically supportive of different sides in the conflict, neither of those countries had any 
interest or possible gain by getting involved militarily (other than through multilateral 
organizations).  In fact, if either Greece or Turkey had wanted to more directly support or 
intervene in the conflict without Western or NATO “meddling,” then surely one or both would 
have exercised its veto within the NAC to prohibit NATO intervention.  The fact that each 
country chose to not exercise such a veto logically demonstrates that each had no interest in any 
kind of unilateral intervention of its own.  Turkey did not need such a unilateral option, as it 
supported and encouraged NATO intervention.  Whereas Greece, while opposed to the NATO 
intervention, did not have either the political will or the military capabilities to affect the 
outcome of the war through any type of intervention of its own; in addition, there is strong 
evidence demonstrating that Greece condoned the NATO intervention (despite domestic 
opposition) because its government both valued the Greek relationship with NATO and feared 
Turkish reprisal or counter-intervention.459   
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With regard to the possibility of a wider war involving Albania and/or Macedonia, this 
too was relatively unlikely, as by the time NATO launched its air strikes, Serb forces on the 
ground had already achieved most of their initial operational objectives in attacking the KLA and 
had a fully developed war plan (“Operation Horseshoe”) to destroy the KLA without resorting to 
invasion or intervention anywhere outside of Kosovo.460  If, on the other hand, Albanians outside 
of Kosovo were willing to go to war for their cousins in Kosovo, they displayed no identifiable 
signs of preparing to do so or of a desire to do so.  And in terms of wider escalation within the 
former Yugoslavia, this threat simply did not exist as it had during the Bosnia war, for the simple 
fact that Milosevic had already recognized Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian independence; and 
NATO’s SFOR peacekeeping force (which included a sizable Russian contingent) was already 
on the ground in Bosnia.  There is simply no indication that any of these other former Yugoslav 
republics would have in any way been drawn into the Kosovo conflict.  
In regards to the security “threat” posed to the region by an increase in refugee flows, in 
fact, the refugee exodus from Kosovo increased dramatically after NATO began its air 
campaign.461  As discussed previously, the Serbs used NATO air strikes as a pretext to escalate 
their ethnic cleansing campaign, and the NATO air war did virtually nothing to hinder their 
effort or to protect the fleeing ethnic Albanian civilians.  Thus, if the causus belli was a 
perceived security threat to NATO one or more members or the region from instability arising 
from massive refugee flows, the evidence shows that: 1) no such “threat” existed before the 
NATO air war; and 2) the NATO air war may have escalated such a perceived security threat.   
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Although the existence of a shared external threat is one of the major factors identified by 
alliance theory as fostering collective cooperation among states, in this case study, the hypothesis 
seems to have little relevance.  Despite the absence of an acknowledged and shared external 
threat, the regime was still able to achieve a higher degree of policy congruence more quickly 
than in the Bosnia case study.  Proponents of stronger action (led by the UK) may have tried to 
create the perception of a direct security threat that could be used to encourage other major 
regime members to take a stronger stance against Milosevic, but any evidence that this 
succeeded is lacking.  Logically, if it had succeeded, then the UK’s stronger position on possible 
use of ground forces would have been adopted earlier on by the regime as its collective policy.  
The fact that it was not demonstrates that there simply was not a collective perceived major 
threat to the regime or its member states.462   
In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat level 
intensity, regime participation in military intervention responding to the Kosovo conflict 
represented a low level of threat to regime members (as defined in chapter four).  (See Table 
Three below.)  The only real traditional security threat to the major regime member states 
represented by the Kosovo war was the refugee crisis and possible subsequent regional 
instability derived from it, but there is simply very little evidence that such a collective threat 
perception (if it existed at all) was instrumental in any way in helping achieve policy congruence.  
One interesting note, however, are the geographic positions and roles of Italy (as a 
medium-sized regime member but full member of the Contact Group) and Greece (as a smaller 
regime member), each of which would be more directly affected by events in Kosovo than other 
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regime members.  If one added Italy, for example, to the threat matrix below, its threat 
perception for the Kosovo crisis would be the following: Imminence=Medium; 
Probability=Medium; Proximity=High; and Severity=Low.  Thus, Italy, in fact, had a different 
threat perception of the conflict based upon its obvious geographic proximity (as well as 
historical ties).  At the outset of the crisis and debate over intervention, collective regime policy 
coordination still depended on and revolved around the four major member states.  Yet, as the air 
war continued and the perceived regime security threat of possible refugee flows and regional 
instability became an actual national security threat for individual members Italy and Greece, 
their support for “official” regime policy began to very quickly erode (along with that of 
Germany) due to increases in the categories of the threat matrix.  Additional research and 
analysis on Italy and perhaps Greece in this case study therefore might provide further, 
interesting insights on a possible negative or inverse affect of differences in national (as opposed 
to collective) threat perception on regime policy congruence. 
Finally, as with the Bosnia case study, given the nearly complete lack of debate among 
the major regime members about a specific security threat (or its absence) during the time period 
preceding or during of the Kosovo case study, this variable may also be classified as irrelevant 
(or at least non-causal) in antebellum regime policy congruence but possibly highly relevant for 
regime policy congruence during actual war fighting.  Simply put, a non-existent or limited 
threat before the crisis became an actuated threat once hostilities commenced.  But that threat 
was shared unequally by the regime members, and thus some altered national strategic priorities 
as the war went on.  There is some (albeit limited) evidence to support a thesis that threat 
perception’s affect on regime policy congruence is therefore an unstable variable that may 
change in importance during the course of an individual case study.   
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The fact that regime policy congruence was achieved without the presence of any shared 
external threat before the policy was implemented initially seems to cast doubt on the relevance 
of this hypothesis.  But the fact that regime policy congruence began to fragment after policy 
implementation seems to support the hypothesis.  This distinction between policy formation 
stage and policy implementation stage is highly relevant for public policy analysis and may 
present an opportunity for future research to link the literatures of international relations theory 
and public policy analysis.  Thus, for purposes of the second case study, perceived external 
threat to the transatlantic security regime has no correlation with regime policy congruence 
during the policy formation stage but has a possible correlation with changes over time 
therein—especially in the implementation stage of public policy, and the H2 hypothesis should 












Table Three: Threat Matrix for Kosovo Case Study463
 Imminence464 Probability465 Proximity466 Severity467
France Very Low  Very Low Low Very Low 
Germany Low  Low Medium Very Low 
United Kingdom Very Low  Very Low Low Very Low 
United States Very Low  Very Low Very Low Very Low 
 
6.8.4 Independent Variable 3: International Institutions and Regime Policy Congruence 
As was seen earlier, one of the most striking aspects of the failure to more quickly 
achieve regime policy congruence during the Bosnia crisis was perhaps the initial refusal of both 
the United States and its European allies to appeal to the most relevant regime institution 
(NATO) as an internal dispute resolution mechanism.  In this case study, however, one of the 
central factors different from the Bosnia case study was the relatively rapid involvement of 
NATO and virtually no involvement of the EU in regime policy-making.  As one observation 
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bluntly described it, “Few events in the history of European integration have undermined the 
EU’s image as much as the member states’ collective impotence in the Kosovo crisis.”468  The 
EU was nearly inconsequential (in terms of policy-making) during the Kosovo crisis (especially 
regarding the debate over using military force) and ultimately simply voiced post hoc support for 
the policy initiatives of others (the UNSC, NATO, and/or Contact Group).469  Between the two 
regime institutions, only NATO played any real policy (as distinguished from political or 
diplomatic) role regarding use of force or military intervention during this case study. 
 In direct contrast to Bosnia, throughout the period of the Kosovo crisis, both the U.S. and 
Europeans sought to use NATO for policy coordination—even more so once Russia began to 
obstruct discussion of any options involving the application of military force against the Serbs in 
both the UN Security Council and the Contact Group.470  Because it had been making clear for 
months that any attempt by NATO to use the UN would be doomed to failure, the Russian 
government, in effect, aided those NATO countries (the U.S. and UK) that were not all that 
predisposed to using the UN in the first place.   
Also throughout the period of the case study, both France and Germany (and Italy) used 
NATO as a mechanism to attempt to ward off any more aggressive military action other than air 
strikes (by threatening to obstruct or even veto any proposed authorization to launch a ground 
invasion).471  By limiting the intervention/use of force debate in the NAC to only air strikes, 
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France, Germany, and Italy hoped to pressure the UK (and later U.S.) into avoiding any more 
aggressive actions and restrict regime policy to its initial position (specifically regarding the 
necessity of a UNSC resolution to authorize any use of force and ruling out any possible use of 
ground forces other than post-conflict peacekeepers).  The big risk for France and Germany was 
whether the U.S. and UK would consider unilateral intervention (i.e. outside of the NATO 
command structure) if regime policy did not coalesce around their (much more aggressive) 
position.  Thus, France and Germany seemed to value the political and institutional cohesion of 
NATO more than the credibility or effectiveness of the alliance.    
 The U.S. and UK, in turn, seemed willing to risk the possible collapse of NATO (or at 
least a very serious rift) rather than allow that institution to restrict their national policy means 
and objectives (which, in fact, were identical to the publicly stated initial regime policy 
objectives, if not its initial means of implementation).  By stating that they would commit to an 
invasion using ground forces, the Clinton administration and Blair government appeared willing 
to risk undermining the cohesion of NATO in favor of maintaining its current credibility and 
effectiveness—a position in direct opposition to that of France and Germany.  Indeed, U.S. 
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger argued that victory in Kosovo was more important than 
keeping the alliance together over this issue.  America, he said, was going to win “in or outside 
NATO.”472  To some observers, this was difficult to believe, as, after all, the U.S. and UK were 
(and are) arguably the strongest supporters of NATO, and NATO remains the United States’ 
primary instrument of influence in European security affairs.473    
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a ground invasion without NATO approval (which most likely would never have been given).  For this (less 
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 Ryan C. Hendrickson argues that an additional factor in the institutional influence played 
by NATO in achieving regime policy congruence was that of the role of its Secretary General, 
Javier Solana, arguing that throughout the crisis, Solana played a highly visible and instrumental 
role within the alliance.474  In most assessments of the politics and differing viewpoints within 
the alliance during the Kosovo crisis, however, little attention is given to Solana as playing any 
sort of major role, and it is unlikely that this is due to simple oversight.  But Hendrickson’s 
unique review of Solana’s role in the crisis is thorough, and he argues that Solana essentially 
played three important roles for NATO: 1) helping to craft a legal justification and consensus for 
use of force without a UNSC resolution; 2) acting as a “go-between” between the NAC and 
SACEUR General Clark; and 3) providing political leadership to mirror (and buttress) General 
Clark’s military leadership during the actual air war.475   
Unfortunately, these roles (however important) had nothing to do with NATO policy 
formation and congruence in decision-making about the use of force.  The latter two were roles 
that Solana played only after a common/collective policy had been decided upon and the 
decision to begin bombing had been made by the NAC.  The first aspect may have been 
indirectly helpful in getting unanimous NAC support for air strikes without a UNSC resolution.  
However, Hendrickson provides no evidence that such a decision would not have been made 
without the involvement of the Secretary General.  There is simply no evidence to suggest that 
either the man as a personality or utilizing his position as Secretary General in any way led to a 
change in policy position or preference by any member state in NATO—much less one of the 
four major members.  In fact, when it came to the much more divisive question of a ground 
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invasion, there is virtually no empirical information that demonstrates that Solana would have 
been able to play any role whatsoever in overcoming the serious chasm between opposing 
member state viewpoints on that subject (nor, frankly, any evidence that he would have even 
wanted to try, as he was most likely opposed to that option, as well). 
Most significant in any analysis of Solana’s role (or lack thereof) in facilitating policy 
congruence is Hendrickson’s admission that another, completely exogenous, factor contributed 
to the Secretary General’s diplomatic skills and efficiency during the Kosovo crisis.476  Simply 
put, Solana benefited greatly from the support and influence of the United States within NATO.  
From the outset of the crisis, the U.S. made a conscious decision and effort to coordinate policy 
through NATO rather than bilaterally (or multilaterally through a “coalition of the willing”) and 
to allow the Secretary General a significant diplomatic role within the alliance.  Without the 
diplomatic and military weight of the United States behind him, Hendrickson admits, “The 
Secretary General would have found it difficult to exercise such a prominent role in the 
Alliance.”477  Indeed, while one would not want to discount the role or importance of NATO’s 
Secretary General, it is simply too uncertain as to whether the more active and visible role played 
by Solana during the Kosovo crisis aided in achieving regime policy congruence or benefited 
from it.    
It is clear that the involvement of an international institution (in this case NATO) may 
have affected regime policy formation and congruence.  But a more stringent test would have 
come as to whether desire to maintain NATO cohesion could have overcome a much more 
controversial and divisive debate, such as launching a ground invasion.  Fortunately for the real 
world (but perhaps unfortunately for this dissertation), the world never found out.  Thus, like the 
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Bosnia case study, different aspects of this case appear to be both consistent and inconsistent 
with the hypothesis; and those aspects of the case that do seem to support the hypothesis do so in 
a corollary rather than a causal manner.  There is similarly enough cursory and counterfactual 
evidence that merits further investigation, however.  Thus, for purposes of the second case study, 
the presence of an “enforcing” regime institution and/or policy entrepreneur has a correlation 
with regime policy congruence or changes over time therein, but it does not conclusively prove 
to be a causal factor.  The H3 hypothesis therefore should not be rejected.  
Additional research and analysis is necessary to make any further assessments, in 
particular, the differing roles played by simple institutional membership versus actual 
institutional participation.  Specifically, further research should examine a larger selection of 
regime member states in order to evaluate if this type of institutional constraint is more 
applicable (or applicable at all) to smaller regime member states, which the institutionalist 
literature argues are more susceptible to such constraint and have less freedom of action.  In 
particular, Italy’s role in this case study is perhaps more relevant than in others, and its policy 
pursuits and diplomatic efforts during this case study period may merit further study and 
analysis.  
6.8.5 Independent Variable 4: Risk Assessment and Regime Policy Congruence  
At the stage of the Kosovo conflict at which the transatlantic security regime acted, 
Milosevic was unwilling to give up his political/strategic aims and negotiate—even after four 
weeks of NATO air strikes.  As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points 
out: “The most promising window of opportunity to resolve the Kosovo crisis without war was 
existed in (the) pre-1998 period.  Paradoxically, the political will to mount such a (major) 
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diplomatic effort could only be mobilized only after the conflict escalated into full violence, 
while this violence, in turn, severely constrained the responsiveness of local players to 
diplomatic initiatives.”478  Even after concessions were made, NATO forces would still be 
necessary to enforce/implement any peace agreements.  Thus, any efforts to halt the ethnic 
conflict were likely to result in a long-term NATO commitment.  Certainly, any NATO 
involvement (but especially an open-ended, extended commitment) could become costly and 
result in substantial political risks.     
 In terms of costs, the U.S. alone spent approximately $6 billion for the air war in 
Kosovo,479 and postwar peacekeeping and reconstruction costs for the international community 
were even higher ($200 billion in the first four years alone).480  However, NATO human costs in 
Kosovo in terms of lives lost were extraordinarily light, as NATO suffered no casualties until 
after major combat operations had ended.481
While there was strong political resistance to the use of ground troops in Kosovo by 
several of the regime members, as well as non-regime countries such as Russia, China, and India, 
air strikes were generally supported by the governments of regime members.  However, an 
extended, open-ended air campaign with increasing destruction inside Serbia and increased 
civilian casualties would have most likely been increasingly criticized in many regime member 
states.  While the regime proved to be relatively cohesive at the outset of the air war, differing 
national interests and practices caused serious debates and disagreements among the members of 
the regime.   
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 While NATO (really primarily American) military capability was extraordinary, the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out that the Yugoslav military was 
well-organized, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated.482  The Yugoslav air defense 
capability was efficient enough to lead to the U.S./NATO decision to keep all NATO air sorties 
above 15,000 feet, which, in turn, restricted NATO aircrafts’ ability to successfully attack 
Yugoslav military forces.483  The Commission further notes that Yugoslav forces maintained 
military superiority over KLA forces:  
“At the start of the NATO bombing campaign, the Yugoslav armed forces enjoyed a clear 
advantage over the KLA forces, with 40,000 combat troops, a unified police and 
paramilitary task force, and anti-aircraft and ground artillery units available in Kosovo or 
at its borders.  In contrast, before mid-March 1999, the KLA was not yet a centrally 
organized military force.  The Albanian resistance consisted of 8,000-10,000 lightly 
armed, poorly trained men in Kosovo, with an additional 5,000-8,000 men training in 
northern Albania.  These men belonged to different armed resistance groups.  Most of the 
groups had some connection to the KLA, but they also maintained their individual 
identity.”484  
 
In addition to Yugoslavia’s military power, the climate and terrain also provided serious 
obstacles to any NATO military campaign—air and/or ground.  Foul weather in Yugoslavia 
frequently interfered with NATO pilots’ line of sight and with the lasers that directed precision-
guided munitions.485  Additionally, the mountainous terrain and heavy forests limited military 
reconnaissance systems’ line of sight and diminished the effectiveness of satellite intelligence 
imagery.486  Finally, Milosevic’s political aims provided additional challenges to NATO forces 
and diplomatic mediation.  For Serbia, the war involved the highest stakes for which a nation can 
fight: the defense of its sovereign territory.  In conflicts such as Kosovo, this vital national 
interest of the Serbs clearly outweighed the non-vital humanitarian interests of the transatlantic 
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regime or any of its individual members.  And this meant that, rationally, one could and should 
expect that Serbia’s national will and resolve would be greater than NATO’s—and thus, the 
former would be willing to accept much higher risks than the latter in pursuit of its interests.   
By engaging in military intervention in Kosovo, the transatlantic security regime’s 
prestige and relationships with other major countries was also adversely affected (and this was 
well-known as a political risk before the decision to go to war was made).  The military 
intervention especially had important strategic consequences with regard to Russia and China.  
According to a Russian political analyst: 
“Few people in Russia believe(d) that NATO undertook its military action in response to 
a humanitarian catastrophe.  On the contrary, the widespread view (was) that NATO 
instigated instability by supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army and other extremist 
forces as a pretext to further split up Yugoslavia—the only country in the region not 
aspiring to join the alliance—and to increase its military presence in the Balkans.”487
 
Russia’s engagement in the Kosovo crisis was primarily to counterbalance NATO, which (from 
the Russian point of view) was encroaching into a traditional Russian sphere of influence 
(through the air war) and threatening Russia’s own sovereignty (by setting a precedent in Kosovo 
for possible foreign intervention on behalf of Chechens in Russia).  Writing about the attitudes of 
Russia’s political elites, Christopher Williams and Zinaida T. Glonkova state:  
“From a Russian perspective, the West failed to give Serbia time to reach a compromise 
with the Kosovo Albanians.  Instead, the West tried to force the February 1999 
Rambouillet agreement….Meanwhile, the European Union and the USA pursued their 
own aims; they wanted a radical solution—to return the ‘powder keg’ of the Balkans to 
what it used to be….NATO’s hard-line reaction received a cold reception from many 
quarters in Russia….The West therefore risked severing ties with Russia and forcing 
Moscow to resume full military cooperation with Belgrade and to seek new alliances 
elsewhere if NATO bombing continued.”488  
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Concerns about NATO’s relationship with China were also raised—especially after the 
accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. 
In the final analysis, NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo constituted a significant 
risk to the transatlantic security regime in terms of the perceived benefits of intervention (as 
expressed by the publicly stated goals mentioned earlier) versus the possible political, economic, 
and human costs of intervention.  High-level costs/risks were present as a result of the expected 
long-term and possibly open-ended military and economic involvement, the costs associated with 
intervening in an ongoing active war, generally limited support for escalation beyond the air 
campaign, the perception on behalf of Serbs that their vital national interests (and, in fact, 
sovereignty) were at stake, increased costs due to the physical operational environment, and the 
potential for very negative consequences to relations with other major powers (especially Russia 
and China), and the fact that the Serbs had sufficient military power to prolong or even escalate 
the conflict, and the uncertainty of public support—especially the longer the war continued.  It is 
also noteworthy that these perceived and acknowledged costs of the air war would have been 
dramatically greater had a ground invasion been launched—including an exponential increase in 
the human costs (in terms of casualties) and material costs for the regime members who may 
have participated.  The perceived benefits of military intervention were ending the humanitarian 
crisis, and the need to maintain the credibility of NATO.      
The case of Kosovo does seem to support the hypothesis regarding the cost-benefit 
conditions under which the transatlantic security regime will adopt a cohesive, collective policy 
regarding military intervention.  When NATO first launched limited air strikes, no member state 
other than the UK seemed to believe that a prolonged air war would be necessary, and thus, 
regime cohesion was quite strong.  Thus, the military and human costs were initially perceived as 
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quite low, and there was little disagreement among the major regime members.  When the 
limited air strikes had no effect on the Serbs and a prolonged strategic air campaign was 
launched, however, major regime members began to diverge in views about how to proceed.  
And once it became clear that even the strategic bombing campaign might not achieve the 
desired effect, the regime members began to openly and bitterly disagree about executing the 
ground war option.  
Basing their military strategy on the perceived low-cost success of the limited air strikes 
during the Bosnia war, the regime members readily chose the same option to pressure Milosevic 
over Kosovo—a very rational option that reflected a balance between the greater perceived 
human costs of non-intervention and the higher military and economic costs of a more aggressive 
and robust intervention.  But it was changes in the perceived cost-benefit analysis that (in part) 
pushed the regime members to move from policy agreement to disagreement.  When the low-cost, 
limited, coercive use of force was adopted as regime policy, there was cohesion and widespread 
agreement—despite some very real political costs.  Bt it was when the human and military costs 
increased for the regime that there was increasing divergence and  disagreement.  This leads to 
the conclusion (in this case study) that regime cohesion is relatively stable in the face of 
perceived high political and economic costs but not in the face of perceived high military and 
human costs.   
Like Bosnia, then, the Kosovo case seems to provide (qualified) support for this 
hypothesis.  It is also obvious that if NATO—or any of its individual members—had launched a 
ground invasion, the regime would have faced a completely different set of risks and associated 
costs than were associated with the air war alone.  The U.S. and UK, by the very act of 
threatening a ground invasion, expressed a higher degree of perception of utility gained by such 
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an action than did their allies (credibility versus cohesion, as discussed earlier).  Thus, unlike in 
Bosnia, wherein the U.S. and Europeans had diametrically opposite views of perceived costs and 
benefits associated with increasing military intervention, during the Kosovo crisis, it appears that 
the U.S. and UK had diametrically opposite views than those of France, Germany, Italy, and 
other European governments—but with the U.S. position changing during the war.  This clearly 
led to increasing degradation of regime policy cohesion as the war went on.   
The greater the perceived costs of intervention in Kosovo compared to the perceived 
benefits, the more unlikely any individual regime member was to support increased intervention 
(i.e. a ground war).  It was differences among major regime members in this cost-benefit analysis 
that began to cause (to some degree) the erosion of a congruent intervention policy.  When 
perceptual differences began to change, so too did the ease of collective policy formation and 
implementation.  Thus, for purposes of the second case study, the perceived risk analysis or cost-
benefit ratio of the policy also has a strong correlation with regime policy congruence (and, in 
fact, seems to play a relatively strong causal role).  The H4 hypothesis therefore should not be 
rejected.  
6.8.6 Independent Variable 5: Perceptual Lenses and Regime Policy Congruence 
As discussed earlier, throughout most of the course of the Bosnia conflict, the Clinton 
administration had little in terms of shared political ideology with the leaders of the major 
European regime members.  The Clinton administration was a center-left Democratic one, and 
the major leaders of Europe were either from center-right political parties (Major in the United 
Kingdom and Kohl in Germany) or even farther left than Clinton and his advisors (Mitterand’s 
socialist government in France).  In stark contrast, throughout the period of the Kosovo crisis, the 
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government leaders of all the three of the major European states were different from those in 
place at the outset of the Bosnia crisis.  In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair’s “New Labor” 
center-left government had replaced John Major’s center-right Conservative government.  And in 
Germany, Gerhard Schröder’s and Joschka Fischer’s leftist Socialist-Green coalition had 
replaced Helmut Kohl’s center-right government.  Out of the four major regime member states, 
only France did not have a left-leaning political party in power.  The question, then, is did this 
significant change in the political dynamics of the leadership of the major regime member states 
enable the regime to more readily adopt a more cohesive policy choice regarding use of force in 
Kosovo (in comparison to Bosnia)?      
Due to the significant change in national leadership, the Kosovo case thus provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the perceptual lenses and ideological belief structures 
of individual political leaders outside the traditional context of domestic politics and policy (and 
make a comparison to the Bosnia case study) using the same framework of analysis developed in 
the previous case study.  A similar model may be utilized in order to determine the belief 
typologies of the leaders of the four major member states within the transatlantic security regime 
during the Kosovo crisis.  As described in the previous chapter, the neo-isolationist group 
identified by Posen and Ross in the United States corresponds with a “non-intervention” 
typology within the transatlantic regime.  Similarly, their selective engagement group 
corresponds to a “limited intervention” typology.  And finally, the American cooperative security 
group corresponds to an “active intervention” typology in transatlantic security policy making.  
The primacy group is non-existent in this particular case study.  Table Four outlines the various 
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As in the Bosnia case study, each of the leaders of the four major regime members had 
strong political/ideological core values that appear to translate into their varying positions on 
military intervention during the crisis in Kosovo.   The key members of each typology are as 
follows.  Interestingly, the non-intervention typology during the Kosovo crisis did not include 
any of the four major leaders.  The limited intervention typology included French President 
Jacques Chirac and German Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  The active 
intervention typology included U.S. President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
Also interesting to note is that, unlike during the Bosnia crisis, the Kosovo crisis saw no change 
in government leadership of any of the “big four” (although the Schröder government began the 
crisis in transition from the Kohl government).  
The foreign policy of the Blair government exhibited some continuity with that of John 
Major’s Conservative government.  However, it is quite distinctive on topics such as the concept 
of an international community, humanitarian intervention, morality in world politics, and 
Britain’s international role—including relations with other European countries and the EU.  
During the Kosovo conflict, Prime Minister Blair’s “doctrine of the international community” 
speech in Chicago (April 1999) outlined the issues that his government placed greater 
importance on in British foreign policy than had his predecessor (or indeed most of his 
predecessors).489  In the speech, he posited the existence of an international community, and he 
argued for spreading “our values” of liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and an open society 
and suggested reforming the UN Security Council.490  The Blair government has indicated a 
serious commitment to strengthening the rules and values of the international community in a 
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series of measures, including pursuing the following: reducing poverty and debt in developing 
countries, and supporting the establishment of an international criminal court.   
 However, the core of Prime Minster Blair’s Chicago speech was a plea for a modification 
of the principle of non-intervention in international affairs that he linked to the ruin brought on 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia by Slobodan Milosevic and on the people of Iraq by 
Saddam Hussein.  The rationale for, and timing of, his proposal was certainly meant to not only 
bolster the legitimacy of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo—but also to prepare for 
future cases where he deemed intervention was necessary (like Iraq).  Blair argued for a new 
framework permitting intervention in cases of genocide, to deal with cases of “massive flows of 
refugees,” and when regimes “are based on minority rule” as in the previous case of South Africa 
(or Iraq).491  These far-reaching proposals marked a major break with the traditional “rules” of 
international relations and use of military force.   
 One of the most striking characteristics of the approach of the Blair government’s 
approach to foreign policy is the concept of moral righteousness—as is evident in the response to 
ethnic cleansing by the Serbs in Kosovo.  The stance of the Blair government on intervention in 
Kosovo owed much to the passionately held view that it was a vital test of a commitment to 
protect human rights and defend civilized values.  This commitment, which is a core element in 
the pledge by the Blair government for the UK to be a “force for good in the world,” was 
espoused in the early months of the government and reiterated in the British Strategic Defense 
Review of 1998.492  In September 1999, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook commented that in cases 
such as Kosovo: “To know that such atrocities are being committed and not to act against them is 
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to make us complicit in them, and to be passive in the face of such events is to make it more 
likely they will be repeated.”493  These comments made by Blair and Cook encapsulate the 
philosophical, political, and policy foundations of the “active interventionists” of the political 
left.  And in the Kosovo conflict, the Blair government was particularly effective in advancing its 
humanitarian and international agenda—and thus influencing regime policy.     
Using the measurements discussed previously, the political/ideological typologies may be 
placed within the parameters of the dependent variable in a ratio manner: 0-2=non-intervention 
typology; 2.1-5=limited intervention typology; and 5.1-8=active intervention typology.  Thus, 
President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder fall within the limited intervention typology; and 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair fall within the active intervention typology.  Of 
particular interest in this case is the fact that Chancellor Schröder and the German government, 
despite having a very strong leftist coalition in power, remained in the “limited intervention” 
bloc (which is traditionally more right-leaning).  This may be explained due to the unique 
domestic situation within Germany and the German population’s traditional pacifism.  The 
German government certainly desired and supported a more active intervention in Kosovo, but it 
was reluctant to openly support such a position due to domestic pressures (which will be 
discussed later).  This is a clear case of a government or government leader being constrained in 
personal beliefs/ideology by domestic pressures.  Additionally, Schröder’s government was also 
in support of a more active/robust intervention conducted by other nations but without German 
participation.  In other words, official German national policy was in support of limited 
intervention; but unofficial German regime policy was in favor of more active intervention.     
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Ideologically, then, during the Kosovo crisis, one can see a sort of horseshoe-shaped 
ideological graph in which political leaders may be placed based upon the joining of their 
political beliefs and policy preferences about military intervention and use of force during the 
crisis which is identical to the one previously noted for the Bosnia crisis (see below).  A major 
difference from Bosnia was thus a shift in the ideological balance of the leadership of the four 
major regime member states, from somewhat in the middle of the “horseshoe” during the Bosnia 
crisis to further left during the Kosovo crisis.   
 
      Active Intervention                                 Limited Intervention 
            (Pres. Clinton. P.M. Blair)                 (Pres. Chirac, Chclr. Schröder494) 
 
“Leftist”          “Rightist” 
Political Ideology       Political Ideology 
 
           
          Non-intervention                Non-intervention 
    
 
 
Similar to the Bosnia crisis, policy core beliefs clearly came into conflict during the crisis 
in Kosovo.  In competition this time, however, were the limited interventionists’ core beliefs of 
maintaining the Westphalian concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity versus the 
active interventionists’ core beliefs of upholding the Wilsonian concepts of human rights and 
self-determination.  Unlike during the Bosnia crisis, no major regime members state leaders fit 
the non-intervention typology, and this fact may very well have played a strong role in the much 
quicker decision to use military force as well as the stronger regime cohesion at the outset of the 
crisis.   
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Similar to Bosnia, both groups protected their normative core beliefs by making 
adjustments in secondary (policy core) aspects of their belief systems, and this may be why the 
“least common denominator” of limited intervention evolved as regime policy.  It required the 
least amount of change (in terms of secondary beliefs) on behalf of the limited interventionists 
and active interventionists.  It is clear, based on this analysis, that not only did each major 
political leader possess his own set of belief structures regarding the issue-area but that the 
change in leadership (and therefore belief structures) in two of the major leadership positions 
(from the time of the Bosnia intervention) coincided with greater initial agreement and cohesion 
in regime intervention policy.  While similarly (but conversely), the stronger push by the active 
interventionists for policy change later in the conflict coincided with rapidly degrading regime 
agreement and policy cohesion.  
Thus, for purposes of the second case study, the degree of congruence in the ideological 
beliefs/structures of the leaders of the major regime member states also has a strong correlation 
with regime policy congruence and, in fact, also seems to play a relatively strong causal role—
including influencing changes in regime policy over time.  The H5 hypothesis thus should not be 
rejected.    
6.8.7 Independent Variable 6: Domestic Political Pressures and Regime Policy 
Congruence 
It seems logical to assume (as do most theoretical approaches to foreign policy behavior) 
that the more internally “unified” and actor is, the more likely it will succeed in achieving its 
foreign policy goals and objectives.  The Bosnia case study raised interesting questions about 
this premise, and the Kosovo case study explores it further. 
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 The United States 
 At the time of the Kosovo conflict, successive American administrations since Gerald 
Ford had consistently applied the “lesson” of Vietnam: not to deploy ground troops in a conflict 
where large-scale casualties might occur.  The exception (the Gulf War of 1991) was hailed by 
President George H.W. Bush as ending “Vietnam syndrome.”  The Clinton administration 
nevertheless clearly continued to operate on the basis that significant American casualties would 
not be tolerated and (as discussed earlier) thus began the Kosovo crisis with a firm position 
against the use of ground troops.  On May 18, however, nearly two months into the war and in 
the face of mounting criticism over the administration’s declared position against ground troops, 
Clinton announced, “We have not and will not take any option off the table.”495  
 Maintaining regime unity was certainly one reason for the U.S.’s reluctance to give the 
ground force option serious consideration until later in the conflict.  But there is abundant 
evidence to suggest that the Clinton administration saw the deployment of ground forces to the 
area as crossing a risky political threshold on the domestic front as well.  President Clinton was 
not really vulnerable to being removed from office (despite his impeachment), but he did have to 
worry about losing control of the decision-making agenda in Washington to the Republican-
controlled Congress.  Since he was in his second, final term of office, Clinton also did not have 
to worry about reelection, but he did have to contend with congressional involvement (some 
might say “meddling”) in Kosovo policy and the uncertainty that brought.  As a result, he was 
ultimately willing to move toward the ground force option but only after it appeared that not 
using ground troops would lead to a terrible national foreign policy failure.  The cost of such a 
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failure for American (and NATO) prestige and Clinton’s own political legacy were thus 
considered intolerable.    
 During the war, the domestic political threshold between supporting air power and 
resisting ground troops was clear in both public opinion and congressional sentiment, which the 
administration recognized explicitly.  According to one U.S. official involved in the crisis, “The 
administration was operating on the assumption that ground troops would raise this to a new 
level, and we hadn’t prepared the public for that.”496
President Clinton’s close attention to public opinion posed particular dilemmas with 
regard to Kosovo.  On the one hand, both the Gulf War and Bosnia had shown that once 
American forces were committed (and if they had the backing of the international community), 
the public traditionally rallied behind them and the president’s leadership.  But on the other hand, 
until they were deployed, that endorsement was either absent, uncertain, or even opposed by at 
least a substantial minority (if not actual majority) of Americans.   
The American public’s attitudes on Kosovo were muddled and divided, and, like Bosnia, 
a significant portion of the population seemed fairly apathetic, even in the latter stages of the air 
war.  Most Americans did not believe that any vital American interests were at stake but also 
believed that U.S. involvement in Kosovo was morally appropriate.  Gallup polls taken in 
February and March 1999 showed that the public was relatively supportive of NATO air strikes 
at the outset of the conflict (about sixty percent favoring) but was evenly split over the U.S. 
participating in them (43 and 46 percent favoring and 45 and 43 percent opposed, 
respectively).497  A slightly larger number believed that the U.S. had a “moral obligation to help 
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keep the peace in Kosovo” (52 and 58 percent agreeing and 43 and 37 percent disagreeing, 
respectively).498   And a fairly large majority believed that the U.S. had no vital national interests 
in Kosovo (55 and 50 percent versus 37 and 42 percent, respectively).499  Polls for ABC News 
taken later in the year in April, May, and June, however, found that narrow minorities (56, 54, 
and 55 percent, respectively) supported U.S. military involvement (with 41, 42, and 41 percent, 
respectively, believing that intervention would be a mistake).500  Other surveys found that most 
Americans supported air strikes against Serbia.501  Although a majority even supported the use of 
American ground troops to force a resolution to the conflict, this disappeared if any casualties 
occurred (something both rather unavoidable and strangely puzzling in public opinion).502   
 The surveys revealed an American public (to the extent that it was paying attention to 
Kosovo) that endorsed a limited U.S. military action for humanitarian reasons.  That response 
was a function partly of doubts about the merits of intervention where national interests are not 
clearly at stake and partly of concerns about casualties.  Such mixed public reactions strongly 
contributed to Clinton’s decision to wage the bombing campaign at no lower than 15,000 feet 
and (initially) to rule out any use of ground forces in order to minimize U.S. casualties.  These 
decisions were also, however, a result of discordant political reactions in Washington.  The 
administration feared that any escalation would spark a national debate over the war and 
embolden anti-war members of Congress, who would feel more confident in challenging the 
President’s policy.  “As the air campaign got underway,” noted Wesley Clark in his memoirs, 
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“political considerations came to dominate Washington.”503  It was not public opinion primarily 
but the prospects of congressional intervention that caused the administration the most domestic 
political difficulty regarding Kosovo.   
 Thus, politically, Kosovo became almost a sort of proxy for the conflicts between 
President Clinton and the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress.  Uncertainty over what Congress 
would do about the question of escalation put the administration in a difficult position.  
Republican congressional leaders even derisively labeled the conflict the “Clinton-Gore War.”  
Political tensions peaked in late April and early May 1999 when the House of Representatives 
voted to require congressional approval for the use of ground troops and deadlocked on a vote 
authorizing U.S. involvement in the air war (which was ultimately broken by a single deciding 
vote).   
The most important short-term factor shaping the U.S. domestic influence on its Kosovo 
policy was probably the President’s impeachment.  The Lewinski scandal and the independent 
counsel investigation by Kenneth Starr had dominated the news in 1998.  Allegations that 
Clinton’s foreign policy was an imitation of the film Wag the Dog plagued the President 
throughout the year, undermining the political credibility of U.S. military strikes against 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq.  However much these charges lacked evidential support, Clinton’s 
preoccupation with the scandal contributed to a sense of stasis that surrounded administration 
policy on Kosovo during 1998 and assisted Secretary of State Albright’s taking a lead role in 
formulating a more aggressive U.S. policy.504   
 The impeachment and partisan and institutional conflict of the late 1990s were more 
delayed rather than determined administration action on Kosovo.  The war offered Clinton a 
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chance to put impeachment behind him and regain some of the leadership authority he had lost 
during the scandal.  Democrats were naturally reluctant to dissent from administration policy, 
whereas Republican Party divisions (ideological, strategic, tactical, and bicameral) were 
significant enough to preclude any concerted resistance or coherent alternative to the 
administration’s developing Kosovo policy.  
 While the likely outcome of any congressional vote on the use of ground troops is unclear 
and was never actually tested, a congressional vote on this escalating step would clearly have 
presented a political risk to the President.  If air strikes alone could not gather majority support in 
the House of Representatives, it is doubtful that the more dangerous ground force option would 
have.  More importantly, the President had a strong interest in avoiding the uncertainty of a 
congressional vote in the first place.  The safer political option was to keep the use of force 
below the ground troops threshold, thereby avoiding domestic challenges (both in Congress and 
in public opinion) to his policy that would have been produced if that threshold had been 
crossed.  It was only when the administration realized that it risked actually losing the war 
altogether that the President was willing to accept the political risk of escalation.  Thus, even 
more than in the Bosnia case study, domestic political pressures not only constrained U.S. policy 
goals and decisions but also actually played a strong role in determining them.   
 
United Kingdom 
 From the beginning of the transatlantic security regime’s deliberations over what should 
be done about the civil conflict in Kosovo, the United Kingdom was a persistent advocate of the 
use of force.  In fact, at no time in the months preceding the war or during the air campaign itself 
did the British government demonstrate even a hint of reluctance to employ military force.  The 
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UK was the first NATO member to suggest the use of force, and by August 1998, the British 
cabinet agreed to play a major role in any NATO action, including the deployment of a large 
ground force.505  During the war, the UK was the only regime member consistently ready and 
willing to support a ground invasion to achieve NATO’s stated objectives. 
 In early April, General Clark briefed Prime Minister Tony Blair on the disposition of 
Serbian forces in Kosovo, the ongoing expulsion of Kosovar Albanians, and the effects of the 
two-week old air war underway.  The briefing apparently solidified Blair’s already strong 
support for a ground invasion of Kosovo.  According to Clark, the “British were leaning hard to 
push ahead for planning the ground option.  The Prime Minister was determined to do all 
required to win.”506  On April 21, two days before the NATO summit, Blair flew to Washington 
to meet with Clinton administration officials to press the case for a ground invasion.507  On May 
20, while doubts over the air campaign’s effectiveness increased, British Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook flew to Washington to again lobby for escalating the conflict.  Despite failing to 
convince its allies, the British government went so far as to call up 30,000 army reservists for 
possible duty in a ground war in Kosovo.508      
An important reason for Prime Minister Blair’s greater willingness to escalate the conflict 
was certainly his insulation from the kinds of domestic political pressures faced by his 
counterparts in the other major regime member states.  Unlike his counterparts in the U.S., 
France, and Germany, Prime Minister Tony Blair did not have to balance uncertain domestic 
political considerations against the UK’s commitment to NATO action.  The British commitment 
of forces to Kosovo was popular both with public opinion and with rival political parties.  
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Traditionally in the UK, it had been Blair’s Labor Party that had opposed to the use of military 
force.  Indeed, the party’s support for the Gulf War in 1991 had caused a small internal rebellion.  
But if there was opposition to the Kosovo war within the Labor Party, it remained relatively 
quiet.     
There were thus no major, mainstream political disagreements over the Kosovo crisis 
during the lead up to the war from October 1998 to March 1999 or over course of the bombing 
campaign itself.  The day before the air war began, even the opposition Conservative Party 
offered “wholehearted support for the British force who (sic) might have to take part in the 
NATO action.”509  General support from all the major British political parties continued 
throughout the air campaign.  As late as April, the Conservative Party opposition made it clear 
that, “We continue support the government.  We continue to believe that it was right to take 
action against the regime that has inflicted so much terror on those whom it regards as its own 
citizens.”510  Overall, the opinion of the center-left tended to be in favor of any action that could 
prevent ethnic cleansing and that would deal decisively with the dictatorship in Belgrade, while 
center-right opinion was more skeptical about humanitarian intervention.511  This near reversal 
of traditional positions regarding military action had the effect of dampening political criticisms 
during the course of the operation.   
Given that the Kosovo crisis was far away from the UK and did not appear to have any 
strategic importance beyond the humanitarian principles involved, there was great public 
curiosity about the campaign but not an enormous amount of public interest at stake in it.  But, 
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like the U.S. public, while the British public was generally supportive of the war, it was also 
highly critical of the possibility of British casualties.  
The government and Prime Minister’s handling of the crisis received high praise from the 
public throughout the crisis, but Blair’s eagerness to pursue the option of deploying ground 
troops was certainly not shared by the British public.  In March 1999, 62 percent of those polled 
disagreed with the statement that Britain should send ground troops into the conflict and only 26 
percent agreed; in April, the figures were 43 and 47 percent, respectively.512  Support was strong 
for the air war, however, as in polls conducted throughout the war, public support generally 
weighed in at 58 to 72 percent supporting the air war.513  When asked how many British lives 
would be worth losing to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, however, in repeated polls, 45 to 
56 percent said “none,” while most others indicated very low numbers (less than 100) or “don’t 
know.”514  Thus, it seems that, in stark contrast to President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair was 
able to conduct British policy on Kosovo with little domestic constraint.  However, the caveat is 
that the British public’s and Parliament’s apparently higher support for the war was never 
seriously questioned, as NATO never had to follow through on its threat to launch a dangerous 
and expensive ground invasion. 
 
France 
 Unlike the British government, which enjoyed a large majority in Parliament and could 
depend on the support of the two major opposition parties and the British public, the French 
executive under President Jacques Chirac faced possible domestic division at two levels: 
                                                 




between the President (Chirac) and the government (led by Socialist Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin) and from French public opinion.   
The former situation, which the French call cohabitation, certainly seemed as if it could 
cause serious internal division over a serious an issue such as going to war.  Aside from 
Socialists, Jospin’s cabinet also contained Communists, Greens, and members of the small but 
influential left-wing Citizens’ Movement (MDC).  The Communists and MDC, in particular, 
were generally pro-Serb and adamantly opposed to the war.  The Socialists and Greens, while 
having initial misgivings, decided to support the war on humanitarian grounds.515   
The main criticism over France’s role in the Kosovo conflict came from within the major 
political parties, French intellectuals, the right-wing National Front Party, and small groups on 
the far-left.  Divisions over the war in mainstream parties tended to reflect a deeper split between 
“sovereigntists” (who want to maintain France’s autonomy in international affairs) and 
“internationalists” (who are more concerned with France’s role and participation in international 
institutions).516  The latter formed the majority opinion within the Socialist Party, the parties of 
the center-right, and the Gaullist RPR (Rassemblement pour la République), while the 
Communists, the MDC, National Front, and some traditional Gaullists espoused the 
“sovereigntist” position.517  The forces of the sovereigntists within both the government and the 
opposition never gained enough strength to seriously challenge the Kosovo policies adopted by 
President Chirac, however.    
French public opinion appeared even more ready than the government to prosecute a war 
(air or ground) against Serbia.  Support for air strikes in France was reported as between forty 
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percent early in the campaign to a high of 72 percent in April; significantly, support for use of 
ground troops was also relatively high, fluctuating between 47 and 68 percent.518  Like public 
opinion in many Western countries, the French public’s backing for NATO action against Serbia 
appears to have been more an emotional response to the human rights abuses than due to 
strategic or political reasons, as the support increased after reports of such abuses by the Serbs.  
But also like other Western publics, French support for the war was fragile and often 
confused.519        
 
Germany 
 German participation in the NATO air strikes provoked surprisingly little domestic 
political dissent, considering Germany’s generally pacifistic post-Cold War political culture.  
The fact that military intervention occurred under a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens 
seems to have helped contain public opposition.  The Green Party’s traditional views on 
international relations had been grounded solidly in strict pacifism and anti-NATO protest.520  In 
the Kosovo crisis, however, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (the senior Green Party 
member in Schröder’s government) was an unwavering advocate of the use of air power against 
the Serbs.  But what German domestic politics also demonstrated during the crisis was a clear 
threshold between using air power and ground forces.      
The Schröder government was able to portray the war to the German people as a moral 
war for human rights, and this proved a difficult proposition for the political left in Germany to 
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oppose.521  In addition, however, German participation in the NATO air war was also seen as an 
affirmation of the country’s full reintegration into the Western community of nations by many 
German political elites and intellectuals.  This aspect was especially important to the opposition 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which passed a resolution supportive of NATO’s 
intervention at its party convention in April 1999.522  No major political party in Germany 
favored the use of ground troops, however. 
 This favorable political support for limited military intervention in Kosovo was also 
reflected in public opinion.  Among the German public, there was initially broad support for 
NATO air strikes, but this support gradually eroded over time.  The issue of state sovereignty 
and lack of UN Security Council authorization also added to the controversy in the German 
public.  As of April 1999, 63 percent of Germans supported German participation in the NATO 
air campaign, with 34 percent opposed.523  As with the Bosnia case, however, there were striking 
differences between former West and East Germany.  Whereas 68 percent of western Germans 
supported the NATO air campaign, only 38 percent of eastern Germans did.524   By late May, 
however, German public support for the war had declined to just 51 percent.525  The 
constitutionality of German participation was even challenged in the Constitutional Court, but 
the Court later dismissed the charges. 
On the other hand, the most consistent and decisive impediment to the escalation of 
NATO’s war in Kosovo to a ground phase was the persistent and vigorous opposition of 
Germany.  And German reluctance can, in turn, be traced to domestic politics.  Specifically, it is 
rooted in Chancellor Schröder’s vulnerability to opposition within his own government and the 
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danger of the Social Democratic Party losing power if NATO proceeded with a ground invasion.  
Nearly everyone in Germany—political left or right, western or eastern, elite or average 
person—opposed a ground war.  This fear led Schröder to make a bold pledge that Germany 
would block any effort by NATO to escalate the conflict with ground forces—regardless of the 
position of the rest of the NATO allies or of the original, publicly stated objectives of the NATO 
intervention.526  Thus, when forced to choose between several of its dominant foreign policy 
beliefs (pacifism versus humanitarian aid and intervention) when the limited NATO military 
intervention appeared to be failing, both the German political leadership and German public 
clearly chose pacifism in the case of Kosovo.     
 
Analysis 
 It is obvious that the degree and character of domestic policy differences within the major 
regime member states did not initially prevent consensus on the use of military force to achieve 
regime objectives regarding the Kosovo crisis.  Regime policy cohesion was also maintained 
(with significant effort) during the air campaign, despite increasing civilian casualties from 
NATO attacks and the general lack of coercive effect that the bombing had on the Serb 
leadership.  However, analysis of domestic influences during this period reveal an important 
aspect that had a crucial impact on regime policy congruence—the importance of domestic 
political variation among the four major regime members, especially in comparison to their 
domestic political situation during the Bosnia crisis.  As General Clark noted, “In all allied 
countries, Kosovo was a domestic political issue, but from different angles.”527   
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Prime Minister Blair was the most thoroughly insulated politically of the four leaders, as 
he was in no danger of being removed from office, and his Labor government was supported by 
such a large majority in Parliament that he did not have to be concerned with interference in 
Kosovo policy from the legislature.  As a result, he had tremendous freedom of action to press 
for a ground assault and all of the risks that this entailed.  Like Blair, President Chirac had a 
significant degree of institutional political leeway in deciding French policy regarding Kosovo, 
but he was still limited by French historical and strategic considerations, as well as a certain 
amount of pressure from public opinion.   
President Clinton was not in danger of being removed from office over Kosovo, so his 
decision-making was relatively free from concerns over his own political future.  He did have to 
worry about congressional activism and opposition, however, which could potentially have 
placed serious restraints on his freedom of action regarding Kosovo.  As a result of these two 
factors, he had a strong interest in keeping the war limited to the air campaign in order to keep 
Congress as quiescent as possible on Kosovo policy.  This helps explain his reluctance to 
condone a ground invasion until it appeared that NATO risked actually losing the war unless it 
escalated.   
Chancellor Schröder was the most vulnerable political leader of the four.  Military 
escalation would have stimulated legislative opposition that would have greatly complicated 
Germany’s relationship with other NATO members and certainly had a negative impact on 
maintaining regime policy cohesion.  Schröder also faced the very real possibility of losing 
power if his coalition government collapsed over the issue (something none of the other three 
leaders had to worry about).  As a result, Schröder was a persistent critic of launching a ground 
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invasion, even going so far as to say that Germany would veto any effort to pursue this option in 
the NAC. 
Underlying the domestic influences on all four regime members was the issue of public 
opinion.  Based on data from a number of different polls, public support for the Kosovo air war 
was strongest in the UK and France, followed by Germany, and then the U.S.  The evidence 
suggests that the British and French publics strongly supported NATO’s intervention, and even a 
ground war would have been supported by a significant proportion of their populations (although 
this would obviously depend on additional factors such as allied and civilian casualties).  
German popular support for the air war was also surprisingly strong, although it declined 
substantially as the air campaign continued.  But at the same time, the German public displayed 
nearly overwhelming opposition to a NATO ground war, with support never moving above thirty 
percent (and support for German participation even less).528  Finally, in the U.S., public support 
was mixed but also dropped later in the campaign; support in the U.S. for a ground invasion was 
quite low.    
Unlike the Bosnia case study, there was no transatlantic “gap” within the regime 
regarding public opinion and the issue of using military force in the conflict.  During the Kosovo 
crisis, public opinion in the U.S. and public opinion in the three major European regime 
members was relatively congruent, with general support for NATO air strikes but a distinct lack 
of support for a ground invasion.  This varied somewhat within individual countries over time 
but not to a high degree across the regime members.   
The second domestic “gap” found in the Bosnia case (between the publics and the 
governments of the major regime member states) was also not found in the Kosovo case.  
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National governmental policy-making regarding Kosovo appears to have been relatively 
congruent with national public opinion and level of domestic governmental cohesion.  The UK 
and France, which had strong domestic political cohesion, were stronger advocates of using 
force.  In the U.S. and Germany, weaker domestic political cohesion translated into higher 
resistance concerning escalation.   
In terms of the variable being tested, for purposes of the second case study, the degree of 
domestic political and public support congruence across the four major regime members has a 
strong correlation with regime policy congruence and (unlike Bosnia) seems to also play a 
strong causal role—including influencing changes in regime policy over time.  The H6 
hypothesis thus should not be rejected and might, in fact, be a causal factor in this case study.  
Further research is necessary to prove this more conclusively, however. 
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7.0  CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 EVALUATION OF THE VARIABLES AND FINAL ANALYSIS 
The two cases examined suggest the diversity of decision-making influences and 
processes when the decision unit is an international security regime comprised of several 
sovereign states—and the sharply divergent outcomes that can result.  A further point is also 
highlighted by these cases.  Foreign policy crises are usually viewed as sequences of events for 
decisions that extend over time.  The time frame leading up to military intervention may be as 
little as a few weeks or months, as in the Kosovo intervention, or it may be as long as several 
years, as the Bosnia crisis demonstrated.  In each of the cases described here, the four 
governments in question made numerous decisions, both domestically and 
diplomatically/internationally.  These two cases thus also illustrate that regime-level policy 
formation—even when seemingly deadlocked for prolonged periods, as in the Bosnia case—is 
not stagnant but instead is dynamic and ongoing.  A key factor to understanding regime-level 
policy formation, change, and cohesion, however, is that (like national foreign policy-making) it 
has to be seen within the context of domestic political contexts.  
These various factors will influence not only regime-level military intervention policy but 
also more general regime security policy in the near future.  They will not, in themselves, 
determine regime security policy content, but policy-makers seeking effective regime-level 
 228 
policies must consider how these factors, both international-level and domestic-level, are now 
shaping and will further shape the transatlantic security environment.    
When the hypotheses were tested against the two cases, some proved to be far more 
relevant (and with a much greater explanatory role) than did others.  A summary of the findings 
appears in Table 6 (below).  The collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility variables, 
in particular, proved generally more useful in understanding collective regime intervention 
policy congruence.  Only two variables (collective threat perception and collective domestic 
pressures) proved to be inconsistent with the evidence in these cases, and neither varied to a 
highly significant degree across the two cases (with collective threat perception rating a weak-to-
moderate influence, and collective domestic pressures rating a moderate-to-strong influence).  
Only one variable (distribution of relative power as influence) was found to be completely 
irrelevant to regime policy congruence.  Of course, this variable, while judged irrelevant here, 
might have an impact under different circumstances, but it would even then be difficult to 
consider it an essential element in regime policy congruence, given the findings here.  Two 
variables (collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility) were judged to be both 
consistent (having the same level of impact) and confirmed (having a strong level of impact) in 
each case, thus proving to be the most reliable explanatory elements in regime intervention 







Table 6: Summary of the Variables 
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7.1.1 International-Level Variables 
The international level of analysis has frequently been the major focus of international 
relations theory, yet international-level variables generally turned out to be the least useful in 
explaining regime intervention policy congruence.  The power as influence variable, in 
particular, turned out to be irrelevant across both cases, and the collective threat perception 
variable turned out to be inconsistent across the two cases.  In realist and neorealist theory, 
comparative power resources has long been considered a defining variable of state interaction: 
the most powerful state is expected to be dominant.  In this study, however, a simple comparison 
of relative power resources did not prove reliably predictive of the outcome of either case.   
While the importance of power in the absolute sense was difficult to judge, the relative 
balance of power (and small changes therein over time) either between the United States and its 
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European allies or among the major European powers seems to have had little or no impact on 
the outcome of these cases.  In neither of the cases did judgments about the relative power 
standings (or shifts therein) seem to be relevant to individual government calculations.   
Shared external threat was judged inconsistent; yet, the two cases do closely resemble 
each other in terms of their threat assessment.  With the end of the Cold War and absence of the 
Soviet Union as an immediate threat, what is most noticeable in the two cases is the difficulty in 
reaching agreement on a shared threat among regime members (although more so in the Bosnia 
crisis).  In both of these interventions, NATO forces were deployed (whether in stability or 
offensive operations) primarily for humanitarian reasons and concerns related to refugee flows.  
Consequently, the overall threat level for these cases was low, since there was no real direct 
military or other security threat to any regime member states—and certainly not to the four major 
member states.  In both cases, the general threat of regional instability seemed to be recognized, 
but it was not sufficient by itself to lead to force regime policy congruence.   
Of the three international-level variables, the one most relevant to regime intervention 
policy congruence was the involvement of an international institution in which all four major 
regime countries were active members.  This obviously means NATO and not the EU.  Indeed, 
the evidence from these two case studies would seem to indicate the more active the role and 
participation of the EU in a given crisis (especially at the expense of NATO), the less likely the 
regime will be to agree on an intervention policy.  Conversely, in both cases, NATO provided a 
format and mechanisms that proved fairly important for moving a common regime policy 
forward.   
The variable’s impact was only judged moderate in both cases, however, due to the fact 
that by itself, it did not seem to be able to drive (or hinder) collective policy-making.  In other 
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words, NATO as an institution was able to help facilitate collective policy formation but only 
when there were other, stronger variables present.  While not a strong facilitator of policy-
making, however, NATO was able to perform a strong policy implementation role for the regime 
in the two cases.  
The general lack of importance ascribed to the international-level variables in these cases 
has several important implications.  It might be argued that the irrelevance of power and the 
moderate value of international institutions seem to indicate the superiority of liberal 
international relations theories (especially neoliberal institutionalism).  But it should be 
remembered that this dissertation deals with diplomatic relations within a security regime—in 
other words, among states that have a predetermined set of common beliefs and interests and 
enjoy typically quite friendly relations with one another.  And where such a dense 
interdependence exists across wide array of issue-areas, it perhaps should not be surprising that 
relative power is not be the most effective indicator of state behavior.                 
7.1.2 Domestic-Level Variables 
In contrast to international-level variables, those centered on domestic political factors 
turned out to have a great deal of explanatory power in these two cases.  Two hypotheses, the 
impact of collective risk analysis and ideological compatibility, were judged confirmed in both 
cases.  And collective domestic pressure had a moderate to strong influence in both cases (being 
stronger in the Kosovo case), demonstrating reasonable consistency.  Overall, this set of 
variables seems especially significant.  
While the importance of each risk factor may be contingent partly on other circumstances 
specific to the context of a given proposed intervention, some general conclusions can be made. 
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The historical evidence of the two cases strongly supports the hypothesis that perceived risk 
analysis can increase or decrease the likelihood of regime intervention policy congruence, with 
the regime more easily able to come to agreement in potentially lesser risk interventions but 
finding it more difficult to come to agreement in potentially greater risk interventions.  In 
addition, several specific factors may be identified that influence the common risk assessment, 
including (but not limited to): type of intervention, expected duration of the intervention, 
expected economic costs of intervention, expected casualties from intervention, and possible 
domestic or international political costs of intervention (or not intervening, in terms of 
credibility).    
The basic argument presented by the fifth variable (ideological compatibility) 
hypothesizes that competing normative ideas and beliefs and the advocacy of these ideas and 
beliefs plays a central role in the outcomes of when, where, and how the transatlantic security 
regime collectively decides to militarily intervene in another country.  The general research 
presented in this dissertation supports this basic hypothesis in both cases.  U.S. and European 
government leaders, officials, and policy elites do hold different normative beliefs about the use 
of military force, and they do engage in intense disputes for public and political support for their 
views—both within their home country and across the regime.  In both cases, each government 
leader (or administration) established his preferences regarding military intervention based to 
some degree on underlying normative predispositions.  Once that preference was established, 
each leader (or group of leaders) engaged in diplomatic and public activity to frame and shape 
information about the crisis in an effort to cultivate support for his advocated policy.  This clash 
of normative beliefs regarding military intervention clearly played out in both cases.  
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As for the last variable, it has long been surmised that internal divisions or strong public 
opposition weaken a government, making it less likely to achieve foreign policy objectives.  The 
same seems to hold true to some degree for policy formulation at a regime level.  While 
decisions regarding the use of military force or military intervention are not made by public 
referendum, Western governments do understand that their publics can be highly sensitive to 
such questions.  It is precisely because of publics’ heightened interest in “high politics” matters 
of war and peace that government leaders are particularly sensitive to the views of their 
constituents.    
The impact of this variable is largely borne out to a strong degree in the Kosovo case, 
wherein public opinion in all four major countries coalesced around regime policy, and wherein 
suggested changes in that policy (i.e. launching a ground invasion) were hindered by heavy 
public opposition.  But the Bosnia case offers some interesting complications.  In that case, there 
was a more significant division between the government of U.S. on one side and the European 
governments on the other, as well as between the American public and European publics.  
Ironically (and perhaps sadly), the transatlantic difference in public opinion had the effect of 
making each side better able to resist any attempt at regime policy change by the other.  Thus, 
while domestic political pressure could not explain the regime policy that was eventually 
adopted, it had a strong explanatory role in the initial lack of regime policy congruence. 
7.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study has sought to contribute to the understanding of the interrelated processes of 
national foreign policy-making and influence in international affairs.  In doing so, this work has 
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contributed to understanding in three additional areas: the use of influence generally in the 
international arena, the behavior of states in an interdependent international security regime, and 
the intricacies of transatlantic relations.  Additionally, however, it has made specific 
contributions to the literature on international relations and foreign policy-making.      
The first significant theoretical contribution of this research is the further demonstration 
of the inherent weakness of distribution of materialist power-based realism and realist threat 
perception arguments.529  Neither fared well in analyzing regime policy cohesion.  First, as 
previously mentioned, realist arguments often fail to fully conceptualize or specify an accurate 
portrayal of what constitutes power, much less what constitutes security or national interests.  
Because the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia did not directly threaten the major regime 
members’ political independence or territorial integrity, the exact nature of threats to their 
security and interests is very difficult to measure with any objective precision.  Power, security, 
and national interests are rather ambiguous with respect to such regional and civil conflicts, and 
scholars and policy-makers alike in a single country will rarely agree among themselves as to 
what constitutes a threat to national security and interests—much less scholars and policy-
makers across different countries within the regime.            
The research presented here also provides additional empirical content to the recent 
scholarship on the role of ideas and foreign policy in liberal democratic states.  Ideas and 
ideological compatibility are critical factors in explaining regime policy congruence.  The 
research presented here suggests that ideology and normative beliefs can and do have an effect 
on policy.  The research here, however, adds an additional element on the role of ideas and 
                                                 
529 See Chapter Four, Sections 1 and 2. 
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beliefs and the ways in which they can influence policy outcomes.  In the existing literature,530 
policy outcomes are seen as a function of how well various individuals and groups can change 
the minds of decision-makers.  In the case studies of this dissertation, however, ideological 
perceptions gained influence through highly charged political battles for public opinion.  In that 
sense, institutional resources and domestic bureaucratic cohesion were important means through 
which normative beliefs about military intervention were (to some degree) “sold” to the publics 
of the four major regime member states.  
7.3 INTO THE FUTURE: RECOMMENDATIONS  AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
REGIME 
As many pundits noted, the Cold War was followed by a “hot peace”—a period of 
regional and global security challenges for leaders of all four countries.  Ironically, although 
Western nations were more secure, instability, disorder, and frequent military operations 
dominated headlines.  Throughout history, states have often established long- or short-term 
political and military ties in order to preserve peace, win wars, or pursue other purposes despite 
seemingly incompatible philosophies, policies, and even values.  Alliances and coalitions have 
varied remarkably, but regardless of characteristics, each member of any multilateral security 
endeavor must make strategic decisions that concern the compatibility of partners, the merits of 
formal versus informal agreements, command and control arrangements, and respective 
contributions.  Domestic goals, ideological links, perceived threats, geographic circumstances, 
anticipated benefits, probable costs or liabilities, individual personalities, and other diversified 
                                                 
530 See Chapter Four, Section 5. 
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factors may affect the formation, configuration, cohesion, utility, effectiveness, and longevity of 
every military coalition, formal alliance, or security regime.   
As the case studies in this dissertation demonstrate, there have been, and doubtless will 
continue to be, deep differences over both policy and process among the four major powers of 
the transatlantic security regime.  Largely, this is due to the fact that the leaders, governments, 
and policy elites of these countries represent different constituencies and thus tend to see the 
same issues from different policy perspectives.  NATO officials, for instance, can (or at least 
should) view a matter of military intervention from the perspective of the Alliance as a whole 
and how that policy will influence overall regional security or stability.  Individual national 
governments and their leaders, however, tend to view the same issues from the perspective of its 
impact on their particular country and constituents, sometime regardless of the overall 
international or regional impact. 
All political leaders act in what they perceive as being in the interest of their 
constituency.  For American national government leaders, their constituency is their country 
first, political party and supporters second, and allied countries third.  For European leaders, 
however, the constituency is their country first, political party and followers second, their fellow 
EU member states third, and other non-EU allies (including the U.S.) fourth.  The interplay of 
these separate and unique interests, viewed and tested in this dissertation through a lens of 
several causal mechanisms, is what will determine the degree of convergence or divergence in 
both U.S.-European relations and intra-European relations in the future.  This dissertation has 
given a brief glimpse (and analysis of that glimpse) into one particular issue-area (multilateral 
military intervention) in which that interplay occurs, and it has attempted to identify causal 
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mechanisms that shape the outcomes of the convergence of these constituencies and the study of 
collective regime policy formation, change, and implementation. 
The operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate the difficulties involved in forming 
and maintaining regime-level policy and undertaking regime-level multilateral military action.  
However, the U.S. and its European allies will continue to face threats to their common interests 
that may necessitate collective action.  As the four largest and militarily most capable regime 
members, the U.S., UK, France, and Germany must therefore increase the exchange of policy 
ideas, intelligence, and operational planning in peacetime.  If U.S. operational planning for 
contingencies outside of Europe is to take greater account of potential European interests and 
contributions, the European allies must also demonstrate in advance that they are both willing 
and able to participate.  Otherwise, future collective regime military intervention policy is likely 
to remain informal and ad hoc.  Decisions about where, when, and how to intervene militarily in 
regional or global crises necessarily call for subjective judgments.  Nevertheless, based upon the 
findings in this dissertation, some guidelines for collective regime intervention may be 
suggested.  
First, military intervention in the absence of highly valued (not necessarily vital) 
collective regime interests is difficult to justify—both to reluctant regime member state 
governments and their domestic populations.  The advisability of armed action is most evident 
when strong political and/or economic interests are at stake for all four major regime members.  
Humanitarian and intangible interests, such as international credibility, may muster immediate 
support, but they are much harder to sustain in the long-term.   
Third, national security planners must balance interests, objectives, and available power 
against risks and costs, taking policy guidance into account, as they search for feasible, suitable, 
 238 
and politically acceptable solutions to security problems and threats.  This process is fraught with 
difficulties at the national level, much less the regime level.  Thus, developing agreed upon 
contingency plans in advance in case of a failure of regime agreement in any one of these areas 
may help facilitate greater acceptance of and cohesion in the overall policy.  NATO’s revitalized 
flexible organizational and operational structures are, once again, an obvious forum for 
development of such planning.   
And fourth, strong public support within the individual regime members ideally should 
precede rather than follow military intervention; but that is not always possible, as seen in this 
dissertation; and such support may be ephemeral at best anyway.  The leaders of all the major 
regime member states therefore must continue to more actively rally and sustain public support 
that may not otherwise be spontaneous or long lasting.  Government leaders should also make 
greater effort to explain and outline reasons and necessities for regime intervention to their 
constituents and never assume such reasons are obvious to their publics or that public support is 
equal across national populations or guaranteed.  
This study contributes most directly to our knowledge of transatlantic relations.  Above 
all, this analysis indicates that issues of collective security policy coordination are—and will 
continue to be—an essential element in the relationship.  In part, this is because there is so much 
interaction among the major regime member states, but also in part because each of them has so 
much at stake in not only their relationship with each other but also in the existing international 
order.  Disagreements will be inevitable, and these disagreements will be important.  The four 
major regime members must find ways to address these differences, for the collective good of the 
entire regime, as well as for regional (and perhaps even international) stability as a whole.    
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The implications for the future of the regime are clear.  As the regime members address 
and interact across an ever-widening range of diverse international security issues (humanitarian 
intervention, terrorism, rogue states, failed states, proliferation of WMD, etc.), there will be 
increasing opportunities for disagreement—as the rift over the Iraq war has demonstrated.  In 
some cases, they may simply agree to disagree, because the stakes of that particular issue or 
crisis do not require a cooperative or coordinated approach.  But in other cases, the regime 
members may decide that collective policy cohesion (even if reluctantly secured, as was the case 
with Greece and Italy in the Kosovo crisis) is essential if certain goals are to be reached…and the 

















Founding Members (1949)   
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, United Kingdom, United States 
 
Cold War Enlargement 
Greece (1952), Turkey (1952), (West) Germany (1954), Spain (1986) 
 
Post-Cold War Enlargement 
Round One (1999): 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland  
 
Round Two (2004): 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
NATO Partner Countries 
Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, 
Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, 
Morocco, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
 
EU Membership 
European Economic Community Founding Members (1957) 
Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
 
EEC Enlargement/European Union Founding Members 
Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain 
(1986) 
 
EU First Round Enlargement (1995) 
Austria, Finland, Sweden 
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EU Second Round Enlargement (2004) 





SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT 
Ranked from Lowest Level of Conflict to Highest 
1) Normative Social Conflict 
2) Peaceful Civil Conflict 
3) Low-level Criminal Behavior/Normal Crime 
4) Organized Crime/Gang Violence/Criminal Networks 
5) Rioting/Disruption/Civil Disorders 
6) Terrorism 
7) Guerrilla War 
8) Low-intensity Conflict 
9) Limited Conventional War 
10) Conventional War (“Full-scale War”) 
11) War of Limited Mass Destruction 
12) War of Unlimited Mass Destruction 
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APPENDIX C 
DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT 
On November 25, 1995, the signatories of the peace accords that negotiators drafted in 
Dayton, Ohio agreed to “recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life” in war-torn 
Bosnia.  Provisions of particular interest were: 
• Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain an independent state that retained Sarajevo as its 
capital and contained two semi-autonomous “entities” 
• The predominantly Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would comprise 
approximately 51 percent of its territory 
• The predominantly Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska would comprise approximately 49 
percent  
• Boundaries in each instance would generally coincide with agreed upon cease-fire lines 
• International peacekeepers would patrol a narrow buffer zone between the two “entities” 
and secure a corridor within the Gorazde salient 
• All armed forces “not of local origin” were to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
within thirty days (except for international peacekeepers) 
• All indigenous forces were to remain within designated locations and demobilize assets 
that prescribed facilities could not accommodate 
• All armed civilian groups were to disband 
• All refugees had the right to return home without risk of harassment, intimidation, or 
persecution for ethnic, religious, or political reasons.531 
 
                                                 
531 Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement Fact Sheet (Washington: U.S. Department of State, December 11, 
1995).   
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APPENDIX D 
DISTRIBUTION OF REGIME POWER OVER TIME532
D.1.1 Part One: Measured as Combined Economic and Military Power  
1992 
Group Total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Billions = $10,039.12 
Group Total Military Spending (MS) in Billions = $401.19 
 
France: (GDP=1,270.5)/(10,039.12) + (MS=37.4)/(401.19)  
= (.127+.093)/2 = .11 (11%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=1,774.9)/(10,039.12) + (MS=35.2)/(401.19)  
= (.177+.088)/2 = .1325 (13.25%)  
 
United Kingdom: (GDP=1,048.02)/(10,039.12)+(MS=41.7)/(401.19) 
= (.104+.104)/2 = .104 (10.4%) 
 
United States: (GDP=5,945.7)/(10,039.12)+(MS=286.89)/(401.19) 




Group Total GDP in Billions = $10,626.4 
Group Total MS in Billions = $395.6 
 
France: (GDP=1,348)/(10,626.4) + (MS=37.2)/(395.6) 
 = (.127+.094)/2 = .1105 (11.05%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=1,807)/(10,626.4) + (MS=31.8)/(395.6)  
 = (.17+.08)/2 = .125 (12.5%) 
                                                 
532 All data from The Military Balance (London: Oxford University Press, 1993-2004).  
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United Kingdom: (GDP=1,100.4)/(10,626.4) + (MS=34.2)/(395.6) 
 = (.104+.086)/2 = .095 (9.5%) 
 
United States: (GDP=6,374)/(10,626.4) + (MS=292.4)/(395.6) 




Group Total GDP in Billions = $10,924.4 
Group Total MS in Billions = $385.88 
 
France: (GDP=1,329.3)/(10,924.4) + (MS=35.9)/(385.88) 
 = (.122+.093)/2 = .1075 (10.75%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=1,834.9)/(10,924.4) + (MS=36.3)/(385.88) 
 = (.168+.094)/2 = .131 (13.1%) 
 
United Kingdom: (GDP=1,023.3)/(10,924.4) + (MS=34.88)/(385.88) 
 = (.094+.09)/2 = .092 (9.2%) 
 
United States: (GDP=6,736.9)/(10,924.4) + (MS=278.8)/(385.88) 




Group Total GDP in Billions = $11,796 
Group Total MS in Billions = $397.6 
 
France: (GDP=1,538)/(11,796) + (MS=48)/(397.6) 
 = (.13+.121)/2 = .1255 (12.55%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=1,908)/(11,796) + (MS=41.8)/(397.6) 
 = (.162+.105)/2 = .1335 (13.35%) 
 
United Kingdom: (GDP=1,104)/(11,796) + (MS=34.2)/(397.6) 
 = (.094+.086)/2 = .09 (9%) 
 
United States: (GDP=7,246)/(11,796) + (MS=273.6)/(397.6) 




Group Total GDP in Billions = $12,900 
Group Total MS in Billions = $382.3 
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France: (GDP=1,400)/(12,900) + (MS=40.6)/(382.3) 
 = (.109+.106)/2 = .1075 (10.75%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=2,100)/(12,900) + (MS=33)/(382.3) 
 = (.163+.086)/2 = .1245 (12.45%) 
 
United Kingdom: (GDP=1,300)/(12,900) + (MS=37.4)/(382.3) 
 = (.101+.098)/2 = .0995 (9.95%) 
 
United States: (GDP=8,100)/(12,900) + (MS=271.3)/(382.3) 




Group Total GDP in Billions = $13,900 
Group Total MS in Billions = $397.2 
 
France: (GDP=1,400)/(13,900) + (MS=37.1)/(397.2) 
 = (.101+.093)/2 = .097 (9.7%) 
 
Germany: (GDP=1,900)/(13,900) + (MS=31.1)/(397.2) 
 = (.137+.078)/2 = .1075 (10.75%) 
 
United Kingdom: (GDP=1,400)/(13,900) + (MS=36.9)/(397.2) 
 = (.101+.093)/2 = .097 (9.7%) 
 
United States: (GDP=9,200)/(13,900) + (MS=292.1)/(397.2) 
 = (.662+.735)/2 = .6985 (69.85%)   
 
D.1.2 Part Two: Measured as Military Power Only 
1992 
Group Total Military Spending (MS) in Billions = $401.19 
 
France: (MS=37.4)/(401.19) = .0932 (9.32%) 
 
Germany: (MS=35.2)/(401.19) = .0877 (8.77%)  
 
United Kingdom: (MS=41.7)/(401.19) = .1039 (10.39%)  
 





Group Total MS in Billions = $395.6 
 
France: (MS=37.2)/(395.6) = .094 (9.4%) 
 
Germany: (MS=31.8)/(395.6) = .0803 (8.03%) 
 
United Kingdom: (MS=34.2)/(395.6) = .0865 (8.65%) 
 




Group Total MS in Billions = $385.88 
 
France: (MS=35.9)/(385.88) = .093 (9.3%)  
 
Germany: (MS=36.3)/(385.88) = .0941 (9.41%) 
 
United Kingdom: (MS=34.88)/(385.88) = .0904 (9.04%) 
 




Group Total MS in Billions = $397.6 
 
France: (MS=48)/(397.6) = .1207 (12.07%) 
 
Germany: (MS=41.8)/(397.6) = .1051 (10.51%) 
 
United Kingdom: (MS=34.2)/(397.6) = .086 (8.6%) 
 




Group Total MS in Billions = $382.3 
 
France: (MS=40.6)/(382.3) = .1062 (10.62%) 
 
Germany: (MS=33)/(382.3) = .0863 (8.63%) 
 
United Kingdom: (MS=37.4)/(382.3) = .0978 (9.78%) 
 





Group Total MS in Billions = $397.2 
 
France: (MS=37.1)/(397.2) = .0934 (9.34%) 
 
Germany: (MS=31.1)/(397.2) = .0783 (7.83%) 
 
United Kingdom: (MS=36.9)/(397.2) = .0929 (9.29%) 
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